scholarly journals Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE PETERS
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
World Government ◽  
Global Constitutionalism ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
International Constitutionalism ◽  
The Many ◽  
Domestic Level

The article conceives international (or global) constitutionalism as a legal argument which recommends and strengthens efforts (legal and political) to compensate for ongoing de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. Although the notions ‘international constitution’ and ‘international constitutionalism’ have in recent years served as buzzwords in various discourses, the many meanings of those concepts have not yet been fully explored and disentangled. This paper suggests a specific understanding of those concepts. It highlights various aspects and elements of micro- and macro-constitutionalization in international law, and identifies anti-constitutionalist trends. On this basis, the paper finds that, although no international constitution in a formal sense exists, fundamental norms in the international legal order do fulfil constitutional functions. Because those norms can reasonably be qualified as having a constitutional quality, they may not be summarily discarded in the event of a conflict with domestic constitutional law. Because the relevant norms form a transnational constitutional network, and cannot be aligned in an abstract hierarchy, conflict resolution requires a balancing of interests in concrete cases. Finally, because constitutionalism historically and prescriptively means asking for a legitimate constitution, a constitutionalist reading of the international legal order provokes the question of its legitimacy. This question is pressing, because state sovereignty and consent are – on good grounds – no longer accepted as the sole source of legitimacy of international law. International constitutionalism – as understood in this paper – does not ask for state-like forms of legitimacy of a world government, but stimulates the search for new mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy of global governance.

Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHANNES GERALD VAN MULLIGEN
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Ideal Agent ◽  
Global Constitutionalism ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Global Values ◽  
Foundational Problem

AbstractGlobal constitutionalists argue that the international legal order can only be meaningfully construed as having an objective, value-based purport. There is, however, something hybrid about the constitutionalist argument, as constitutionalists espouse a normative agenda whilst at the same time setting out to ground their approach in positive international law. It is contended that to avoid both this foundational problem and the charge of utopianism, and as a rejoinder to positivistic arguments for the denial of objective purport, constitutionalists are forced to reason along indirect, transcendental lines. Thus, constitutionalists are to be construed as avouching global values as necessary conditions for making sense of existing international legal practice, rather than merely invoking direct, positivistic evidence and/or mere normative arguments to ground their position. Moreover, it is submitted, first, that global constitutionalists would do better by adopting a less objectivist stance as regards global values, as on the ideal-agent theory of value. Second, it is argued that even though there might be room for so-called constitutionalist ‘mindsets’, these fall short of establishing the objective purport of the international legal order. Third, d'Aspremont's positivistic argument contra objective purport is construed as (also) an argument to the effect that the rules and architecture of the international legal order only warrant the existence of Hobbesian interests as necessary conditions for making sense of it. The constitutionalist case for objective purport, then, hinges on the issue of whether constitutionalism is necessitated by considerations as regards the intelligibility of international legal argument, by explanatory desiderata regarding trends in international law-making, and as a viable response to the problems posed by fragmentation, deformalization, and international legal scepticism.

The Nomadic Sense of Law in an International Constitutionalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 234-283
Author(s):  
William E. Conklin
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
History Of ◽  
Nomadic Communities ◽  
Legal Space ◽  
International Constitutionalism

This article examines the place of Nomadic peoples in an international constitutionalism. The article claims that an important element of a Nomadic culture is its sense of law. Such a sense of law differs from a constitutionalism which has privileged fundamental principles aimed to constrain acts of the executive arm of the State. Such a constitutionalism is shared by many contemporary domestic legal orders. Public international law also takes such a constitutionalism for granted. In the focus upon rules to constrain the executive arm of the State, the sense of law in Nomadic communities has slipped through arguments which the jurist might consider inclusive of the protection of such communities. This problem is nested in a legacy which has weighted down the history of European legal thought. The article initially identifies three forms of nomadism. The social phenomenon of nomadism has been the object of juristic commentary since the Greeks and Romans. The image of Nomadic peoples in such a legacy has imagined Nomadic peoples as lawless although the article argues that a sense of law has existed in such communities. Such a sense of law contradicts a State-centric international legal order. Public international law has reserved a special legal space relating to Nomadic peoples. The article identifies four arguments which might be rendered to protect Nomadic peoples in such a State-centric international community. Problems are raised with each such argument

11. Normative Interactions: Implementation and Hierarchy of Norms

2020 ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
Peremptory Norms ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
National Systems ◽  
Domestic Level

This chapter deals with some fundamental realities of international law as a body of legal rules which traditionally requires implementation at domestic level through transposal. In so doing it discusses the traditional theoretical distinction between monism and dualism, as abstract approaches to the relationship between domestic and international legal order. It then tackles the issue of the effects (including direct effects) that international law may have in concrete situations within national systems, as a consequence of, or, in some instances even irrespective of, transposal through national legislation. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the ‘verticalization’ of the international legal order with the affirmation in the second half of the twentieth century of the notion of jus cogens (or peremptory norms) and the effects this has (or might have) within international law and in its relationships with municipal laws.

International Legal Histories as Orders: An Afterword to Martti Koskenniemi’s Foreword

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1115-1119
Author(s):  
Francesca Iurlaro
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Hugo Grotius ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of International Law ◽  
The Many

Abstract In this article I address the question of what Martti Koskenniemi refers to in his EJIL Foreword as Hugo Grotius’ legal imagination – the type of values he was trying to convey and the strategies he meant to pursue while constructing his idea of an international legal order. As a matter of fact, focusing on such an apparently narrow aspect is not just relevant to those with a historical interest in Grotius. It also tells us something about the inveterate relationship between international law and historiographic practices. What I want to suggest here is that the history of international law is not just an a posteriori critical reflection on the international legal order – a subgenre for lovers of intellectual escapism in search of a distraction from the many problems of the contemporary world – but, rather, that one of the many successful projects of international law was (and still is) the ambition to order the world through histories.

