Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHANNES GERALD VAN MULLIGEN

AbstractGlobal constitutionalists argue that the international legal order can only be meaningfully construed as having an objective, value-based purport. There is, however, something hybrid about the constitutionalist argument, as constitutionalists espouse a normative agenda whilst at the same time setting out to ground their approach in positive international law. It is contended that to avoid both this foundational problem and the charge of utopianism, and as a rejoinder to positivistic arguments for the denial of objective purport, constitutionalists are forced to reason along indirect, transcendental lines. Thus, constitutionalists are to be construed as avouching global values as necessary conditions for making sense of existing international legal practice, rather than merely invoking direct, positivistic evidence and/or mere normative arguments to ground their position. Moreover, it is submitted, first, that global constitutionalists would do better by adopting a less objectivist stance as regards global values, as on the ideal-agent theory of value. Second, it is argued that even though there might be room for so-called constitutionalist ‘mindsets’, these fall short of establishing the objective purport of the international legal order. Third, d'Aspremont's positivistic argument contra objective purport is construed as (also) an argument to the effect that the rules and architecture of the international legal order only warrant the existence of Hobbesian interests as necessary conditions for making sense of it. The constitutionalist case for objective purport, then, hinges on the issue of whether constitutionalism is necessitated by considerations as regards the intelligibility of international legal argument, by explanatory desiderata regarding trends in international law-making, and as a viable response to the problems posed by fragmentation, deformalization, and international legal scepticism.

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE PETERS

The article conceives international (or global) constitutionalism as a legal argument which recommends and strengthens efforts (legal and political) to compensate for ongoing de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. Although the notions ‘international constitution’ and ‘international constitutionalism’ have in recent years served as buzzwords in various discourses, the many meanings of those concepts have not yet been fully explored and disentangled. This paper suggests a specific understanding of those concepts. It highlights various aspects and elements of micro- and macro-constitutionalization in international law, and identifies anti-constitutionalist trends. On this basis, the paper finds that, although no international constitution in a formal sense exists, fundamental norms in the international legal order do fulfil constitutional functions. Because those norms can reasonably be qualified as having a constitutional quality, they may not be summarily discarded in the event of a conflict with domestic constitutional law. Because the relevant norms form a transnational constitutional network, and cannot be aligned in an abstract hierarchy, conflict resolution requires a balancing of interests in concrete cases. Finally, because constitutionalism historically and prescriptively means asking for a legitimate constitution, a constitutionalist reading of the international legal order provokes the question of its legitimacy. This question is pressing, because state sovereignty and consent are – on good grounds – no longer accepted as the sole source of legitimacy of international law. International constitutionalism – as understood in this paper – does not ask for state-like forms of legitimacy of a world government, but stimulates the search for new mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy of global governance.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Schwöbel

Global constitutionalism, an idea neither necessarily rooted in nor emerging specifically from international law, has captured the imagination of public international lawyers. Rather than adding to the plethora of suggestions of what a global constitution would and should look like, this article is aboutwhyinternational lawyers are interested in this idea. The literature so far has largely omitted a stocktaking of what it is that is so appealing about constitutionalism and who is particularly partial to it. When discussing global constitutionalism, international lawyers commonly assume one of two orientations: either a normative orientation (this is the type of constitutionalism we should have) or a descriptive orientation (this is the type of constitutionalism we already have). The former mostly concerns visions for “a global constitution” while the latter often concerns ideas of the process that will at some point culminate in “a global constitution;” this process is commonly referred to as “constitutionalization.” The recent co-authored book by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein,The Constitutionalization of International Law, sets out to go further. It aims to see “what a constitutional international legal order could look like.” In a sense, they have therefore adopted a third orientation: one that takes the descriptive case of constitutionalism as a given and theorizes about further normative aspects in regard to the international legal order.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas S. Eder

China aims to become a “leader country” in international law that “guides” the international legal order. Delivering the first comprehensive analysis of case law and Chinese academic debates from 2002 to 2018, this book shows that gradually increased engagement with international adjudication is part of a broad effort to consolidate China’s economic and political gains, and regain great power status. It covers trade, investment, territorial and law of the sea matters – including the South China Sea disputes – and delineates a decades-long process between caution and ambition. Both in debate patterns and in actual engagement, this book finds remarkable similarities in all covered fields of law, merely the timetables differ.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 81-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Bianchi

My very first publication, admittedly written in a language that many AJIL Unbound readers might be unable or unwilling to read, was an essay on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its effects vis-à-vis third parties. Already back then, I found it difficult to justify how an international treaty could rubber-stamp such a highly uneven state of affairs. The overt acknowledgement of the discrimination between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the hypocrisy about “unofficial” nuclear states, and the Article VI obligation for nuclear states to negotiate effective measures of disarmament, largely ignored in the first twenty years of the treaty, were all elements that contributed to my perception of unfairness, if not blatant injustice. As a young researcher approaching international law with the enthusiasm of the neophyte, however, this looked like a little anomaly in an otherwise fair and equitable international legal order. It did not set off warning bells about the system as such. After all, international law was geared, at least in my eyes, towards enhancing the wellbeing of humanity. It must have been so. And it is not that I leaned particularly on the idealistic side; it seemed normal to me … at the time.


