A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Harry Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Widespread Agreement

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.

Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods

1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The One ◽  
Considered Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Convictions

What role, if any, should our moral intuitions play in moral epistemology? We make, or are prepared to make, moral judgments about a variety of actual and hypothetical situations. Some of these moral judgments are more informed, reflective, and stable than others (call these our considered moral judgments); some we make more confidently than others; and some, though not all, are judgments about which there is substantial consensus. What bearing do our moral judgments have on philosophical ethics and the search for first principles in ethics? Should these judgments constrain, or be constrained by, philosophical theorizing about morality? On the one hand, we might expect first principles to conform to our moral intuitions or at least to our considered moral judgments. After all, we begin the reflection that may lead to first principles from particular moral convictions. And some of our moral intuitions (e.g., that genocide is wrong) are more fixed and compelling than any putative first principle. If so, we might expect common moral beliefs to have an important evidential role in the construction and assessment of first principles. On the other hand, common moral beliefs often rest on poor information, reflect bias, or are otherwise mistaken. We often appeal to moral principles to justify our particular moral convictions or to resolve our disagreements. Insofar as this is true, we may expect first principles to provide a foundation on the basis of which to test common moral beliefs and, where necessary, form new moral convictions.

A Common Sense Response to Hume’s Moral Atheism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Engels Kroeker
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Psychological Processes ◽  
Moral Principles

This chapter presents Reid’s answers to three non-theistic implications of Hume’s moral philosophy. One non-theistic implication of Hume’s view is the claim that morality is tied to human nature, and is hence secular because it is autonomous from religious doctrines, beliefs, or motivations. Another implication is that the standard of morality is determined by human mental states and psychological processes, and hence renders all reference to an objective, mind-independent standard, unnecessary. A final implication, according to Hume, is that our human passions are not directed toward God, and hence that God is not the object of any human moral discourse. In response, Reid argues that the truth of moral principles is not relative to human nature and to natural human passions. It follows, Reid holds, that talk of a benevolent God is intelligible. Reid’s explicit objective is to criticize not only Hume’s moral philosophy, but also his moral atheism.

Prichard, Harold Arthur (1871–1947)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Macadam
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
Philosophical Style ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
Epistemological Realism

One of the most influential Oxford philosophers of the twentieth century, Prichard was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy there from 1928 to 1937. His work combines epistemological realism and moral intuitionism. From 1906 onwards Prichard was active with the Oxford realists, who held, against idealists, that reality exists independently of mind, that knowledge is of reality, and that common-sense realism is correct. In ethics, he was the leader of the Oxford intuitionists who held, against utilitarianism, that common-sense morality is correct, its duties are known non-inferentially, and are an irreducible plurality of distinct kinds of act. His philosophical style displays concentration on specific problems, carefully using ordinary language to make precise distinctions in the absence of general theory. He influenced Oxford’s next generation of Austin, Ryle, Hart and Berlin, who attended his classes and, occasionally, his ‘philosophers’ teas’.

Perceptual-Imaginative Space and the Beautiful Ecologies of Rose Lowder's Bouquets

Paragraph ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-329
Author(s):  
Sarah Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ecological Principles ◽  
Short Films ◽  
Ecological Concern

Experimental filmmaker Rose Lowder is an intricate explorer of perception. Many of her exquisite silent short films feature flowers that are scrutinized frame by frame in shots that appear to have layers, as well as volume, and to quiver between simultaneity and succession. Yet these perceptual palimpsests that present almost too much for the eye to take in also reveal an as yet unexplored relation to imagination. Informed by ecological principles and foregrounding floral beauty, Lowder's Bouquets create a striking bond between perceptual and imaginative space. This article draws upon twentieth-century phenomenological accounts of perception before delving into earlier historical discussions of beauty in nature and in art, and bringing out connections to moral philosophy and feminist ecophilosophy, in order to understand how the beautiful entwines with ecological concern in the perceptual-imaginative space of her films.

