Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970: The Tilt Towards the Soviet Union

1980 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 214-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Garver
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Table Tennis ◽  
Warsaw Pact ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The U.S

It has become conventional wisdom that the U.S.–Chinarapprochementwas a result (from the Chinese side) of Beijing's fear of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the border confrontation which developed rapidly in the months after the clashes at Zhen Bao island on the Ussuri River in March 1969, are seen as exacerbating Chinese fears of Soviet attack.1 These fears had emerged during the Cultural Revolution when Moscow began insinuating that it might intervene in China in support of the anti-Maoist, “healthy forces.” 2 It was in hopes of deterring possible Soviet invasion, surgical strike, or intervention – so the argument runs – that Beijing wanted to improve relations with Washington. By establishing more cordial relations between Beijing and Washington, the risks which Moscow would assume in making a decision to attack China would be increased. Soviet-American détente would, conceivably, be endangered. The possibility of a Soviet-American confrontation arising out of such a Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out. This added increment of uncertainty about the U.S. response to a Soviet attack on China would be useful in preventing such an attack. Thus, it is concluded, in November 1968 Beijing moved to reopen the talks with the U.S. at Warsaw as a first step towards substantially improving Sino-American relations. Two years after the clashes at Zhen Bao the U.S. table tennis team arrived in Beijing in April 1971. A snowballing series of events rapidly unfolded, culminating in the 15 July 1971 announcement of Henry Kissinger's visit to China and President Nixon's impending visit

When the Levee Breaks: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1967–1970

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mircea Munteanu
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Warsaw Pact ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Evidence

Romania's position regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the culmination of almost a decade of increasingly autonomous moves vis-à-vis Moscow. Based on new evidence from the Romanian archives, this article paints a more complete picture of Nicolae Ceauşescu's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, placing it in the context of the international system and especially the Sino-Soviet split. Following the invasion, Romania remained just as committed as before to the goal of ensuring its maneuverability on the world scene, especially with regard to sovereignty and independence. Although Romanian leaders tried not to provoke the Soviet Union outright, they did not back down on important issues concerning Sino-Romanian relations and did not embrace Moscow's call for a common Warsaw Pact foreign policy. Romania did agree to certain compromises, but only because Ceauşescu believed that Romania would remain largely unaffected by them.

US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.

Crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Persian Gulf ◽  
The United States ◽  
Persian Gulf War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
Foreign Policy Strategies

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.

Laying Blame for Flight and Fight: Sino-Soviet Relations and the “Yi–Ta” Incident in Xinjiang, 1962

2019 ◽  
Vol 238 ◽  
pp. 504-523
Author(s):  
Charles Kraus
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
Russian Language ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Northern Xinjiang ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Major Flare ◽  
Party State

AbstractIn spring 1962, 60,000 individuals fled from northern Xinjiang into the Soviet Union. Known as the “Yi–Ta” incident, the mass exodus sparked a major flare up in Sino-Soviet relations. This article draws on declassified Chinese and Russian-language archival sources and provides one of the first in-depth interpretations of the event and its aftermath. It argues that although the Chinese government blamed the Soviet Union for the Yi-Ta incident, leaders in Beijing and Xinjiang also recognized the domestic roots of the disturbance, such as serious material deficits in northern Xinjiang and tensions between minority peoples and the party-state. The Chinese government's diplomatic sparring with Moscow over the mass exodus reflected Mao Zedong's continued influence on Chinese foreign policy, despite claims by scholars that Mao had retreated from policymaking during this period.

Perspectives on Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Sheng ◽  
Qiang Zhai ◽  
Deborah Kaple
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Realist Approach ◽  
The Soviet Union

In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967, published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.

10. The U.S. Navy in the Twenty-First Century

2018 ◽  
pp. 110-122
Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Hot Spots ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
First Century ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
The U.S

The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not erase the need for a global U.S. Navy, as events in the Middle East and elsewhere provoked serial crises that led to the dispatch of U.S. naval combat groups to various hot spots around the world. ‘The U.S. Navy in the twenty-first century’ explains how the U.S. Navy continues to fulfill many of its historic missions—suppressing pirates, protecting trade, and pursuing drug runners. It is also a potent instrument of American foreign policy and a barometer of American concern. In addition to its deterrent and peacekeeping roles, the U.S. Navy also acts as a first responder to natural or man-made disasters that call for humane intervention.

The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations

1991 ◽  
Vol 125 ◽  
pp. 55-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
South Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
National Power ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Power Central

Chinese foreign policy is typically a complex mix of bilateral, regional and global considerations shaped by the perceptions and domestic political concerns of various participants in China's decision-making process. One significant factor shaping Chinese foreign policy over the past decade which has not been given adequate attention is Chinese consideration of South Asia, and especially India. India's size, substantial aggregate national power, central geographic position in South Asia, prominent role in the Third World/Non-Aligned Movement, and the determination of its leaders to establish India as the pre-eminent power in South Asia, have given India significant weight in Chinese foreign policy calculations. This includes, I will argue, Beijing's calculations regarding China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.

Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy in Balkan Perspective: Tracking between the Superpowers and Non-Alignment

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 97-113
Author(s):  
John R. Lampe
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
European Trade ◽  
Special Relationships ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
Foreign Ministry

From 1960 forward, Yugoslavia based its independent foreign policy on three “special relationships”, balancing its accommodation with the Soviet Union by close relations with the United States and the new Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Paying special attention to the roles of Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry and the US State Department as well as President Tito, this article addresses three crucial periods in which the intersection of Yugoslavia’s relations with the US, the USSR and the NAM prompted a decisive turn in its foreign policy. In 1961–63, Tito’s support for the NAM damaged its US relations to Soviet benefit. But in 1967–71, NAM indifference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia turned Tito back toward the US, as advocated by his Foreign Ministry. And in 1976-79, Soviet and Bulgarian efforts to coopt the NAM through Cuba’s Presidency prompted a successful rebuff led by Yugoslavia and appreciated in Washington. After 1979, however, Belgrade’s post Tito reliance on economic relations with the NAM members had unintended and damaging domestic consequences, obstructing the Slovenian and Croatian commitment to West European trade while also dividing Bosnian Muslims from Bosnian Serbs.

When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Blight ◽  
janet Lang
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Oral History ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
The Other ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

Drawing on “critical oral history” conferences held after the demise of the Soviet Union, this article seeks to explain why the détente in U.S.-Soviet relations collapsed at the end of the 1970s. Both the U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, had sought to improve bilateral ties, but instead they found that the relationship deteriorated and then broke down altogether after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The article suggests that neither side had a sufficient appreciation of how the other side perceived the relationship. The authors argue that the critical oral history helped officials on both sides to develop a sense of empathy for how the other side viewed its own interests and objectives. Empathy does not imply any sympathy; instead, it merely entails an effort to understand the other side's perceptions and goals. Presenting excerpts from an oral history conference, the authors argue that greater empathy in the policymaking process might have helped to avoid an outcome that neither side desired.

FORUM: Mao, Khrushchev, and China's Split with the USSR: Perspectives on The Sino-Soviet Split

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priscilla Roberts ◽  
Steven I. Levine ◽  
Péter Vámos ◽  
Deborah Kaple ◽  
Jeremy Friedman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Princeton University ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Short Time

This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Lüthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Lüthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Lüthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Lüthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Lüthi's reply to the commentaries.

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