Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Banner

The British treated Australia as terra nullius—as unowned land. Under British colonial law, aboriginal Australians had no property rights in the land, and colonization accordingly vested ownership of the entire continent in the British government. The doctrine of terra nullius remained the law in Australia throughout the colonial period, and indeed right up to 1992.

Author(s):  
Krystyna Szczepanowska-Kozłowska

AbstractOne form of industrial property right infringement is stocking for the purpose of offering or marketing. This form of infringement appears both in EU legal acts on trademarks or designs, as well as in national regulations, including those concerning patents. What is specific to stocking when compared to other activities comprising the stipulated exclusivity of the holder of industrial property rights is the fact that the literal meaning of “stocking” does not explain whether the infringing party or the warehouse keeper is the entity that places the goods in storage. The structure of industrial property rights as absolute rights would theoretically permit the view that the law is violated by both the entity that accepts the goods for storage and the entity that places such goods in storage. To determine if there is an infringement, it must be established what the goods being stocked are further intended for. It is not without significance that the finding of an infringement of industrial property rights does not depend on fault or awareness. From the point of view of the industrial property law regime, it is difficult to find arguments against this understanding of infringement by stocking. Since the offeror of goods infringing industrial property rights may be held liable even if the goods have not yet been manufactured, it is conceivable that the entity accepting such goods for stocking is also liable. This interpretation of the concept of stocking would certainly correspond to the absolute nature of liability for infringement.In a recent judgment the CJEU confirmed that the warehouse keeper who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trademark rights only creates the technical conditions for trademark use by this third party provided that the warehouse keeper is not aware of that infringement. The CJEU also confirmed that only the person who decides about the purpose of storing the goods can be treated as an infringer. However, the CJEU did not respond to the question regarding whether the warehouse keeper could be treated as an infringer if it pursues the aims of storing the goods at the request of the entity that put the goods into storage.


2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-309
Author(s):  
Neil Maddox

While recognising property in the human body would have its uses, there are objections to granting such rights given the unique nature of the body. One objection is that property serves individualistic and not communitarian values and fails to capture the body’s relational interdependent nature. I contest this objection as it takes an overly narrow view of property as being ‘Blackstonian’ in character, eliding the diversity of property institutions that actually exist. Thus, the usefulness of property law in the protection and management of community resources and the manner in which property is often limited by non-property interests that the law is accustomed to protecting have not been accounted for. I contend that property facilitates cooperative human activity and could potentially provide useful tools for the protection of individual and communal rights in the body. I further contend that, where property rights have tentatively been recognised in human biomaterials, they are not strongly exclusive in character and are consistent with property’s inclusive and communitarian nature in being limited to prevent public harm and by reference tothe non-property interests of other persons and the community.


Author(s):  
J. E Penner

This chapter explains the concept of transmissibility of rights and the power to transfer title to property. The chapter discusses Hohfeld’s adoption of the extinction–creation model of transmissibility and the notion of identity and sameness as it applies to norms. It shows why conceiving of transfer as a kind of ‘directional abandonment’ is incorrect. The chapter concludes that nothing that is known about property rights or the law of property is illuminated by the Hohfeldian analysis of jural relations; indeed many aspects of property law are obscured by it.


2006 ◽  
Vol 78 (9) ◽  
pp. 413-441
Author(s):  
Janko Kubinjec

Legal concept of person is to be constituted, while the legal concept of thing is to be established. Legal concept of thing is a metaphysical category that shall be differentiated from the positive-legal definition of thing as an empirical phenomenon, as well from the natural thing, which is also as an empirical phenomenon. Legal concept of thing is a spiritual phenomenon, which belongs to the field of objective spirit. The thing is the basis for the entire civil law. The wrong conclusion that civil law starts with ownership and ownership with possession, is based on the so called naturalistic error. For the title, the thing is primarily a freedom for the person, while the mortgage is the border with which the owner is confronted. At the point where freedom overflows from person to thing we have erga omnes effect of property rights. It is not possible to clearly and materially differentiate person from the thing without defining the law as the freedom, and without making this distinction, the persons can also be defined as res cogitans. In the property law, the essence is manifested through the human relationship. In the law of the contracts and torts the thing is neglected up to the point where we come to property, and point where property becomes the claim. If, in addition to that, directly natural refutation of things is produced, we are faced with the legal concept of damages. In the authentic law, the succession is always the concept pertaining to things and only in the non authentic law it may be the concept pertaining to persons.


2019 ◽  
pp. 535-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter considers the major intellectual property rights in the UK and the protection the law gives to these rights. It explains the meaning of copyright, patents, trade marks, and design rights, and considers the types of works that might be protected by them. It explains whether the rights need to be registered and if so the process of registration. It examines the time limits for the protection of the various rights and the remedies available for infringement of them. It also considers the protection the law gives to intellectual property via the tort of passing off. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the possibilities of protecting intellectual property rights outside the UK.


Author(s):  
Wian Erlank

Elsewhere in "Rethinking Terra Nullius and Property in Space", I have argued that due to the changing circumstances of access to space by private entities rather than governments, the current legal situation with regard to ownership in space should be reconsidered. As it stands, ownership in space is governed by international law and currently private and even national ownership of celestial bodies is prohibited.While (controversially) arguing for the recognition of private ownership in space, I constantly have to field questions surrounding the pragmatic assertion that since international law and United Nations treaties and conventions prohibit ownership in space, there can be no development that will allow for this. Hence, while not abandoning my purely property law-oriented arguments for recognising private ownership in and on celestial bodies, I will maintain my arguments for property rights in space and analyse a number of differing options available to private entities who would like to acquire property rights in space. As such, I purposefully avoid the maligned terminology of "ownership", and rather look at various other options that still give the intrepid celestial entrepreneur some sort of property right, or even a property-like protection of their interests in space. Some examples include concessions, mining licences, prospecting rights, and certain contractual rights that could benefit from property-like protection.The thesis is that even if ownership of celestial objects is not accepted due to the existence of various problematic dogmatic viewpoints, one would still be able to achieve much the same effect by using other property mechanisms. 


Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter considers the major intellectual property rights in the UK and the protection the law gives to these rights. It explains the meaning of copyright, patents, trade marks, and design rights and considers the types of works that might be protected by them. It explains whether the rights need to be registered and if so the process of registration. It examines the time limits for the protection of the various rights and the remedies available for infringement of them. It also considers the protection the law gives to intellectual property via the tort of passing off. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the possibilities of protecting intellectual property rights outside the UK.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fahmi Rois ◽  
Kholis Roisah

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menjawab perlindungan hukum kerajinan tembaga dan kuningan tumang bernilai seni melalui hak kekayaan intelektual. Penggunaan HKI dalam perberdayaan pengrajin tumang penting untuk meningkatkan daya saing dan mendorong kreativitas. Metode penelitian yang dipakai adalah sosiolegal yaitu dengan melihat hukum dalam konteks sosialnya. HKI penting bagi ekonomi kreatif untuk menghindari pencurian ide dan hak cipta. Namun pengrajin tumang belum peduli dengan HKI kerajinannya. HKI dapat digunakan untuk meningkatkan daya saing dan meningkatkan kreativitas; terdapat beberapa faktor yang menghambat perlindungan HKI kerajinan Tumang. Model pemberdayaan yang efektif adalah dengan melibatkan pemerintah dan koperasi dalam pemberdayaan. Intellectual Property Law Protection on Brass Tumang Crafts This study aims to answer the legal protection of valuable copper and brass Tumang crafts through intellectual property rights. The use of intellectual property rights in empowering Tumang craftsmen is important to increase competitiveness and encourage creativity. This is socio legal research by looking at the law in its social context. Intellectual property rights is important for the economy creative and to avoid theft of ideas and copyrights. However, Tumang craftsmen have not cared about intellectual property rights of their crafts. Intellectual property rights can be used to enhance competitiveness and creativity; there are several factors that hinder the protection of intellectual property rights of Tumang crafts. An effective empowerment model is the involvement of government and cooperatives institution.


2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Megan Richardson

This article begins by describing the current range of intellectual property rights in Australia (statutory and common law/equity), then canvasses recent reforms that seek to address some of the problems raised by new innovation practices. A particular focus of the article is the piecemeal nature of the law reform process which continues to treat the law in this area in a highly compartmentalised fashion. Some tentative proposals for improvement are made at the end.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual propertyrights has long been neglected in debates over the economics ofintellectual property. In a path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what hecalls "collective rights organizations," industry groups that collectintellectual property rights from owners and license them as a package.Merges finds that these organizations ease some of the tensions created bystrong intellectual property rights by allowing industries to bargain froma property rule into a liability rule. Collective rights organizations thusplay a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual propertyrights.There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectualproperty owners and users, however. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs)regularly encounter situations in which one or more companies claim to ownproprietary rights that cover a proposed industry standard. The industrycannot adopt the standard without the permission of the intellectualproperty owner (or owners).How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual property rights iscritically important. Whether or not private companies retain intellectualproperty rights in group standards will determine whether a standard is"open" or "closed." It will determine who can sell compliant products, andit may well influence whether the standard adopted in the market is onechosen by a group or one offered by a single company. SSO rules governingintellectual property rights will also affect how standards change astechnology improves.Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual property rights,there has been surprisingly little treatment of SSO intellectual propertyrules in the legal literature. My aim in this article is to fill that void.To do so, I have studied the intellectual property policies of dozens ofSSOs, primarily but not exclusively in the computer networking andtelecommunications industries. This is no accident; interface standards aremuch more prevalent in those industries than in other fields. In Part I, Iprovide some background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of groupstandard setting in network markets. In Part II, I discuss my empiricalresearch, which demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs even withina given industry in how they treat intellectual property. In Part III, Ianalyze a host of unresolved contract and intellectual property law issuesrelating to the applicability and enforcement of such intellectual propertypolicies. In Part IV, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws placeon SSOs in general, and on their adoption of intellectual property policiesin particular. Part V offers a theory of SSO intellectual property rules asa sort of messy private ordering, allowing companies to bargain in theshadow of patent law in those industries in which it is most important thatthey do so. Finally, in Part VI I offer ideas for how the law can improvethe efficiency of this private ordering process.In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things. First, SSO rulesgoverning intellectual property fundamentally change the way in which wemust approach the study of intellectual property. It is not enough toconsider IP rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actuallyused in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IPincentives in different industries. Second, there is a remarkable diversityamong SSOs in how they treat IP rights. This diversity is largelyaccidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between differentpolicies. Third, the law is not well designed to take account of the modernrole of SSOs. Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when thoseorganizations are serving procompetitive ends. And enforcement of SSO IPrules presents a number of important but unresolved problems of contractand intellectual property law, issues that will need to be resolved if SSOIP rules are to fulfill their promise of solving patent holdup problems.My fourth conclusion is an optimistic one. SSOs are a species of privateordering that may help solve one of the fundamental dilemmas ofintellectual property law: the fact that intellectual property rights seemto promote innovation in some industries but harm innovation in others.SSOs may serve to ameliorate the problems of overlapping intellectualproperty rights in those industries in which IP is most problematic forinnovation, particularly in the semiconductor, software, andtelecommunications fields. The best thing the government can do is toenforce these private ordering agreements and avoid unduly restricting SSOsby overzealous antitrust scrutiny.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document