2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Hugues Verdier ◽  
Erik Voeten

Customary international law (CIL) is widely recognized as a fundamental source of international law. While its continued significance in the age of treaties was once contested, it is now generally accepted that CIL remains a vital element of the international legal order. Yet CIL is also plagued with conceptual and practical difficulties, which have led critics to challenge its coherence and legitimacy. In particular, critics of CIL have argued that it does not meaningfully affect state behavior. Traditional CIL scholarship is ill equipped to answer such criticism because its objectives are doctrinal or normative—namely, to identify, interpret, and apply CIL rules, or to argue for desirable changes in CIL. For the most part, that scholarship does not propose an explanatory theory in the social scientific sense, which would articulate how CIL works, why states comply, and why and how rules change.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat

The international legal order today constitutes a truly universal legal system. It has received guiding principles through the United Nations Charter: ever since this ‘Constitution for the world’ began operating, sovereign equality of states, self‑determination of peoples, and human rights have been key components of this architecture, which has reached a state of ‘conceptual unity’ belying the talk of ‘fragmentation’ of international law that so fascinated scholars in their debates only a short while ago. The great peace treaties of 1648, 1815, and 1919, as Euro‑centric instruments influenced by the interests of the dominant powers, could not bring about a peaceful world order. After World War II, it was, in particular, the inclusion of the newly independent states in the legislative processes that has conferred an unchallenged degree of legitimacy on international law. Regrettably, its effectiveness has not kept pace with its normative growth. Some islands of stability can be identified. On the positive side, one can note a growing trend to entrust the settlement of disputes to formal procedures. Yet the integration of human rights in international law – a step of moral advancement that proceeds from the simple recognition that, precisely in the interest of world peace, domains of domestic and international matters cannot be separated one from the other as neatly as postulated by the classic doctrine of international law – has placed enormous obstacles before international law. It must be expected that the demand for more justice on the part of developing nations will subject the international legal order to even greater strain in the near future. Currently, chances are low that the issue of migration from the poorer South to the ‘rich’ North can be resolved.


2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dusko Dimitrijevic

In this study the author attaches a great importance to the theoretical examination of the concept of the New International Legal Order that was embodied in the last decades of the 20th century. The starting point for that reflection is the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia that illustrates one of the fundamental legal precedents. Reminding that the basic principle for the post-modern State behavior must be the one that includes minimal disturbance of the existing international legal relations, the author stresses that "the Yugoslav case" was customized in the way to respond to the new reality where the principle of effectiveness played an essential role in valuation of the statehood. It could also be one of the greatest catalysts for all further 'development rules' of international law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (127) ◽  
pp. 115-122
Author(s):  
I. Zabara

The article deals with one of the theoretical aspects of international legal order issues – the question of its properties. The author summarizes the doctrinal views of international law and regards the basic properties of the phenomenon of international legal order as its ability to act as system complexity, dynamism, orderliness, the reality and legitimacy of actions of subjects. The author notes that there is a common position in the doctrine, according to which the international legal order is a system. However, he notes that the difference in views on the international legal order as a system consists in the components the researchers include in its composition; the author examines two theoretical approaches. The complexity of the international legal order is determined from the standpoint of the number of its elements and components, as well as the number of their connections. This opinion highlights the fact that the predominant role is played by the quantity of links between elements and components, and indicates the international legal order capacity for permanent changes under the influence of the relevant internal and external factors. The dynamism of the international legal order is characterized from the point of capacity for the development and modification. It is stated that the state of the dynamics is effected by several circumstances. The author concludes that this international legal order’s property as a dynamism is one of the qualities that characterizes its condition as a system. The orderliness of the international legal order is considered from a consistency point, the interaction of parts of the whole, due to its structure. The author notes that the ordering of the international legal order displays its internal relationships and emphasizes its status as a system. The reality of the international legal order is characterized from the point of objectively existing phenomenon. The author concludes that the allocation of the international legal order of reality as one of its properties is intended to emphasize the status of one of its most important components - the state of international relations. Separately, the author considers the question of the legality of actions of subjects of international law, which are discussed in the doctrine from the standpoint of the conditions necessary for its maintenance. The author points out that in the general context of the properties that characterize the international legal order, it can be considered as an aspect wich together with other characterizes the state of the international legal order.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Shruti Rana

Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic and related shutdowns created seismic shifts in the boundaries between public and private life, with lasting implications for human rights and international law. Arriving just as the international legal order was wobbling in the wake of a populist backlash and other great challenges, the pandemic intensified fault lines of marginalisation and state action, amplifying the forces that had already left the liberal international order in crisis and retreat. This article examines the pandemic’s impacts on the international legal order through a gendered lens. It argues that in the short-term, the pandemic has reinforced public-private divides in international law, reinvigorating previous debates over the role of the state in protecting its people from harm. It argues that in the long-term, these developments threaten to unravel the most recent gains in international law and global governance that have supported and expanded the recognition of human rights to marginalised groups. Left unaddressed, this unraveling will further entrench such divides and contribute to the further retreat of the liberal international order. Examining these fault lines and their implications can help us re-imagine a post-pandemic international legal order that offers more protection for human rights, even as multilateral institutions and cooperation sputter or fail.


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