The China Factor in the U.S.-Japan Alliance: The Myth of a China Threat

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihide Soeya

This paper argues that “China threat” was largely a myth and that the China factor was not the critical factor leading to the re-affirmation process of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the mid-1990s. It took the 1994 Korean crisis for this to materialize. The China factor was important only as a general background, and the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in dealing with the rise of China was implicit, remaining in the domain of managing shifting major power relations after the Cold War rather than being directed against the myth of a “China threat.” The paper also argues that preoccupation with Japan as an independent security pole is an important source of confusion about the nature of Japan's security policies and its profile therein, which, as before, will continue to be premised on the U.S.-Japan alliance. It explains actual records of Japanese security behaviors as a series of attempts to cope with the dual identity as a security actor. Japan's readjustment to the post-Cold War security environment, founded upon the re-affirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, was a clear case in point.

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 360-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Swaine

China's rise as a major power constitutes one of the most significant strategic events of the post-Cold War period. Many policy-makers, strategists and scholars express significant concern over the implications of China's growing military and economic capabilities for the future security environment in Asia and beyond. Such concern derives in part from an anticipation of the systemic security problems that have historically accompanied the emergence of a new power. In the Chinese case, however, these anxieties are greatly compounded by the rapidity of internal change under way in China, the general lack of knowledge about Chinese strategic ambitions, the existence of many unresolved Chinese territorial claims, the intense suspicion and even hostility toward the West harboured by China's leadership, and China's internal political and social instabilities.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 247-264
Author(s):  
Chunsi Wu

In the Asia-Pacific geopolitical dynamics, China's rise and its accompanying "assertive" diplomacy are often cited by some studies as the cause of security concerns. The author argues that this interpretation of the Asia-Pacific security situation is wrong. The Asia-Pacific confronts various and complex security problems, which cannot be simply attributed to the rise of China. The occurrence and activation of so many security problems in the Asia-Pacific only indicate that the security architecture in the region is undergoing a profound transition. The old security architecture inherited from the Cold War era cannot effectively handle the security problems in the region any more. The Asia-Pacific needs a new architecture adaptive to the features of the post-Cold War era. The new security architecture should embody the spirit of cooperation and reflect Asian countries' interests and ways of handling regional affairs. More importantly, the new security architecture should feature ample accommodativeness, not only including the diverse cultures and paths of development of the region, but also encouraging and incentivizing all parties of the region to learn from each other so as to JNTly create a sustainable security environment for the region.


2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

AbstractThis article addresses the question of Japan’s security ‘normalisation’ by examining from realist and liberal perspectives the foreign policy tools Japan has used to redefine its engagement with the outside world in the post-Cold War period. It also analyses the international and domestic factors, which have underpinned that redefinition. The article argues that while Japan is more willing to consider seemingly realist foreign policy instruments, namely by strengthening its defence posture and alliance with the U.S., Japan’s so-called ‘normalisation’ does not represent a strategic policy shift towards realism. Rather, it should be seen as a mature response to the changed regional security environment in East Asia, as well as a ‘product’ of particular domestic political dynamics in Japan, especially the emergence of conservative Koizumi-like politicians. Japan’s main foreign policy approach — most recently represented by Fukuda’s diplomacy — remains largely a liberal one and stresses the promotion of multilateralism, peaceful cooperation and economic diplomacy.


Asian Survey ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 33 (8) ◽  
pp. 832-847
Author(s):  
Allan E. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  

Author(s):  
Tatheer Zahra Sherazi ◽  
Amna Mahmood

Asia Pacific, which is extended Eastward to the states of Oceania, Westward to Pakistan, Southward to New Zealand, and Northward to Mongolia, is currently a pivot of the globe due to its economic growth. Since last two decades, it has got status of ‘growth center’ owing to its high economic growth rate. The United States (US) had been very active in Asia Pacific throughout the Cold War period, but in post-Cold War era, it was disengaged due to its pre-occupation in Middle East. However, the rise of China attracted US again with multiple arrangements at political, economic and social fronts. There are two world views about the US presence in Asia Pacific. The first one asserts that the Asia Pacific is more secure without the presence of US, while others takes the US presence as a patron for stability and solidarity within the region. The US policy of ‘Pivot to Asia’, ‘Asia Pacific’ commonly known as ‘Rebalancing’ ensured its new commitment of deep engagement in Southeast Asia. Policy shift under Trump administration from ‘Pivot to Asia’ to ‘Free Indo-Pacific’ has direct as well indirect implications for Pakistan. The study analyses the US strategies and polices under the theory of ‘Offensive Realism,’ where ‘rational powers uncertain of intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive’. Analytical, descriptive approaches are adopted in order to analyse US ongoing strategies.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines how, in the post-Cold War era, the United States' alignment with Taiwan and alliance with Japan again have figured prominently among issues affecting U.S.-China security relations. While they are far from being allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are not enemies either, but rather major economic partners who have also cooperated to some degree in addressing an increasing range of international problems. But there are still security tensions between the two sides over issues such as relations across the Taiwan Strait, and both nations practice coercive diplomacy toward the other, sometimes tacitly, sometimes less so. The chapter considers how the legacies of these Cold War alliances—particularly the U.S.–Taiwan relationship and the U.S.–Japan security treaty—have affected U.S.–China relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Franz

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.


1995 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 317-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mohan Malik

In September 1993, China and India signed an agreement “to maintain peace and tranquillity” along their disputed Himalayan border. This agreement between the two Asian giants – which required both sides to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC), that is to maintain the status quo pending a peaceful, final boundary settlement and to reduce military forces along the border in accordance with the principle of “mutual and equal security” – has been described as a “landmark agreement” and “a significant step forward” in their uneasy relations since the 1950s. It was a logical culmination of a series of developments since the late 1980s, especially the visit of India's Premier to Beijing in 1988 and the reciprocal visit of China's Premier to New Delhi in 1991; the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system following the Soviet collapse; the consequent dramatic changes in the global strategic environment; and the overall improvement in bilateral relations between China and India.However, the fact that Sino-Indian relations today seem to be better than at any time during the last four decades should not lead one to assume that all the hurdles in the relationship have been overcome. This article examines the factors underlying the current détente, and analyses Indian and Chinese perspectives on their bilateral relations as well as the wider post-Cold War Asian security environment. It concludes that a thaw in Sino-Indian relations notwithstanding, the two sides are poised for rivalry for regional dominance and influence in the multipolar world of the 21st century.


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