scholarly journals Common values for the development round

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ◽  
ANDREW H. CHARLTON
Keyword(s):  
Trade Agreements ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Domestic Trade ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Practical Operation ◽  
National Governments

In the traditional theory of international trade, multilateral trade agreements should be easy because self-interested governments unilaterally commit to reduce their own protection and, as a bonus, they reap positive externalities from liberalization by other nations. In practice national governments do not behave as though they are maximizing the welfare of a representative citizen, but instead they respond to pressure from a diverse mix of constituencies and competing special interests. Governments attempt to manage domestic trade-offs within international negotiations, so progress is slow and protection persists. The practical operation of trade negotiations, emblemized by the infamous ‘green rooms’, is characterized by factionalism, horse-trading, and brinkmanship.

scholarly journals Not All Special Interests Are Created Equal: The Role Of Industry Lobbying On WTO Patterns Of Protection

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynda D. Vargha
Keyword(s):  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Tariff Protection ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Industrialized Nations ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tariff Structure ◽  
Tariff Reductions

This paper examines to what degree increase in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements has opened up liberalization process to the special interests of powerful industries in industrialized nations. A political economy model of endogenous tariff formation is used to compare the effects of industry lobbying on the tariff structure under unilateral and cooperative liberalization. The results of this analysis illustrate that industry special interests do have an effect on the tariff structure when trade policy is determined unilaterally or cooperatively (especially if the industries of major trading partners are not organized into effective lobbies). However, the model also illustrates that as countries pursue the ongoing liberalization of tariff protection, large industries will experience larger tariff reductions than smaller ones. In fact, during the process of ongoing unilateral or cooperative liberalization, the industries most able to maintain high levels of protection are those that are characterized by high displacement costs and are particularly susceptible to harm from imports. The paper concludes that regardless of the liberalization mechanism the organized special interests of large industries will affect the pattern of protection, however, this effect diminishes if a country commits to an ongoing liberalization process. Instead, ongoing multilateral liberalization through the WTO keeps tariff policy open as an avenue for the government objective of minimizing the deadweight loss associated with liberalization and protecting industries particularly susceptible to harm from imports.

Negotiating Global Change: Progressive Multilateralism in Trade in Telecommunications Talks

2003 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Murphy Ives
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Global Change ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Position Change ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Loss Avoidance ◽  
Predominant Factor

AbstractThis article provides an analysis of negotiated change within the global telecommunications regime. It examines how agreements are achieved in the area of trade and telecommunications, particularly within the aegis of the Geneva-based World Trade Organization (WTO). It argues that, in the negotiations examined, the interplay between unilateral action, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral processes and the ensuing alchemy of coercion and concord led to an overall reframing of the central problem and thereby facilitated multilateral consensus. Drawing upon evidence from Japan-U.S. bilateral, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and multilateral trade and telecom talks, this research tests the proposition that coercive pressure is the predominant factor in bringing about negotiated change. It also considers the alternate thesis that integrative reframing, involving the search for mutual gains, was paramount in facilitating change. Qualitative observations signal the phenomenon of progressive multilateralism, or the sequential interplay of unilateral action, bilateral, and multilateral processes, wherein undercurrents of coercion reorient perceptions of the outcome from uncertain gains towards loss avoidance. Together with information exchange and interaction, one observes position change. Understanding the dynamics at important impasse points facilitates a critical, political-economy reading of these international negotiations as well as more general conclusions about the nature of governance in this area.

Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 896-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Limão
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Detailed Data ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Multilateral Trade Liberalization ◽  
Tariff Reductions

Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow multilateral trade liberalization, i.e., whether they are a “building block” or “stumbling block” to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus, there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on U.S. multilateral tariffs to provide the first systematic evidence that the direct effect of PTAs was to generate a stumbling block to its MTL. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions.

Protection of the Marine Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-211
Author(s):  
Margaret A. Young
Keyword(s):  
Marine Environment ◽  
Marine Protected Areas ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Marine Litter ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Trade Measures

Abstract The general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment is contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Increasingly, marine issues are addressed in regional or multilateral trade agreements, including the covered agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article examines selected legal developments, such as provisions in regional trade agreements on marine capture fisheries, marine litter and waste management infrastructure. Rules on the use of trade measures to eliminate harmful fishing practices, and the prohibition of certain subsidies, are also explored. The article calls for attention to the impact of these developments on dispute settlement between states under UNCLOS, support for marine protected areas, and the capacity for regime interaction between relevant bodies. These issues have relevance for the conservation of marine living resources as well as other issues relating to the protection of the marine environment, including marine plastics and climate change.

scholarly journals Impact of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Resource Revenue

Economies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sena Gnangnon ◽  
Jean-François Brun
Keyword(s):  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Domestic Trade ◽  
Generalized Methods Of Moments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Multilateral Trade Liberalization ◽  
Methods Of Moments ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This paper investigates the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on resource revenue, using an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 57 countries, including both developed and developing countries, over the period 1995–2015. By means of the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, the empirical analysis suggests that multilateral trade liberalization exerts a negative effect on resource revenue, probably at the benefit of non-resource revenue. However, this effect over the full sample hides a positive effect of multilateral trade liberalization on resource revenue in poorest countries, and a negative effect of multilateral trade liberalization on resource revenue in non-poorest countries of the sample. Additionally, the negative effect of multilateral trade liberalization on resource revenue over the full sample appears to be dependent on the degree of domestic trade liberalization. In fact, multilateral trade liberalization genuinely induces a reducing effect on resource revenue only if countries liberalize their domestic trade regime beyond a minimum level.

Creating an International Governance Regime for the Digital Economy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter F. Cowhey ◽  
Jonathan D. Aronson
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
International Governance ◽  
Privacy And Security ◽  
Governance Regime ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Impact

The concluding chapter lays out a strategy for creating an international governance regime for the digital economy. It identifies a core “club” of nations that could champion new digital trade agreements linked to stronger international agreements to advance a trusted digital environment—the Digital Economy Agreement. This agreement would revamp trade policy to adjust to the impact of the information and production disruption by improving rules for digital market integration and would create a foundation that simplifies and strengthens the ability to forge significant pacts advancing the goals of improving privacy and cybersecurity while safeguarding against protectionist trade risks. The design of these agreements emphasizes binding “soft rules” that allow significant variations in national policy trade-offs while establishing a minimum common baseline of policy through the soft rules. Expert multistakeholder organizations drawn from civil society loom large in the design for implementation of the soft rules through such avenues as mutual recognition schemes for certifying compliance with privacy and security objectives. If trade agreements prove unworkable as a starting point, such agreements could be anchored to other types of binding policy agreements. However, trade is the first best option for consideration before there is any decision to resort to second-best strategies.

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