Solidarność, the Western World, and the End of the Cold War

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64
Author(s):  
Idesbald Goddeeris
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Eastern Bloc ◽  
Western World ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Polish Crisis ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Underlying Processes

It is not unusual to credit certain individuals with having put and end to the Cold War. This essay discusses some of the most important of these people, focusing on their role in the Polish crisis of 1980–82: Mikhail Gorbachev, John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, and Lane Kirkland. The author arrives at the conclusion that the question of the extent to which individuals can be held responsible for the victory over the Soviet Union is wrong, because it neglects underlying processes, such as the economic crisis in the Eastern Bloc and East–West contacts established during the détente of the 1970s.

Jazz as Democracy?? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Crist
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Sequence Of Events ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Governmental Secrecy ◽  
The Impact

Abstract The Dave Brubeck Quartet's 1958 tour on behalf of the U.S. State Department, part of the grand Cold War project of propagating American-style democracy in opposition to communism, did not advance in an orderly and self-evident manner. Rather it was an extremely contingent enterprise enacted through countless individual actions and statements by a motley assortment of bureaucrats and businessmen, and frequently teetered on the brink of chaos. The story of Brubeck's tour, including its evolution and impact, is complex and multifaceted, involving overlapping and conflicting agendas, governmental secrecy, high-minded idealism, and hard-nosed business. The narrative also raises issues of race and race relations in the context of the Cold War struggle against communism and brings into focus the increasing cultural prestige of jazz and other popular genres worldwide during the period when the ideological premises of the Cold War were being formulated. Thirty years later——in 1988, as the Cold War was waning——the Quartet performed in Moscow at the reciprocal state dinner hosted by President Ronald Reagan for General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during their fourth summit meeting. The sequence of events leading up to this occasion, including the Quartet's long-anticipated tour of the Soviet Union during the previous year, reveals Brubeck to have been not only a talented musician but a canny entrepreneur as well. By the late 1980s the cultural and political landscape had shifted so dramatically as to be virtually unrecognizable to the Cold Warriors of the 1950s. By all accounts, Brubeck's tours in the 1950s and 1980s were among the most successful of their kind. Though Brubeck attributes their efficacy primarily to the power of an influential idea that came into its own toward the beginning of the Cold War——namely, jazz as democracy——the documentary record makes clear that the impact of his travels involved a multifarious nexus of other factors as well, including reputation, personality, and marketability.

The 1980s

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doug Rossinow
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Political Leader ◽  
Political Movement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Conservatism ◽  
Aids Crisis ◽  
The Cold War

The decade of the 1980s represented a turning point in American history—a crucial era, marked by political conservatism and an individualistic ethos. The 1980s also witnessed a dramatic series of developments in U.S. foreign relations, first an intensification of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and then a sudden relaxation of tensions and the effective end of the Cold War with an American victory. All of these developments were advanced and symbolized in the presidential administration of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), a polarizing figure but a highly successful political leader. Reagan dominates our memories of the 1980s like few other American leaders do other eras. Reagan and the political movement he led—Reaganism—are central to the history of the 1980s. Both their successes and their failures, which became widely acknowledged in the later years of the decade, should be noted. Reaganite conservatives won political victories by rolling back state power in many realms, most of all in terms of taxation and regulation. They also succeeded in putting America at the unquestioned pinnacle of the world order through a victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, although this was unforeseen by America’s Cold Warriors when the 1980s began. The failures of Reaganite conservatism include its handling of rising poverty levels, the HIV/AIDS crisis, and worsening racial tensions, all problems that either Reaganites did little to stem or to which they positively contributed. In foreign affairs, Reaganites pursued a “war on terror” of questionable success, and their approach to Third World arenas of conflict, including Central America, exacted a terrible human toll.

scholarly journals The Artist Nomad

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Clinton Jacob Buhler
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Personal Politics ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Second World ◽  
First World

