scholarly journals Coordinating nominations: how to deal with an incumbent surplus after electoral reform

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jochen Rehmert
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Micro Level

Abstract How do parties and candidates react to electoral system reform? While the literature on causes and consequences of electoral reforms is receiving increasing attention, we lack a systematic micro-level account on how parties and candidates adopt to changes in electoral rules and district boundaries. This paper examines the case of the Japanese Liberal Democrats to explore how the party has managed to accommodate a surplus of incumbents to a reduced number of nominal tier seats following the 1994 electoral reform. By using micro-level data, I examine how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has matched candidates based on their expected electoral strength and ideological positioning to new districts. Moreover, I investigate how the newly instituted party-list allowed the LDP to avoid its disintegration at the local level by systematically defusing local stand-offs through the handing out of promising list positions. My findings help to understand how the LDP could avoid its disintegration and could continue to dominate Japanese politics until today.

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigeo Hirano
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Geographic Patterns ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Electoral Reforms

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY W. COX ◽  
FRANCES McCALL ROSENBLUTH ◽  
MICHAEL F. THIES
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Leaders And Followers ◽  
Short Run

For years, scholars and pundits have blamed Japan's single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system for the factions that divide and organize the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In January 1994, Japan abandoned SNTV, and the first election under the new rules occurred in October 1996. If SNTV did in fact sustain the factions, it makes sense that the factional structure ought to have weakened under the new rules. In this article, we provide an informal model of what the old factional exchange between leaders and followers was like and investigate the extent to which the terms of this exchange, and hence the characteristics of Japanese factionalism, have begun to change under the new rules. We expect and find the largest decline in factional leaders' role in the area of nominations, and the slightest changes, at least in the short run, in the allocation of posts. On the other side of the exchange, we find that followers appear less willing to march to their leaders' tunes in LDP presidential elections.

Dynasties and Democracy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Career Selection ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Dynastic Politics ◽  
Comparative Theory

Democracy is supposed to be the antithesis of hereditary rule by family dynasties. And yet “democratic dynasties” continue to persist in democracies around the world. They have been conspicuously prevalent in Japan, where more than a third of all legislators and two-thirds of all cabinet ministers in recent years have come from families with a history in parliament. Such a high proportion of dynasties is unusual and has sparked concerns over whether democracy in Japan is functioning properly. This book introduces a comparative theory to explain the causes and consequences of dynasties in democracies like Japan. Members of dynasties enjoy an “inherited incumbency advantage” in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. However, the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for elections and representation, varies by the institutional context of electoral rules and candidate selection methods within parties. In the late 1980s, roughly half of all new candidates in Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party were political legacies. However, electoral system reform in 1994 and subsequent party reforms have changed the incentives for party leaders to rely on dynastic politics in candidate selection. A new pattern of party-based competition is slowly replacing the old pattern of competition based on localized family fiefdoms.

The Liberal Democratic Party: Its adaptability and predominance in Japanese politics for 60 years

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-22
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Japanese Society ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic

This article discusses the origin and continuity of the predominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese politics since the party’s formation in 1955. The LDP experienced two crises in its history, the first owing to the transformation of Japanese society by rapid economic development during the 1960–1970s, and the second due to the electoral reform in 1994 and the challenge from the Democratic Party of Japan thereafter. I argue that the LDP’s continuous success is attributable to its adaptability to new environments: the party overcame the first crisis by shifting the policy focus, reorganizing its support base and the party organization to achieve intraparty consensus. It coped with the second crisis by forming a coalition with the Clean Government Party and reforming the party’s presidential election and the ministerial post-allocation system. The article concludes with a summary and a brief discussion regarding the future of the LDP.

