Presidential Profanity in Duterte's Philippines: How Swearing Discursively Constructs a Populist Regime

Swearing in public discourse represents a contentious rhetorical feature of populist leaders’ transgressive politics. This paper argues that, beyond constituting merely “offensive” speech, swearing generatively accomplishes a host of discursive functions which contribute to the fortification of a populist regime. Taking populist President Duterte of the Philippines as a case in point, we utilize a critical text analytics approach to examine his use of profane language across a corpus of 746 of his public speeches. We find that Duterte discursively harnesses swear words to: (a) affirm vernacular identities with hostile humor, (b) claim outsider virtues against corrupt institutions, and (c) marshal insider force as the nation's sovereign leader. Swearing thus represents a rich discursive resource for populist leaders to navigate their contradictory positions as insiders and outsiders to political power, toward both public endearment and coercion of the nation's people. Our findings suggest the importance of critically examining language in relation to collective-level phenomena like populism and the utility of mixed methods approaches for enriching global psychologies of politics and language.

Exactly, what do you mean?

El propósito de este trabajo es explorar los límites de un subconjunto de los usos evalua-tivos del lenguaje: el discurso ofensivo. Nuestro objetivo es doble. Primero, introducimos la rela-ción que hay entre el contexto y las proferencias evaluativas, tal y como puede rastrearse en la literatura reciente acerca de la cuestión. Segundo, nos centramos en el estudio experimental de una interacción particular entre la información contextual y nuestras afirmaciones evaluativas: cuándo el contexto es capaz de convertir una pro-ferencia aparentemente descriptiva en una evalua-tiva. Para este segundo propósito, argumentamos, ciertas propuestas positivas recientes, a pesar de su mérito, son insuficientes. The purpose of this paper is to explore the limits of a subset of the evaluative uses of language: offensive speech. More in particular, our goal is twofold. Firstly, we want to chart the relationship between context and evaluative utterances, as it stands in the current literature. Secondly, we focus on the experimental study of a particular interaction between contextual information and our evaluative claims –when the context is able to turn a seemingly descriptive utterance into an evaluative one. For this second purpose, we argue, certain recent positive proposals, in spite of their merit, come a bit short.

Whose Words Hurt? Contextual Determinants of Offensive Speech

Tracing the boundaries of freedom of expression is a matter of wide societal and academic import—especially, as these boundaries encroach on the politics of inclusion. Yet, the elements that constitute offensive speech and determine its legal status remain poorly defined. In two studies, we examined how lay judges evaluate the offensiveness of apparently descriptive statements. Replicating prior work, we found that non-linguistic features (including speaker intent and outcomes on the audience) modulated the statements’ meaning. The speaker’s identity—and, in particular, their membership in the target group—independently influenced evaluations of offensive speech among conservatives and progressives alike. When asked to disclose their abstract principles, or jointly evaluate two contrastive cases, participants tended to deny the relevance of identity while primarily endorsing the intent principle. Taken together, our findings confirm that assessments of offensive speech are governed by contextual features, some of which are not introspectively deemed relevant.

Who can talk about abortion? Information, offence, freedom of speech, and the advertising ban in Germany

This article examines the debate in Germany on Article 219a of the criminal law, which prohibits doctors from advertising for abortions. This ban prevents advertising for abortions on the grounds that it would be offensive, while defining ‘advertising’ so broadly that it prevents doctors from publicly providing any information about abortions. The article offers an overview of the law, as well as the controversy following the conviction of General Practitioner Kristina Hänel, which led to a reform of the law. The curtailment of the provision of factual information by medical professionals is contrasted with the freedom of speech protection given to highly offensive speech acts by anti-abortion activists. The argument is made that there is a Christian perfectionism at the heart of the law on abortion in Germany that is shared by anti-abortion activists, leading to a situation that facilitates the mobilisation of anti-abortion sentiment while curtailing the freedom of speech of doctors.

The Nature of Offence

The experience of suffering offence relates to a constellation of unpleasant feelings stirred up when one’s expectations of being treated in a certain way are frustrated. This chapter explores how the nature of offence matters for the way the law responds to offensive conduct. Prohibiting speech which offends poses a special problem because it clashes with the free speech principle, i.e. the idea that there is something particularly important in being allowed to speak our minds, which sets free expression apart from a general liberty claim to choose a way of life. It is suggested that when deciding what should count as properly offensive for the purpose of exercising state coercion, only a very narrow definition of offensive speech is compatible with the values underlying freedom of expression. Then, offensive speech is distinguished from hate speech. As the two are morally different, it is inappropriate to borrow arguments from the hate speech debate to justify restrictions on offensive speech.

Offensive Speech, Religion, and the Limits of the Law

Is the government ever justified in restricting offensive speech? This question has become particularly important in relation to communications which offend the religious sensibilities of listeners. It is often argued that insulting a person’s beliefs is tantamount to disrespecting the believer; that insults are a form of hatred or intolerance; that the right to religious freedom includes a more specific right not to be insulted in one’s beliefs; that religious minorities have a particularly strong claim to be protected from offence; and that censorship of offensive speech is necessary for the prevention of social disorder and violence. None of those arguments is convincing. Offence is an unpleasant mental state caused when our expectations of being treated in a particular way are frustrated. Drawing on law and philosophy, the book argues that there is no moral right to be protected from offence and that, while freedom of religion is an important right which grounds negative and positive obligations for the state, it is unpersuasive to interpret constitutional and human rights provisions as including a right not to be caused offence. Rather, we have good reasons to think of public discourse as a space for the expression of all viewpoints about the ethical life, including those which some listeners will find offensive, as this is necessary to sustain a society’s capacity for self-reflection and change.

Blasphemy and Defamation of Religions

Blasphemy laws, the paradigmatic example of prohibitions of religiously offensive speech, remain common in many contemporary liberal legal systems. The chapter begins by tracing how blasphemy evolved over time in two important respects. First, while the blasphemy offence was initially triggered by the mere denial of the truth of Christianity, it later came to depend on the manner of expression, and only insulting or intemperate communications fell within its scope. Secondly, modern blasphemy laws in the Western world have expanded to protect not only the dominant religion but all religious beliefs, and, in some cases, deeply held secular beliefs. These newer versions of blasphemy are often referred to as ‘defamation of religion’ or ‘disparagement of religion’ laws. I discuss two types of objections to them: that they are vague and impossible to enforce in a non-discriminatory manner; and that they are as such incompatible with a free speech principle. The final part of the chapter explores the argument that religious offence bans are necessary for the protection of public order because if insults are not censored believers will become indignant and resort to violence. I argue that while the protection of order and peace is a legitimate governmental interest, the morally appropriate way to pursue it is to arrest those who threaten others with violence, not silence the non-violent speakers who offend the feelings of the listeners.