The Myth of Global Populism

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
David Art
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The People ◽  
Industrial Democracies ◽  
Policy Deliberation ◽  
Previous Decade ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Core Features

The “rise of global populism” has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism—not populism—is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of “left-wing populism” in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena “populist” obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.

Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and Italy

1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Cole
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Late Summer ◽  
The United States ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The North ◽  
The People ◽  
Western Germany ◽  
Western European ◽  
Foreign Ministers

The action of the French National Assembly in the late summer of 1954 finally ended the hopes of proponents of the European Defense Community Treaty. Today the treaties and protocols of the London and Paris Conferences which proposed the creation of a Western European Union are the objects of official scrutiny. Both Italy and Germany will become members of the Western European Union after the appropriate ratifications of these documents. The restoration of Germany to a status of equality with that of other Western European states and her admission into NATO have been proposed by the Foreign Ministers of the Western powers.But behind these actions there has lurked a fear which is reflected in many European countries, the fear of a neo-fascist rebirth in Western Germany and Italy. The image of a rearmed Germany, feeding on the industry of the Ruhr and associated with a Nazi revival, frightens many French parliamentarians. In Britain, the Bevanites have expressed left-wing Laborite fears of German rearmament and have associated it with probable fascist direction. Said their leader on November 18, 1954, in a parliamentary exchange: “Do you think the people of this Country will be safer against the prospects of war if German armies and their Nazi officers have atom and hydrogen bombs?” The neutralism prevalent among some groups in Western Europe can be interpreted in part as their reaction to similar questions. And in the United States, there has not been lacking in some quarters a belief that there is a dangerous spectre which is haunting Western Europe and the world, namely a neo-fascist revival on the north side of the Rhine.

scholarly journals The People’s Champ: Doug Ford and Neoliberal Right-Wing Populism in the 2018 Ontario Provincial Election

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Budd
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Liberal Party ◽  
The People ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
Ideological Commitment

The 2018 Ontario provincial election marked a decisive shift in the political direction of Canada’s most populous province. The election brought an end to the long reign of the Ontario Liberal Party (2003–2018), whose government devolved into a series of scandals that resulted in a third-place finish. The Liberal’s defeat came at the hands of the Progressive Conservative Party led by former Toronto city councillor, Doug Ford. The Progressive Conservative’s victory was propelled on the back of Ford’s deeply populist campaign where he promised to reassert the interests of ‘the people,’ expel the influence of elites and special interests, and clean up government corruption. This campaign discourse led many political opponents and media pundits to accuse Ford of importing the nativist, xenophobic, and divisive rhetoric of other radical right-wing populist leaders. This article advances the argument that rather than representing the importation of ‘Trumpism’ or other types of radical right-wing populism, Ford’s campaign is better understood within the tradition of Canadian populism defined by an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism. In appealing to voters, Ford avoided the nativist and xenophobic rhetoric of populist leaders in the United States and Western Europe, offering a conception of ‘the people’ using an economic and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centred upon middle class taxpayers. This article makes a contribution to both the literatures on Canadian elections and populism, demonstrating the lineage of Ford’s ideological commitment to populism within recent Canadian electoral history, as well as Ford’s place within the international genealogy of right-wing populism.

Do Americans Like to Punish?

Metamorphosis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Values ◽  
The People ◽  
American Prison

This chapter addresses the question of whether Americans like to punish. The United States clearly punishes more heavily and for longer periods than other countries, with comparable social and political values. One can land in an American prison for life over minor offenses—a punishment not used for serious offenses in Western Europe. The leading comparativist on criminology, James Whitman, argues that a politics of dignity has instilled mercy and mildness in European systems, while leveling impulses, distrust of authority, and too much power in the people is said to have left the United States with a criminal justice system long in degradation and short on mercy.

