Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods

1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The One ◽  
Considered Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Convictions

What role, if any, should our moral intuitions play in moral epistemology? We make, or are prepared to make, moral judgments about a variety of actual and hypothetical situations. Some of these moral judgments are more informed, reflective, and stable than others (call these our considered moral judgments); some we make more confidently than others; and some, though not all, are judgments about which there is substantial consensus. What bearing do our moral judgments have on philosophical ethics and the search for first principles in ethics? Should these judgments constrain, or be constrained by, philosophical theorizing about morality? On the one hand, we might expect first principles to conform to our moral intuitions or at least to our considered moral judgments. After all, we begin the reflection that may lead to first principles from particular moral convictions. And some of our moral intuitions (e.g., that genocide is wrong) are more fixed and compelling than any putative first principle. If so, we might expect common moral beliefs to have an important evidential role in the construction and assessment of first principles. On the other hand, common moral beliefs often rest on poor information, reflect bias, or are otherwise mistaken. We often appeal to moral principles to justify our particular moral convictions or to resolve our disagreements. Insofar as this is true, we may expect first principles to provide a foundation on the basis of which to test common moral beliefs and, where necessary, form new moral convictions.

scholarly journals Evaluating Others If They Stand Up for Their Moral Convictions, and Evaluating Ourselves If We Don't Stand Up

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florien M. Cramwinckel ◽  
Kees van den Bos ◽  
Eric van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Sexual Minorities ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Moral Courage ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Situational Demands ◽  
Moral Convictions

AbstractActing on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It may often cause people to remain silent on their convictions, while at the same time some may show the moral courage to speak out. How do people evaluate those who do stand up, and how does it affect their self-evaluations? In two experimental studies (Ns = 207 and 204), we investigated both types of evaluations. The studies demonstrate that people who failed to uphold their moral beliefs still had positive evaluations of others who showed moral courage. More specifically, pro-gay participants who went along with writing an anti-gay essay denouncing equal rights for sexual minorities had positive evaluations of another person who spoke up and refused this task. The failure to display moral courage had negative consequences for participants’ self-concepts. In Experiment 1, we show that pro-gay participants’ positive self-concepts were lowered after writing an anti-gay essay (vs. a pro-gay essay). In Experiment 2, we reveal that participants' positive self-concepts were lowered only when they were confronted with morally courageous behavior and their own failure to uphold their moral beliefs was visible to the experimenter.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Disagreement, design, and Thomas Reid

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. 224-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van Woudenberg
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Basic Design ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
The One

This paper argues that Reid's first principle of design can be more widely accepted then one might suppose, due to the fact that it specifies no marks of design. Also it is explicated that the relation of the principle, on the one hand, and properly basic design beliefs on the other, is a relation of presupposition. It is furthermore suggested that Reid's discussion of what can be done in case of disagreement about first principles points to a position that is relevant to the current debates in the Epistemology of Disagreement literature and that merits further elaboration.

A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Harry Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Widespread Agreement

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.

Not Our Fault

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-575
Author(s):  
Michael Gilead ◽  
Yair Ben David ◽  
Yael Ecker
Keyword(s):  
Social Distance ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
End Points ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Psychological Continuum ◽  
Positive Rights

The current research aimed to delineate the moral intuitions that underlie apathy toward the suffering of socially distant others. Past research has shown that people endorse in-group-focused morality, according to which the fate of socially distant others is discounted, and harm-focused morality, according to which the omission of care is viewed less negatively as compared to the commission of harm. In the current study, we investigated how these two moral principles interact, by examining whether increased social distance differentially attenuates the severity of moral judgments concerning acts of apathy and harm. The results of five studies show that judgments concerning the omission of care are dependent on social distance, whereas judgments concerning the commission of harm are not. The findings challenge normative theories of morality that deny the legitimacy of “positive rights” and positive theories of morality that see harm and care as two end points of the same psychological continuum.

The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium

1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Holmgren
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Method ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Considered Moral Judgments ◽  
Theory Acceptance

In a well-known series of articles, Norman Daniels has drawn a contrast between wide reflective equilibrium and a more traditional method of theory acceptance in ethics that would be employed by a sophisticated moral intuitionist. The more traditional method is geared towards achieving a narrow equilibrium, or ‘an ordered pair of (a) a set of considered moral judgments acceptable to a given person P at a given time, and (b) a set of moral principles that economically systematizes (a).’ Although we might achieve narrow reflective equilibrium by deducing particular moral judgments from self-evident moral principles, the more plausible approach is to start from our particular moral judgments. Here we begin by screening our intial moral judgments to eliminate those in which we have little confidence and those made under circumstances conducive to error. We then search for general moral principles that best account for the remaining ‘considered’ moral judgments.