The Appeal of the Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public International Lawyers

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Schwöbel
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Global Constitutionalism ◽  
International Legal Order

Global constitutionalism, an idea neither necessarily rooted in nor emerging specifically from international law, has captured the imagination of public international lawyers. Rather than adding to the plethora of suggestions of what a global constitution would and should look like, this article is aboutwhyinternational lawyers are interested in this idea. The literature so far has largely omitted a stocktaking of what it is that is so appealing about constitutionalism and who is particularly partial to it. When discussing global constitutionalism, international lawyers commonly assume one of two orientations: either a normative orientation (this is the type of constitutionalism we should have) or a descriptive orientation (this is the type of constitutionalism we already have). The former mostly concerns visions for “a global constitution” while the latter often concerns ideas of the process that will at some point culminate in “a global constitution;” this process is commonly referred to as “constitutionalization.” The recent co-authored book by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein,The Constitutionalization of International Law, sets out to go further. It aims to see “what a constitutional international legal order could look like.” In a sense, they have therefore adopted a third orientation: one that takes the descriptive case of constitutionalism as a given and theorizes about further normative aspects in regard to the international legal order.

The Unsolved Riddle of International Constitutionalism

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-110
Author(s):  
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
International Constitutionalism ◽  
Fragmentation Of International Law

AbstractThe extremely diverse contributions present in the volume edited by Nicholas Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism: International Law and European Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 377) are contextualized through an exploration of some of the different strands of international legal doctrine that have been making use of the constitutionalist vernacular in recent years. These strands include among others, the growth in European Union-related constitutionalist discourse and the emergence of a transnational comparative legal realm at the cross-roads of the European and the international spheres; the historical lineage and the contemporary appeal of the constitutional vernacular in the field of international organizations; and the phenomenon of the fragmentation of international law along with the upholding, in reaction to that fragmentation, of a hierarchy of international legal norms. It also includes an examination of the emergence of alternative vocabularies that sustain a “fragmented/societal” model of constitutionalism on the basis of systems-theory as well as an examination of a constitutionalist value ridden perspective of the international legal order that, in mirroring recent developments, attempts to “restate” a classic teleologically conceived narrative of progress without yet leaving the realm of positivism. This article, which confronts “in fine” the “international community school” with its critics, does not aim to provide a complete deconstructed genealogy of each converging strand of doctrine that one might locate behind the current appeal of constitutionalist talk at the dawn of a post-hegemonic era. Yet it is hoped that it might serve as a reminder of the multifaceted factors that lie behind the contemporary renewal of the international constitutionalist arena and, thus, help to strengthen the latter’s potential as a benchmark for diagnosing the legitimacy deficit(s) of international law.

China and International Adjudication

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas S. Eder
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
International Law ◽  
South China ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
International Adjudication

China aims to become a “leader country” in international law that “guides” the international legal order. Delivering the first comprehensive analysis of case law and Chinese academic debates from 2002 to 2018, this book shows that gradually increased engagement with international adjudication is part of a broad effort to consolidate China’s economic and political gains, and regain great power status. It covers trade, investment, territorial and law of the sea matters – including the South China Sea disputes – and delineates a decades-long process between caution and ambition. Both in debate patterns and in actual engagement, this book finds remarkable similarities in all covered fields of law, merely the timetables differ.

scholarly journals Choice and (the Awareness of) its Consequences: The ICJ's “Structural Bias” Strikes Again in the Marshall Islands Case

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 81-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Bianchi
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Marshall Islands ◽  
Young Researcher ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
State Of Affairs

My very first publication, admittedly written in a language that many AJIL Unbound readers might be unable or unwilling to read, was an essay on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its effects vis-à-vis third parties. Already back then, I found it difficult to justify how an international treaty could rubber-stamp such a highly uneven state of affairs. The overt acknowledgement of the discrimination between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the hypocrisy about “unofficial” nuclear states, and the Article VI obligation for nuclear states to negotiate effective measures of disarmament, largely ignored in the first twenty years of the treaty, were all elements that contributed to my perception of unfairness, if not blatant injustice. As a young researcher approaching international law with the enthusiasm of the neophyte, however, this looked like a little anomaly in an otherwise fair and equitable international legal order. It did not set off warning bells about the system as such. After all, international law was geared, at least in my eyes, towards enhancing the wellbeing of humanity. It must have been so. And it is not that I leaned particularly on the idealistic side; it seemed normal to me … at the time.

Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Hugues Verdier ◽  
Erik Voeten
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Explanatory Theory ◽  
State Behavior ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Vital Element ◽  
Affect State

Customary international law (CIL) is widely recognized as a fundamental source of international law. While its continued significance in the age of treaties was once contested, it is now generally accepted that CIL remains a vital element of the international legal order. Yet CIL is also plagued with conceptual and practical difficulties, which have led critics to challenge its coherence and legitimacy. In particular, critics of CIL have argued that it does not meaningfully affect state behavior. Traditional CIL scholarship is ill equipped to answer such criticism because its objectives are doctrinal or normative—namely, to identify, interpret, and apply CIL rules, or to argue for desirable changes in CIL. For the most part, that scholarship does not propose an explanatory theory in the social scientific sense, which would articulate how CIL works, why states comply, and why and how rules change.

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