The Trilateral Era

Worldview ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 21-23
Author(s):  
Jeremiah Novak
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
George Bush ◽  
The Past ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
The U.S

For the past four years right-wing and left-wing organizations in the United States have been aware of a new foreign policy establishment known as the Trilateral Commission. This group, founded by David Rockefeller, is comprised largely of corporate executives from Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Cyrus Vance, as well as seventeen other members and former members of the Carter administration, belonged to this group before they took office. Key political figures in the governments of Japan and Western Europe also belong, as do John Anderson, George Bush, and Henry Kissinger.

scholarly journals The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The Ideological Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980–2014

2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 84-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Wagner ◽  
Thomas M Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Niche Parties ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
The Right

The emergence of the radical right as a strong competitor to mainstream parties has fundamentally reshaped patterns of competition in many European party systems. In this article, we systematically explore changes to the ideological landscape in Western Europe by examining whether there has been programmatic mainstreaming of radical right parties due to (a) accommodation to and (b) moderation by radical right parties. We examine positions and salience on liberal-authoritarianism and the salience of economic issues using manifesto data from 68 parties in 17 countries. Our findings provide empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems: on liberal-authoritarianism, mainstream left and right parties have increased their emphasis and moved to the right. Yet radical right parties have generally remained niche competitors; they are increasingly extreme and more focused on liberal-authoritarianism. Our analysis has important implications for understanding party systems, party competition and citizen representation in Europe.

Poverty Knowledge and the History of Poverty Research

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
War On Poverty ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Industrial Democracies ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Official Declaration

This article examines the history of poverty research and the evolution of the practice of gathering knowledge about the poor. It distinguishes between poverty research and poverty knowledge, suggesting that the convergence of the two was a historically specific development that first began to gain wide currency in the late nineteenth century in response to the vast and increasingly visible disparities of industrial capitalism in Western Europe and the United States. It also situates poverty research within the politics and social organization of knowledge and considers the influence of broader contextual factors, such as the creation, expansion, and subsequent restructuring of welfare states in Western industrial democracies; the geopolitical imperatives of empire, decolonization, and the Cold War; and the official declaration of the War on Poverty in the 1960s. Finally, it explores how poverty knowledge was reshaped by the economic, political, and ideological transformations associated with the rise of neoliberalism.

The Strategic Adaptation of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe

2019 ◽  
pp. 837-862
Author(s):  
Elie Michel
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Strategic Adaptation ◽  
Populist Radical Right ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Radical Right Parties

Populist radical right parties have long been considered to mobilize their voters on specific issues, which they are deemed to “own.” Voters support these parties largely because of their “nativist” agenda, and more precisely because of their stance against immigration. In fact, research had established a “winning formula” of electoral persuasion for radical right parties, referring to a combination of “economically neoliberal” and “authoritarian” appeals that would jointly explain the strong electoral support. However, populist radical right parties have transformed their positions, through “second order messages,” by investing in a socioeconomic issue agenda. These parties can increase their electoral support by siding with their working class voters on redistributive issues, particularly through a welfare chauvinist frame. This chapter argues that populist radical right parties have strategically shifted on this latter dimension in order to adapt to their voters’ preferences. It shows that, in view of increased electoral persuasion, populist radical right parties modify some of their positions to tailor them to their working-class core electoral clientele.

Radical Right Parties in Office: Incumbency Records and the Electoral Cost of Governing

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 574-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjitske Akkerman ◽  
Sarah L. de Lange
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Integration Policies ◽  
Radical Right Parties ◽  
Additional Support ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Electoral Performance

AbstractRadical right parties are becoming increasingly likely candidates to participate in government coalitions in Western Europe. Comparative research on the electoral performance of these parties in government is still scarce. Our overview of the electoral effects of government participation of six parties in national governments shows that they do not run a higher risk of losing votes after government participation than other parties. There is considerable variation, however. Some radical right parties experienced great losses, while others won additional support. Focusing on the ways in which radical right parties conducted themselves in government, we explore why some parties won votes and others lost in post-incumbency elections. We compare their policy achievements with regard to immigration and integration policies, the performance of their ministers, and the party coherence of the six parties in office. Our analysis shows that policy records do not fully explain the variation in post-incumbency electoral results. Weak performance and internal party conflict prevent parties from credibly laying claim to the policy achievements of coalition governments and demonstrate that some of these parties were not ready for office.

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