scholarly journals Balancing Competences? Proportionality as an Instrument to Regulate the Exercise of Competences after the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht

Author(s):  
Niels Petersen ◽  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou

Analysis of proportionality in the context of Article 5 TEU after the PSPP judgment – Bundesverfassungsgericht challenging Court of Justice to control European Central Bank’s motives – Doctrinal tradition of ‘smoking out’ illicit motives through proportionality – Article 5(4) TEU: proportionality of exercise of competences, primarily safeguarding member states’ autonomy – Court of Justice case law on proportionality: deferential standard of review towards measures of EU institutions – Bundesverfassungsgericht case law on federal competences and municipal autonomy: less deferential but still respectful standard of review – PSPP inconsistent with case law and with Article 5 TEU – Balancing-stage of proportionality unsuitable for motive control

2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Alan Dashwood

IN its Keck judgment—famous or notorious according to taste—the Court of Justice drew a distinction, for the purposes of the application of the prohibition in Article 28 EC against measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (“MEEQRs”), between two categories of national measures. On the one hand were “product requirements”: measures specifying requirements to be met, in order to obtain access to the market of a Member State, by products coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, like the minimum alcohol requirement for fruit liqueurs in Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78 [1997] E.C.R. 649). Such product requirements are liable to constitute MEEQRs, and therefore require specific justification, in order to escape prohibition, on one of the public interest grounds recognised by Community law. On the other hand was the category of measures described in the judgment as “provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements”. An example was the legislation at issue in the main proceedings in Keck, which prohibited the resale of products below their purchase price, thereby depriving retailers of a form of sales promotion. Other examples, attested by the case law post-Keck, are measures regulating advertising methods, the kind of shop in which goods of a certain description can be sold, shops’ opening hours and Sunday trading. National provisions in this latter category are not normally such as to hinder trade between Member States under the test formulated by the Court in Dassonville (Case 8/74 [1974] E.C.R. 837, at para. 5), and so do not call for justification; not, that is, “so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States”: see Joined Cases C-267 and 268/9 [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, at paras. 15–17.


2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Herwig Verschueren

This article seeks to provide a clearer picture of the role of methods for funding social security benefits in EC Coordination Regulation 1408/71. In past literature and in the case law surrounding Regulation 1408/71, this role has seldom been mentioned. However, this is changing in light of increasing numbers of questions emerging at both the policy-making level and at the level of Court of Justice proceedings. The first part of this paper deals with the role of different methods of financing social security in determining the material scope of the coordination regulation and the question of whether the method of financing certain benefits has a bearing on this material scope. The second part deals with the existing link within the coordination context between paying or having paid contributions and entitlement to benefits. I discuss, inter alia, the extent to which benefit levels are determined by the same legislation as that which determines contribution levels. I examine the extent to which Member States collecting contributions are also responsible for bearing the cost of the corresponding benefits and the extent to which a person who is paying or has paid contributions is entitled to benefits corresponding to those contributions. In light of this examination of the facts as they stand, I endeavour to consider possible alternatives, including the desirability of having a more direct link within the coordination context between payment of contributions and entitlement to benefits.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1099-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

AbstractIn several golden share cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) condemned Member States for reserving certain special rights in privatized companies for themselves. In spite of the Court's consistently strict approach in the golden share cases, the more recent golden share judgments demonstrate that the Court's practice is not free from uncertainties. In its case law, the Court seems to hesitate between the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Additionally, it is not entirely clear which measures are caught by provisions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Łachacz ◽  
Rafał Mańko

Abstract The paper analyses and evaluates the linguistic policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union against the background of other multilingual courts and in the light of theories of legal interpretation. Multilingualism has a direct impact upon legal interpretation at the Court, displacing traditional approaches (intentionalism, textualism) with a hermeneutic paradigm. It also creates challenges to the acceptance of the Court’s case-law in the Member States, which seem to have been adequately tackled by the Court’s idiosyncratic translation policy.


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