What Makes the Good Life Good? An Investigation into the Nature of Happiness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elyse Platt
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
Contemporary Philosopher ◽  
Fred Feldman

My research focuses on the nature of happiness as presented by contemporary philosopher Fred Feldman in his recent work, What is This Thing Called Happiness?(2010). Feldman offers an innovative theory of happiness that suggests happiness is contingent on a subject’s capacity to acquire more pleasure than displeasure in his or her surroundings. Feldman’s model is a valuable contribution to the study of happiness because it calls attention to the power a subject has in determining her own happiness. Like many of his predecessors including Aristotle, Feldman describes the happy life as the Good Life. However, where Aristotle measures the Good Life in terms of virtue, Feldman uses welfare as his metric. A problem with Feldman’s approach is that he rejects Aristotle’s arguments for why happiness is the Good without providing a suitable alternative. In this paper, I address the limitations of Feldman’s model by examining the implications of this omission. I will argue that Feldman lacks a conclusive argument for why the Good Life consists of welfare. Most significantly, Feldman’s account is problematic because it leads to the unusual conclusion that many of us are not in fact pursuing the Good Life for fear of becoming moral monsters. By reintroducing virtue into our description of happiness, and arguments for why happiness is our greatest good, I think that we can rescue contemporary theories of happiness from the repugnant moral conclusions that I have suggested are present in Feldman’s work.

scholarly journals THE IDEA OF THE GOOD LIFE IN ARISTOTLE AND CONFUCIUS

2020 ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
John Gabriel Mendie ◽  
Stephen Nwanaokuo Udofia
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The West ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
Material Things

Man, by nature, desires to live a good and happy life. But often times, the enduring quest for the blissful and delightful, eludes man. This constant questing and concurrent yearning make man restless, until his hopes and aspirations of the good or happy life, are crowned with an éclat. But, can man ever attain or realize this feat in the society? Is the idea of the good life, a mirage, a myth or reality? Even more seriously, what does the good life really entail? Is it predicated on material things, that is, on the mundane? Or is the good life, a kind of utopia, an ideal that seeks to bring to the glare of publicity, the “oughts” of life as the case may be? Since the idea of the good life is something well-defined, does it also imply that there is such a thing as the bad life? If, such exist, what would it consist of? Armed with these cogitations, this paper, attempts an expository-comparative study of the good life, its constitutive elements and its attainability in the thoughts of two distinguished philosophers: Confucius (in the East) and Aristotle (in the West).

Virtue Epistemology and the Democratic Life

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Social Existence ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Life

Integrating insights from the Ancient Greeks (e.g. concerning virtue, eudaimonia, and the original meaning of “democracy”), John Dewey, and recent work in virtue epistemology, this chapter develops a virtue-based defense of democracy, one that conceives of democracy as an inquiry-based mode of social existence. This account of democracy is developed by responding to three common concerns raised against democracy, which the author calls the Irrationality Problem, the Problem of Autonomy, and the Epistocracy Objection. Virtue epistemology can help elucidate the link between democracy and human flourishing by drawing attention to democracy’s potential for cultivating and refining the “intellectual virtues” (e.g. intellectual humility, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, the social virtue of being communicative, etc.) constitutive of the good life.

scholarly journals Philo of Alexandria: A model for early Christian ‘spiritual readings’ of the Scriptures

2015 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul B. Decock
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Spiritual Journey ◽  
Philo Of Alexandria ◽  
Spiritual Exercise ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Human Effort ◽  
Spiritual Reading

Philo of Alexandria represents a Hellenistic tradition of reading the Scriptures in which reading is seen as a spiritual exercise together with other spiritual exercises, like attention, thorough investigation of the issues, self-mastery, detachment, etcetera (see Her. 253; Leg. 3:18), which has as aim the transformation and growth of the person towards the good and happy life. Interaction with the spiritual wealth of the Greek philosophical traditions was seen as a fruitful asset and challenge. This article highlights some of the key themes of Philo’s philosophical or spiritual reading of the Scriptures: the priority of God and of the health of the soul, the importance of human progress, the recognition of one’s nothingness in order to know God, the necessity to choose, human effort and divine achievement, as well as harmony with God, nature and the self as the aims of the good life. Christian spiritual writers, like Origen, found in Philo’s approach to the Scriptures and in his reflections on the spiritual journey a very inspiring model.