When Ronald Reagan infamously declared the Soviet Union to be the “Evil Empire” in 1983, he was playing upon a fundamental axiom of Cold War politics: that the world can be neatly divided between the First World of Capitalism and the Second World of Communism.  Equating this divide with that of good and evil only served to strengthen the notion that the two sides were mutually exclusive.  Personal politics were an extension of this perspective.  One was either a Capitalist or a Communist—to reject one was equivalent to embracing the other.  This paper examines the art of dissident artists such as Alexander Kosolapov, Leonid Sokov, and Ilya Kabakov; artists from the Soviet Union who were exiled to the West during the Cold War.  It seeks to better understand why these artists’ rebellion against the Soviet system did not translate into an embrace of Western culture upon arrival in America.  The roots of their critical artistic approach are interpreted through the prism of ideological nomadism which reveals their art to be deeply ambivalent.  These artworks are analyzed as a disruption to the binary understanding of the Cold War and Post-Soviet eras by their embrace of a liminal position in the overlap between the capitalist and communist cultural milieus.

scholarly journals Promoting the Socialist Community: Efforts and Effects of the Socialist Camp’s Cultural Diplomacy

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oksana Nagornaia
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Cultural Diplomacy ◽  
Cultural Pluralism ◽  
Eastern Bloc ◽  
Hybrid Identities ◽  
Modern Culture ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Based on an analysis of modern Cold War historiography, the article considers current discussions, topics, and perspectives in the chosen research landscape. Taking into account the modern circumstances, the author concludes that in the latest publications, there is a tendency to reconsider the dichotomic model “Sovietisation vs Americanisation” and, instead, take a closer look at the representations of socialism and the structures and actors of cultural diplomacy in Eastern Europe. Referring to propaganda projects of socialist integration and intercultural spaces, the author demonstrates what was specifically socialist about the forms and instruments of representations of the Eastern Bloc, the conflicting spheres of collaboration, and independent initiatives of people’s democracies in the sphere of cultural diplomacy. The author concludes that at the end of the Second World War, the propaganda system in the Soviet Union was integrated into a larger scheme of presenting the world system of socialism where the Eastern European states became symbolically appropriated spaces and promising symbolic resources. The cultural initiatives of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe at the international level testify to the cultural pluralism in the Eastern Bloc. The independent steps the countries of the socialist camp took for self-realisation on the international arena testify to this cultural pluralism. The effectiveness of their symbolic messages was facilitated by the geographical proximity to borders, integration into the contexts of western culture, and better developed information resources. In the article, the author’s own analysis is preceded by a review of materials thematically related to the section of the journal on the cultural diplomacy of socialism. Articles referred to in the study and devoted to the projects of the socialist camp prove the thesis that the Eastern Bloc that emerged during the Cold War and the hybrid identities developed under its influence survived the breakdown of the bipolar order and are important for modern culture.

The United States at the End of the Cold War, 1989–1993

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Graham Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
The Persian Gulf ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Military Campaign

The Cold War may have ended on the evening of November 9, 1989, when East German border guards opened up checkpoints and allowed their fellow citizens to stream into West Berlin; it certainly was over by January 28, 1992, when U.S. president George H. W. Bush delivered his annual State of the Union Address one month after President Mikhail Gorbachev had announced his resignation and the end of the Soviet Union. After the Berlin Wall came down, Bush and Gorbachev spoke of the Cold War in the past tense in person and on the telephone. The reunification of Germany and U.S. military campaign in the Persian Gulf confirmed that reality. In January 1991, polls indicated that, for the first time, a majority of Americans believed that the Cold War was over. However, the poll results obscured the substantial foreign and domestic crises, challenges, and opportunities created by the end of the Cold War that occupied President Bush and his national-security team between November 1989 and Bush’s defeat in the 1992 presidential inauguration and the inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton as America’s first post–Cold War president in January 1993.

Engaging the Enemy

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-39
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
White House ◽  
American President ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Core Components ◽  
The Cold War

Triumphalists contend that President Reagan won the Cold War by employing hard-line policies and refusing to negotiate with Moscow. Reagan’s refusal to engage with the enemy compelled the Soviet Union to disarm, adopt democratic reforms, and ultimately collapse. This chapter debunks the notion that Reagan was a hard-liner throughout his time in office, as well as the idea that he rejected diplomacy. It demonstrates that Reagan’s initially hawkish posture brought the superpowers to the brink of war in 1983. By 1984 the president was actively seeking negotiations aimed at improving superpower relations and reducing nuclear arsenals. Reagan was seeking dialogue and disarmament even before Mikhail Gorbachev came to office and years before the Soviet Union began to reform. By the time he left the White House, Reagan had met with his Soviet counterparts more frequently than any previous American president. These negotiations were critical to the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War. Diplomacy, engagement, and dialogue are core components of Reagan’s legacy.

