Winds of Change: Assessing China’s Assertive Turn in Foreign Policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (6) ◽  
pp. 880-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nien-chung Chang Liao

The current debate on the question of whether China has become more assertive involves two opposing opinions on Beijing’s foreign policy orientation. This article argues that the key question is whether China is about to change its approach to foreign policy, one which has enabled its “peaceful rise” in recent decades. It examines variations in Chinese foreign policy by developing a set of interrelated indicators of changes in a state’s external behavior. The results reveal a marked increase in China’s military spending and power projection capability, foreign aid, and diplomatic initiatives after the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as an expansion of Beijing’s alliance commitments through the establishment of partnership relationships around the world. These findings not only support the increased assertiveness argument but also indicate a larger transformation in Chinese foreign policy—China is becoming more active diplomatically as part of its quest for great power status.

1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-241
Author(s):  
J. D. Armstrong

If Churchill's aphorism about Russia being ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ was an apt formulation of Western puzzlement about that nation, several further layers of obfuscation would be required accurately to depict Western perceptions of China. Since 1949 a number of conflicting conceptions of China's nature and purpose have vied with each other to gain the allegiance of analysts, governments and the general public alike. There was, for too many years, the China of American demonology: aggressive, expansionist and cruel, conspiring with the USSR to bring about world domination, its implacable rulers brooding malevolently over their nation of docile ants. Even while this notion held centre stage, an alternative perspective was available from such eminent Sinologists as C. P. Fitzgerald and I. K. Fairbank: that China had not undergone such a dramatic metamorphosis under the communists as many believed but was still ‘eternal China’, reproducing the same age-old patterns of behaviour that had persisted with little change through many centuries, if not millennia. Then, during the 1960s a new image emerged: China the ultrarevolutionary power, itself engaged upon a process of radical transformation through the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, while simultaneously acting as the principal inspiration of violent revolution elsewhere in the world. The Sino-American rapprochement soon produced an entirely different perspective: China was now a responsible great power, maintaining a global balance of power in accordance with the Nixon–Kissinger vision of international order.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Barnett

How do American Jews envision their role in the world? Are they tribal—a people whose obligations extend solely to their own? Or are they prophetic—a light unto nations, working to repair the world? This book is an interpretation of the effects of these worldviews on the foreign policy beliefs of American Jews since the nineteenth century. The book argues that it all begins with the political identity of American Jews. As Jews, they are committed to their people's survival. As Americans, they identify with, and believe their survival depends on, the American principles of liberalism, religious freedom, and pluralism. This identity and search for inclusion form a political theology of prophetic Judaism that emphasizes the historic mission of Jews to help create a world of peace and justice. The political theology of prophetic Judaism accounts for two enduring features of the foreign policy beliefs of American Jews. They exhibit a cosmopolitan sensibility, advocating on behalf of human rights, humanitarianism, and international law and organizations. They also are suspicious of nationalism—including their own. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that American Jews are natural-born Jewish nationalists, the book charts a long history of ambivalence; this ambivalence connects their early rejection of Zionism with the current debate regarding their attachment to Israel. And, the book contends, this growing ambivalence also explains the rising popularity of humanitarian and social justice movements among American Jews.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (II) ◽  
pp. 238-244
Author(s):  
Asif Farooq ◽  
Umbreen Javaid

China’s tremendous rise will certainly be one of the major turbulent of the current century. Chinese leadership has already astonished the world with its economic development and active diplomacy. It is apparent that there will be a greater increase in Chinese power, influence, and involvement in regional and global affairs in future decades. We cannot envisage the exact nature of Chinese objectives and intentions in near future, however, we can proclaim that Chinese aims will be more spacious than they now are. Some observers view this increasing Chinese enthusiasm in regional affairs as a step towards regional hegemony, while others regard it as promotion of mutual understandings and economic interdependence. Some regional states are viewing Chinese policies with cautions and concerns have been raised in international community. To discuss and elaborate all these aspects of Chinese foreign policy behavior; the major paradigms like realism, liberalism, and constructivism will be explored respectively.


Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 1162-1183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter C. Ladwig

All three branches of the Indian armed forces have recently articulated the need to operate beyond the country's immediate borders. While the Indian military is highly unlikely to achieve its more ambitious power projection objectives in the medium term, the conventional wisdom that India's traditional foreign-policy orientation precludes military power projection is untenable, especially for an aspiring regional hegemon.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN BRÜTSCH

AbstractEven before the global financial crisis restored the International Monetary Fund's (‘IMF’ or ‘Fund’) political fortunes, the ‘monetary managers’ regained ground in supposedly hostile parts of the world, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa. To shed light on the Fund's appeal to governments that do not need its leverage to put dithering cabinets, unruly coalition partners, or restive opposition forces in line, this article examines the interplay between intergovernmental organisations (IGO) and the ‘master institutions’ of the anarchical society. It builds on classic English School inquiries into the ‘words and deeds’ of agents that define, maintain, and transform international societies; tracks collective efforts to harness international credit and debt; and probes bureaucratic obstinacy and great power management in the Fund's conduct in three member states that differ in terms of their borrowing habits, funding options, and creditor relations. It concludes that, in contrast to its reputation as a technocratic manager of cooperation or an imperial agent of contestation, the IMF's appeal lies in its willingness to act as a diplomatic champion of coexistence.