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

Japanese Politics in Transition: A Theoretical Review

1993 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takashi Inoguchi
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Type System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Income Tax Law ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Party Dominance

THE END OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE BY THE LIBERAL Democratic Party of Japan came as abruptly as the fall of the Berlin wall four years before. It started with the debate on electoral system change, ostensibly as an attempt to curb corruption. The LDP has been plagued by a series of large-scale corruption scandals since the Recruit scandal of 1989. The latest concerned former vice-president Shin Kanemaru's alleged violation of the political money regulation law and the income tax law in 1992–93. The Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, accepting a fair degree of compromise with opposition parties, wanted to pass a bill to change the current electoral system. The LDP initially wanted to change from the system of choosing a few persons in each district by one vote to the Anglo-American type system of selecting one person in each district by one vote. The opposition wanted to change to the continental European system of proportional representation. A compromise was made by the LDP's proposal to combine the latter two systems. Then two dissenting groups emerged suddenly in the LDP. One took the exit option by forming new political parties. The other took the voice option by backing away from the Miyazawa compromise plan. Miyazawa was humiliated by his failure to have the bill enacted and a motion of no confidence was passed. He then called for a general election, which took place on 18 July 1993. The outcome did not give a majority to the LDP and subsequently a non-LDP coalition was formed to produce a non-LDP government for the first time since the foundation of the LDP in 1955

Japanese Party Politics at a Crossroads?

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-447
Author(s):  
Benjamin Nyblade
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
First Century ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Electoral Defeat ◽  
Electoral Reforms

In 2009, the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, which had successfully formed governments either alone or as the largest partner in a coalition government for all but a single year since 1955, suffered a devastating electoral defeat when the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won nearly two-thirds of the seats available in the House of Representatives. The landslide DPJ victory was seen by many commentators and academics as the culmination of a decade-long trend toward two-party politics, driven in large part by party and voter adaptation to the electoral reforms of the 1990s, which introduced single-member districts as the means for electing a majority of members of parliament. The three books reviewed in this essay were written primarily in the two years following the 2009 DPJ victory, and each attempts, in quite distinct ways, to update our accounts of electoral and party politics and policymaking in Japan to account for the changes in Japanese politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

scholarly journals Between Pork and People: An Analysis of the Policy Balance in the LDP's Election Platforms

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian G. Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Policy Mix ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Election Manifestos ◽  
Election System ◽  
The 1960S

In this article I examine changes in the election manifestos of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. While the existing literature agrees that the LDP's policy platform has changed considerably since the introduction of the new election system in the 1990s, their analysis focuses on material policies such as pork barrel and welfare. Postmaterialist policies such as environmental protection have hardly been discussed, even though they have been relevant since pollution swept progressive mayors into power in the 1960s. I examine election platforms from 1956 through 2013, and argue that the LDP has carefully adjusted its policy mix by putting a greater emphasis on postmaterialist policies. My analysis also shows that while electoral reform has had an impact on the policy balance between postmaterialist and materialist policies as well as clientelist and programmatic policies, these changes are not linear, but vary from decade to decade.

A Historical Analysis of the LDP’s 2018 Constitutional Amendment Proposals

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 882-904
Author(s):  
Christian G. Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
The 1950S

In 2018 Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party announced four new proposals to amend the seven-decades-old and thus-far unamended constitution of Japan. These include adding a third paragraph to Article 9, as well as state-of-emergency provisions, support for students in need, and changes to the electoral system. By analyzing each proposal’s place in the debate on amendments dating back to the 1950s, I show that these very different proposals share one important feature that sets them apart from recent drafts aiming for wholesale reform of the constitution: they are relatively minimalist in nature. This new modesty is due to the necessity to win over other parties and voters, but it is also an attempt to cement rather than to change the LDP-made status quo.

Selection

2018 ◽  
pp. 115-178
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
National Level ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Dynastic Politics

This chapter examines dynastic candidate selection in Japan under the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system and the changes that have occurred since the adoption of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which combines first-past-the-post and closed-list proportional representation. Dynasties under SNTV were more common in larger, decentralized parties—especially the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The MMM system shifted the focus of elections from candidates to parties. Subsequent party reforms within the LDP have expanded the pool of candidates and placed greater control over nominations with national-level party leaders, who have selected a more diverse range of candidates. Legacy candidates are still nominated, but recently, only the most powerful and longest-serving incumbents are likely to be succeeded in politics by a family member. This suggests that demand-side incentives have changed, leaving mainly supply-side incentives to explain the continued persistence of dynastic politics.

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