THEOPHRASTUS ON PLATONIC AND ‘PYTHAGOREAN’ IMITATION

2013 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 686-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip Sidney Horky
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Equal Share ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The One ◽  
The Universe

In the twenty-fourth aporia of Theophrastus'Metaphysics, there appears an important, if ‘bafflingly elliptical’, ascription to Plato and the ‘Pythagoreans’ of a theory of reduction to the first principles via ‘imitation’ (μίμησις):Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐπιμιμεῖσθαι τ' ἐθέλειν ἅπαντα· καίτοι καθάπερ ἀντίθεσιν τινα ποιοῦσιν τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πᾶσα ἀμορφία καθ' αὑτήν, ὅλως δ' οὐχ οἷον τ' ἄνευ ταύτης τὴν τοὺ ὅλου φύσιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἰσομοιρεῖν ἢ καὶ ὑπερέχειν τῆς ἐτέρας, ᾗ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας. Διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν θεόν, ὅσοι τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτουσιν, δύνασθαι πάντ' εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἄγειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται· τάχα δ' οὐδ' ἂν προέλοιτ', εἴπερ ἀναιρεῖσθαι συμβήσεται τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὖσαν.(Theophrastus,Metaphysics, 11a26–b12)Plato and the Pythagoreans make the distance [between the first principles and everything else] a great one, and they make all things desire to imitate fully; and yet, they set up a certain opposition, as it were, between the Indefinite Dyad and the One. In the former [resides] the Unlimited and the Unordered and, as it were, all Shapelessness as such; and they make it altogether impossible for the nature of the universe to exist without this [that is, the Indefinite Dyad] – it [that is, the Indefinite Dyad] could only have an equal share in things, or even exceed the other [first principle, that is, the One] – whereby they also make their first principles contrary [to one another]. Therefore, those who ascribe causation to the god claim that not even the god is able to reduce all things to the best, but, even if at all, only in so far as is possible. And perhaps he wouldn't even choose to, if indeed it were to result in the destruction of all existence, given that it [that is, existence] is constituted from contraries and consists of contraries.

Common-sense ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte R. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Main Figure

‘Common-sense ethics’ refers to the pre-theoretical moral judgments of ordinary people. Moral philosophers have taken different attitudes towards the pre-theoretical judgments of ordinary people. For some they are the ‘facts’ which any successful moral theory must explain and justify, while for others the point of moral theory is to refine and improve them. ‘Common Sense ethics’ as a specific kind of moral theory was developed in Scotland during the latter part of the eighteenth century to counter what its proponents saw as the moral scepticism of David Hume. Thomas Reid, the main figure in this school, and his followers argued that moral knowledge and the motives to abide by it are within the reach of everyone. They believed that a plurality of basic self-evident moral principles is revealed by conscience to all mature moral agents. Conscience is an original and natural power of the human mind and this shows that God meant it to guide our will. A deeply Christian outlook underwrites their theory.

Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Coope
Keyword(s):  
First Principle ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
The One ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves: they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for nonbodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. This book discusses this notion of freedom, and its relation to questions about responsibility. It explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. Part I sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II looks at the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense (if any) is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Part III looks at questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?

scholarly journals Pressure effect of the mechanical, electronics and thermodynamic properties of Mg–B compounds A first-principles investigations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GuoWei Zhang ◽  
Chao Xu ◽  
MingJie Wang ◽  
Ying Dong ◽  
FengEr Sun ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Thermodynamic Properties ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Boron Content ◽  
Structural Parameters ◽  
Debye Model ◽  
Total Density ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Volume Deformation ◽  
Temperature And Pressure ◽  
Total Density Of States

AbstractFirst principle calculations were performed to investigate the structural, mechanical, electronic properties, and thermodynamic properties of three binary Mg–B compounds under pressure, by using the first principle method. The results implied that the structural parameters and the mechanical properties of the Mg–B compounds without pressure are well matched with the obtainable theoretically simulated values and experimental data. The obtained pressure–volume and energy–volume revealed that the three Mg–B compounds were mechanically stable, and the volume variation decreases with an increase in the boron content. The shear and volume deformation resistance indicated that the elastic constant Cij and bulk modulus B increased when the pressure increased up to 40 GPa, and that MgB7 had the strongest capacity to resist shear and volume deformation at zero pressure, which indicated the highest hardness. Meanwhile, MgB4 exhibited a ductility transformation behaviour at 30 GPa, and MgB2 and MgB7 displayed a brittle nature under all the considered pressure conditions. The anisotropy of the three Mg–B compounds under pressure were arranged as follows: MgB4 > MgB2 > MgB7. Moreover, the total density of states varied slightly and decreased with an increase in the pressure. The Debye temperature ΘD of the Mg–B compounds gradually increased with an increase in the pressure and the boron content. The temperature and pressure dependence of the heat capacity and the thermal expansion coefficient α were both obtained on the basis of Debye model under increased pressure from 0 to 40 GPa and increased temperatures. This paper brings a convenient understanding of the magnesium–boron alloys.

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