Judge Stephen Schwebel: International Jurist Extraordinaire

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle

AbstractThis is a further contribution to the Squire Law Library Eminent Scholars Archive by Lesley Dingle. It is based on interviews with Stephen Schwebel about his distinguished career as an international jurist in the United States and at the International Court of Justice.

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis O. Wilcox

On August 2, 1946, the United States Senate approved the Morse resolution by the overwhelming vote of 62-2, thereby giving its advice and consent to the acceptance on the part of the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the same Senate which, just one year and one week earlier, had cast a vote of 89-2 in favor of the United Nations Charter. On August 26 Herschel Johnson, acting United States representative on the Security Council, deposited President Truman’s declaration of adherence with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At long last the United States assumed far-reaching obligations to submit its legal disputes to an international court.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

The decision of the International Court of Justice in the case between Nicaragua and the United States brims with important procedural and substantive implications for the future of law and adjudication in disputes between states.


1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-174

On September 26, 1991, the International Court of Justice issued an Order recording the discontinuance by Nicaragua of the proceedings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and the removal of the case from the Court’s list. Nicaragua had expressed its wish to discontinue the proceedings against the United States in a letter to the Court of September 12, 1991, in which it cited agreements between the two countries “aimed at enhancing Nicaragua’s economic, commercial and technical development to the maximum extent possible.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-149

While Palestine considers itself a state, the United States does not currently recognize it as such. The relationship between the two has continued to deteriorate following the December 2017 announcement that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move its embassy there. Alleging that the embassy relocation violates international law, Palestine brought a case against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in September of 2018. The United States reacted by announcing its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Also in the fall of 2018, the Trump administration closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, curtailed its own Palestinian-focused mission in Jerusalem, and sharply cut U.S. funding focused on Palestinian interests.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 880-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Egon Schwelb

The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice did not contain a clause regulating the procedure for its amendment. This was considered to be a “gap,” an “unfortunate lacuna.” This “gap” may or may not have been deliberate. It was certainly not a “genuine” gap. In spite of the absence of a provision on amendments, the law provided a clear though inconvenient answer to the question of how the Statute could be amended, namely, by unanimous consent of all parties to it. In 1928 proceedings for the introduction of some amendments were initiated. They were incorporated in a Protocol of Amendment in 1929. The difficulties which were encountered before the Protocol of Amendment entered into force in 1936 are now history and need not be dealt with here, the less so as they have been described in considerable detail in a recent book. The Protocol of Amendment did not remedy this defect of the original Statute. As Hudson has explained, this was due to the fact that the adhesion of the United States was proposed on condition that the Statute “shall not be amended without the consent of the United States.” Such a position could hardly be accorded to the United States unless it were also maintained for the other states which were parties.


1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The history of the International Court of Justice in its thirty-third year is contained in narrow compass. It is chiefly confined to one judgment rendered by the Court in the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed From Borne in 1943, and to the advisory opinion given by the Court on the Effect of Awards Made By the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Apart from these, in the Nottebohm Case between Liechtenstein and Guatemala, the time for the rejoinder of Guatemala to be filed was extended for one month, to November 2, 1954. Action was taken by the Court ordering that the “Électricité de Beyrouth” Company Case be removed from the list at the request of the French Government; the Court also ordered that two cases brought by the United States against Hungary and the Soviet Union, relating to the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America, should be removed from the list for lack of jurisdiction.


1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Gross

One of the most persuasive arguments advanced by the advocates of the repeal of the Connally Amendment has been its “boomerang effect.” While it was intended to protect the vital interests of the United States as a respondent, it also protected, on the basis of reciprocity and perhaps less intentionally, the respondent state in a case instituted before the International Court of Justice by the United States as the applicant.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Preuss

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States “seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States.” This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “The United States, since its formation,” Mr. Dulles states, “has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance.” Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be “of profound moral significance,” it would, Mr. Dulles continues, “assume greatly increased practical significance” only when “limiting factors” have been removed, for the “path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately,” the Court “has yet to win the confidence of the world community,” and “international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests.”


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