Death as a Hermeneutic

Horizons ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
John Carmody
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Global Ethics ◽  
Recent Meeting ◽  
John's Gospel ◽  
The Way

During a recent meeting of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theologians in Graz, Austria, as various speakers discussed the concept of the good life, on the way to preparing a statement on global ethics, I found thoughts of death shifting the horizon within which I was considering the different arguments. Similarly, during recent work on a Jectio divina of John's Gospel, I felt myself drawn to images magnifying the theme, “in him was life,” because I wanted help contending with death. The following brief elaboration of these two experiences may illustrate concretely Nietzsche's dictum that all who philosophize defend themselves. As well, it may expose the roots of a thesis that deeper interpretation is usually religious, because usually we forge it at the crossroads of our contingency and the necessity that there be more. Following the exposition of these two possibilities, I shall suggest a few implications for pedagogy.

scholarly journals Philosophy and the good life

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Hobbs
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Children And Young People ◽  
Ancient Greek Philosophy

This paper considers the implications for education of a reworked ancient Greek ethics and politics of flourishing (particularly as found in Plato), where ‘flourishing’ comprises the objective actualisation of our intellectual, imaginative and affective potential. A brief outline of the main features of an ethics of flourishing and its potential attractions as an ethical framework is followed by a consideration of the ethical, aesthetic and political requirements of such a framework for the theory and practice of education, indicating the ways in which my approach differs from other recent work in the field. I argue that the teaching of philosophy in schools and philosophical approaches to the teaching of other subjects are ideally suited to meet the pedagogic requirements of individual and communal flourishing so understood, contributing greatly both to the understanding of what a well-lived life might be, and to the actual living of it. I further argue that these requirements are not only derived from ancient Greek philosophy but are in turn especially well-served by the teaching and deployment of Greek philosophy itself. My claim is not that Greek philosophy has all the answers, or that other philosophers and philosophical approaches should be excluded; it is simply that Greek philosophy offers rich resources for those seeking to introduce children and young people to philosophy and to foster thereby their flourishing in both childhood and as adults.

scholarly journals Cynicism as a way of life: From the Classical Cynic to a New Cynicism

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 33-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Schutijser
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Value System ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
A Value

In light of the recent revival of interest for philosophy as a way of life, Cynicism has received relatively little attention. Classical cynicism, however, is a particularly rich and valuable school in this respect, offering a philosophy that is before anything else a way of life, combining philosophical reflection, a value system, and a practice of living. The present article articulates classical Cynicism as a philosophy as a way of life along these lines. Additionally, classical Cynicism offers a valuable contribution both to current philosophical investigation and to philosophy’s contribution to the question of the good life. In particular, classical Cynicism gives a number of guidelines for a new cynicism, distinct from and regularly in opposition to common modern cynicism.

scholarly journals Más allá de la polis: la bestia en Aristóteles / Beyond the Polis: Aristotle’s Beast

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuiza Martínez Rivera
Keyword(s):  
Women Workers ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
The Common ◽  
Las Mujeres ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Communicative Abilities

ABSTRACTIn Aristotelian political philosophy, the biological definition of man as a “political animal” functions as the premise upon which the polis can be created. According to Aristotle, man is an animal characterized by rational and communicative abilities that drive him to build communities in pursuit of the “good life.” This definition of human nature presupposes the creation of the polis as the only space where man can fully develop his virtues and live a full and happy life. However, Aristotle’s conception of the polis, only grants political participation within it to individuals that fit this description. This restriction begets the question of who remains beyond the margins of the polis? Beyond the boundaries of this political space remain all those who make life possible in the polis: women, workers, and slaves. Further yet, beyond all economic and social networks, lies the concept that will be the purpose of this article, the “beast,” a human characterized by a lack of political disposition, both in developed instances (like the polis) and the more primitive ones (like a tribe or the home). Following Aristotle’s logic, bestial men are not useful members of the community because they do not fulfill the role of the political animal, as their actions are not guided by the pursuit of the common good. We will argue that as a result, the beast suffers a triple exclusion: political, because he is denied citizenship; social, since he is barred from participating in the community that supports the polis economically; and, biologically for he is excluded from the conceptual group of human.RESUMENEn la filosofía política aristotélica, la definición biológica del hombre como “animal político” funciona como justificación para la creación de la polis. Aristóteles clasifica al hombre como un animal caracterizado por su habilidad racional y comunicativa, capacidades que lo determinan a formar comunidades con miras a la “vida buena”. Esta definición de la naturaleza humana supone la creación de la polis; el único espacio donde el hombre puede desarrollar sus virtudes y vivir una vida plena y feliz. Dentro de esta polis, Aristóteles le otorga participación política solo a los individuos que cum-plen con esta descripción. A partir de esto surge la pregunta: ¿Quiénes quedan al margen de la polis? Fuera de este espacio político quedan todos los que hacen posible la vida en la polis: las mujeres, los trabajadores y  los esclavos. Más allá de estas redes económicas y sociales queda el propósito de este artículo, la “bestia”: los seres humanos caracterizados por su carencia de disposición política tanto en instancias desarrolladas como la polis y las más primitivas como la aldea o el hogar. De esta manera, los hombres bestiales son inútiles para la vida en comunidad ya que no cumplen con su función como animales políticos y sus acciones no están guiadas por un bien común. Se argumentará que a partir de esto que la bestia padece una triple exclusión: la política, al negársele la posibilidad de ciudadanía; la social, al prohibirle la partici-pación en la comunidad que sustenta económicamente a la polis y, por último, la biológica al ser excluido del conjunto conceptual de los hombres.

Tensions Between the Good Life, the Good Profession, and the Good Society

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 667-668
Author(s):  
Isaac Prilleltensky
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Good Society
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document