Gewalt und Kommunikation

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Normal Case ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Philosophy Of Dialogue ◽  
The Individual

In ethics, when discussing problems of justice and a just social existence one question arises obviously: What is the normal case of the relation between I and you we start from? In moral philosophy, each position includes basic socio-anthropological convictions in that we understand the other, for example, primarily as competitor in the fight for essential resources or as a partner in communication. Thus, it is not the human being as isolated individual, or as specimen of the human species or socialised member of a historical society what needs to be understood. Instead, the individual in its relation to the other or others has been studied in phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue of the twentieth century. In the following essay I focus on Martin Buber’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories of intersubjectivity which I use in order to explore the meaning of recognition and disrespect for an individual. They offer a valuable contribution to questions of practical philosophy and the socio-philosophical diagnosis of our time.

scholarly journals Evaluating Others If They Stand Up for Their Moral Convictions, and Evaluating Ourselves If We Don't Stand Up

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florien M. Cramwinckel ◽  
Kees van den Bos ◽  
Eric van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Sexual Minorities ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Moral Courage ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Situational Demands ◽  
Moral Convictions

AbstractActing on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It may often cause people to remain silent on their convictions, while at the same time some may show the moral courage to speak out. How do people evaluate those who do stand up, and how does it affect their self-evaluations? In two experimental studies (Ns = 207 and 204), we investigated both types of evaluations. The studies demonstrate that people who failed to uphold their moral beliefs still had positive evaluations of others who showed moral courage. More specifically, pro-gay participants who went along with writing an anti-gay essay denouncing equal rights for sexual minorities had positive evaluations of another person who spoke up and refused this task. The failure to display moral courage had negative consequences for participants’ self-concepts. In Experiment 1, we show that pro-gay participants’ positive self-concepts were lowered after writing an anti-gay essay (vs. a pro-gay essay). In Experiment 2, we reveal that participants' positive self-concepts were lowered only when they were confronted with morally courageous behavior and their own failure to uphold their moral beliefs was visible to the experimenter.

Property and Progress: Where Adam Smith Went Wrong

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Labour Productivity ◽  
The West ◽  
Property Relations ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
The Way ◽  
Social Property

During the first half of the twentieth century there was widespread agreement as to whether the way to understand the historical emergence of economic development in the West was through the theoretical lens provided by Adam Smith. This chapter critiques Smith's view of the transition through which the pre-capitalist social property relations were transformed into capitalist property relations – a transition that is believed to have been mistakenly attributed by Smith to the expansion of trade. It is argued instead that the rise of capitalist social property relations in England, which led to economic development, was instead catalyzed by the growth of specialization, investment, and the rising labour productivity in agriculture. In addition, it is argued that industrial and economic development were caused by the separation of the manufacturing from the peasantry.

A Righteous Consensus, Whig Style

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-88
Author(s):  
George M. Marsden
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
State Universities ◽  
Reformed Tradition ◽  
Christian Morality ◽  
Protestant Denominations

Various Protestant denominations founded hundreds of colleges during the first half of the nineteenth century. Even two-thirds of presidents of state universities were clergymen. Though those in the Reformed tradition tended to be the leading educators, denominational diversity and necessities of attracting varieties of students weakened doctrinal distinctives. The prevailing “Whig” ideal emphasized combining building a modern civilization with Christian morality. Educators, such as Francis Wayland or Mark Hopkins, confidently assumed that the best of objective common sense and modern science would support traditional Christianity. Colleges still promoted the evangelical tradition, as in campus revivals. They taught the classics as a way of developing moral faculties, as the Yale Report of 1828 advocated. Specifically Christian perspectives were found in capstone moral philosophy courses.

Moral sentiments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Enlightenment

Moral sentiments are those feelings or emotions central to moral agency. Aristotle treated sentiments as nonrational conditions, capable of being moulded into virtues through habituation. The moral sense theorists of the Enlightenment took sentiments to provide the psychological basis for our common moral life. Kantian approaches deny the primacy of sentiments in moral personality, and treat moral sentiments as conditioned by our rational grasp of moral principles. A central issue is whether moral sentiments incorporate moral beliefs. Accounts which affirm a connection with moral beliefs point to the complex intentionality (object-directedness) of such states as resentment or indignation. Against this, some observe that moral emotions may be felt inappropriately. Of special interest are the sentiments of guilt and shame. These seem to reflect different orientations towards moral norms, and questions arise about the degree to which these different orientations are culturally local, and whether either orientation is superior to the other.

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