1980 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 490-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Segal

The notion of a great power triangle composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and PRC, and the “card games” played within this geometric configuration, are now particularly prevalent in the field of international politics. It is the purpose of this analysis to study the relevance of the great power triangle concept for Chinese foreign policy. A primary assumption will be that an understanding of Beijing's previous policies in a tripolar system will be a useful guide to the policies and problems of the present. Therefore we will begin with a review of the development of tripolarity and China's past attitudes. We will then concentrate on some crucial aspects of the triangle, the difficulties facing the Chinese leaders, and some possible policy options derived from our focus on the great power triad.


2021 ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Oleg E. Nepomnin

The article is a continuation of the cycle of theoretical works by Oleg E. Nepomnin (1935–2020) published in previous issues of the “Oriental Courier” [Nepomnin, 2019, 2020, 2021]. Oleg Nepomnin was among the most brilliant theorists of the development of Eastern societies. The author considers the foreign policy doctrine of traditional China as an integral part of China’s social perceptions of the world order. Based on the concepts of “world–cosmos” and “world-society”, the Chinese foreign policy doctrine was based on the fundamental idea of the oneness of the world order. In the “world of men”, world laws were embodied by the Chinese emperor — the Son of Heaven — and Chinese statehood. Next to China and its emperor, there could be no equal states and no equal monarchs. In this view of the world, China had borders and the Celestial Empire had none, implying the worldwide scope of the power of the Son of Heaven. On this ideological basis emerged the foreign policy dichotomy “civilized centre — savage periphery”, or “China — barbarians”. The author examines the origins of this influential concept from antiquity to the fall of the empire in China in the 20th century. A “tribute” system of interaction with other states was a logical continuation of ideas about the world order in China and its place in it. But the author stresses that despite China’s desire to maintain the illusions of a functioning “tribute” system, strengthen the prestige of imperial power and carry out monopolistic state trade with “barbarians”, “barbarian” embassies themselves often arrived in China with purely pragmatic goals: to establish trade, receive rich gifts from the emperor, elevate official status, get investiture and the Chinese title. In fact, China lost its status as the hegemon of the ‘tribute” system and the “Centre of the Universe’ after the Opium Wars in the 19th century. China was relegated to the level of the “sick man of Asia”, although the “tribute system” itself continued to function long after that. Even as the “Chinese world order” rapidly collapsed in the 70–90s of the 19th century, and previous Chinese “tributaries” were turned into colonies and semi-colonies of the capitalist West, Beijing’s rulers clung frantically to the “tribute” system. Up to the fall of the empire, the Manchu rulers could not get rid of the burden of traditional notions of China as the “Centre of the Universe” surrounded by the periphery and “barbarian rebellion”.


Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
Feng Liu

China proposed its “peaceful rise” strategy in 2003 as a signal to the world of its peaceful intentions during its rising process. The strategy is not only a discursive response to the “China threat” theory of the 1990s but also a rational policy choice based on both domestic economic needs and international conditions. In practice, China’s “peaceful rise” strategy highlights four priorities in its foreign policy: major powers, neighboring states, developing countries, and international institutions. Although this strategy is rooted in Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping-a-low-profile” policy principle, it has also experienced necessary adjustments along with China’s increasing power capabilities, as evidenced by China’s assertive turn in diplomacy after 2008. China’s “peaceful rise” strategy will face two challenges in the future. Domestically, the country’s economic growth model and political and social uncertainties might change the direction of its foreign policy. Internationally, the outside world can shape China’s rise as much as China can shape the world.


1995 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 388-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven F. Jackson

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty. Mao ZedongIn the middle of October 1975, a dusty column of South African troops, equipped with armoured cars and helicopters, rumbled north into Angola, further internationalizing the already complex civil war there. The South African attack not only broadened the war, prompting an even greater Cuban intervention, it also posed a dilemma for China, which supported the same Angolan parties as did South Africa: should China follow its policy of tit-for-tat opposition to Soviet expansion world-wide, even if it meant allying with the racist government of South Africa? Or should it follow the opinions of its fellow Third World nations in Africa, even if it led to a Soviet bloc advance? The difficulty China's leaders faced in the autumn of 1975 was one which had hidden origins in the different ways in which China viewed conflicts around the world, a difficulty that had lain dormant for years but which erupted in 1975 into full view, and with disastrous consequences for Chinese foreign policy in Africa. It is, moreover, a discrepancy which continues to exist in China's views of the world today.How does China view conflicts and revolutions in the Third World? How do the Chinese organize their relations with Third World revolutionary organizations and their post-independence governments? This article examines the tensions and shifts of Chinese policy towards two essentially simultaneous revolutionary struggles and their post-independence governments: Angola and Mozambique.


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