The Cold War heats up: propaganda and subversion, 1945–48

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel W. B. Lomas
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Bloc ◽  
Special Operations ◽  
Research Department ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Information Research ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Defensive Measures

Chapter Three explores the development of British propaganda policy towards the Soviet Union. While Ministers began the process of dismantling the wartime information machinery, the developing threat of the Soviet Union forced them to sanction defensive measures where British interests were threatened. The chapter also looks at discussions on anti-Communist propaganda that would ultimately lead to the formation of the Information Research Department (IRD) in 1948. The chapter also shows how, while agreeing to overseas information activities, Bevin resisted calls for Britain to start a Cold War offensive involving subversion and special operations inside the Eastern Bloc.

“I Feel More Comfortable with You”: France, the Soviet Union, and German Reunification

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 116-158
Author(s):  
Frédéric Bozo
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
German Reunification ◽  
European Security ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
German Question ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
The Cold War

This article explores the interactions between French and Soviet leaders at the end of the Cold War when they were confronted by German reunification. This important dimension of the events of 1989–1990 has been largely neglected up to now. Although allegations of Franco-Soviet collusion against German reunification have long been widespread, the evidence presented here from declassified French, Soviet, and West German sources shows that the two countries in fact failed to cooperate to shape the modalities and outcome of these processes despite the close relationship that by then prevailed between French President François Mitterrand and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Although for decades Paris and Moscow had shared the objective of avoiding a disruptive settlement of the German question, and although both leaders were initially deeply troubled by the pace of events, they did not agree about the fundamental issue of German self-determination and did not share an understanding of the international conditions required for German reunification. Even more critically, they had different visions of the transformation of the European security system that should accompany it.

Engaging the Evil Empire

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Breathing Room ◽  
Key Events

In a narrative-redefining approach, this book dramatically alters how we look at the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Tracking key events in US–Soviet relations across the years between 1980 and 1985, the book shows that covert engagement gave way to overt conversation as both superpowers determined that open diplomacy was the best means of furthering their own, primarily competitive, goals. The book details the history of these dramatic years, as President Ronald Reagan consistently applied a disciplined carrot-and-stick approach, reaching out to Moscow while at the same time excoriating the Soviet system and building up US military capabilities. The received wisdom in diplomatic circles is that the beginning of the end of the Cold War came from changing policy preferences and that President Reagan, in particular, opted for a more conciliatory and less bellicose diplomatic approach. In reality, the book demonstrates, Reagan and ranking officials in the National Security Council had determined that the United States enjoyed a strategic margin of error that permitted it to engage Moscow overtly. As US grand strategy developed, so did that of the Soviet Union. This book covers five critical years of Cold War history when Soviet leaders tried to reduce tensions between the two nations in order to gain economic breathing room and, to ensure domestic political stability, prioritize expenditures on butter over those on guns. The book shifts the focus of Cold War historians away from exclusive attention on Washington by focusing on the years of back-channel communiqués and internal strategy debates in Moscow as well as Prague and East Berlin.

How to Survive the ’80s

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-164
Author(s):  
David L. Pike
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Electrical Power ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Antinuclear Movement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Cold War

The original bunker fantasy had hinged around the Cuban Missile Crisis; its reemergence nearly two decades later was triggered by several new circumstances. By 1980, the threat of non-wartime nuclear accident had come to the forefront of the public imaginary in a newly immediate way. Ronald Reagan was elected president on a hardline stance towards the Soviet Union, escalating the Cold War to its hottest and most polarized moments since 1962. The nuclear condition now meant more than the omnipresent yet abstract risk of devastating war; by the early 1980s, it included the everyday fact of the infrastructure of electrical power, which became a focus of the antinuclear movement as it crystallized widespread suspicion over the military-industrial complex. The end still served to put the world in focus, but there was no longer any shelter to retreat to, rely upon, or even plead for; the bunker fantasy around 1983 afforded survival only by looking death in the face and protesting against it. Yet for all its stress on the linearity of survival, the fiction of the nuclear 1980s finds utopian moments in the brief opportunities it affords for thinking laterally, beyond or around the blinkered causality that had the world locked into an infinite play of near-annihilation inherited from 1962. In their very extremity, the self-regarding conventions of the ’80s open up their own critical perspective through the earlier Cold War onto the decade’s new survivalism.

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