China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry

1995 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 317-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mohan Malik

In September 1993, China and India signed an agreement “to maintain peace and tranquillity” along their disputed Himalayan border. This agreement between the two Asian giants – which required both sides to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC), that is to maintain the status quo pending a peaceful, final boundary settlement and to reduce military forces along the border in accordance with the principle of “mutual and equal security” – has been described as a “landmark agreement” and “a significant step forward” in their uneasy relations since the 1950s. It was a logical culmination of a series of developments since the late 1980s, especially the visit of India's Premier to Beijing in 1988 and the reciprocal visit of China's Premier to New Delhi in 1991; the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system following the Soviet collapse; the consequent dramatic changes in the global strategic environment; and the overall improvement in bilateral relations between China and India.However, the fact that Sino-Indian relations today seem to be better than at any time during the last four decades should not lead one to assume that all the hurdles in the relationship have been overcome. This article examines the factors underlying the current détente, and analyses Indian and Chinese perspectives on their bilateral relations as well as the wider post-Cold War Asian security environment. It concludes that a thaw in Sino-Indian relations notwithstanding, the two sides are poised for rivalry for regional dominance and influence in the multipolar world of the 21st century.

China Report ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsering Topgyal

In official quarters in Beijing and New Delhi, the Tibet issue figures only as a bargaining chip to ‘regulate’ their bilateral relations, not as an issue that has an independent bearing on the intractability or resolution of the Sino–Indian border dispute. Scholars of the Sino–Indian border dispute either dismiss the relevance of the Tibet issue or treat it as only a prop in their framing of the dispute in terms of security, nationalism and great power rivalry. This article argues that the Tibet issue is more central to the border dispute than official and scholarly circles have recognised so far. The article demonstrates this through an examination of the historical roots of the border row, the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of both Beijing and New Delhi and the revelation of concurrent historical developments in the border dispute and the Sino–Tibetan conflict. On the place of Tibet in broader Sino–Indian relations, the article posits that while Tibet was a victim of India’s moralistic–idealist policies toward China in the 1950s, it has now become a victim of the new realism pervading India’s policy of engaging and emulating China in the post-Cold War era.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrik Johansson

AbstractUnder Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has the unique authority to make decisions that are binding on member states. However, the lack of a standard definition of what makes a Security Council resolution "a Chapter VII resolution" has caused disagreement regarding the status of several resolutions. This is unfortunate as the international community should never have to doubt whether a Security Council resolution is in fact adopted under Chapter VII or not. It is also unnecessary. This article addresses this problem by proposing a definition of Chapter VII resolutions, based on two criteria referred to as "Article 39 determinations" and "Chapter VII decisions". On the basis of the proposed definition, the article describes and analyses a dramatic increase in the use of Chapter VII during the post-Cold War era. It concludes that as Chapter VII has come to constitute the majority of Security Council resolutions in recent years, the resort to Chapter VII no longer signifies exceptional determination and resolve, which it did during the Cold War; instead Chapter VII today implies business as usual. An appendix lists all Chapter VII resolutions from 1946–2008.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Manjari Chatterjee Miller

What is known of rising powers is both sparse and contentious. This chapter discusses the assumptions of rising powers and puts forward an alternate way of understanding them. It shows that all rising powers are not the same, even if their military and economic power is increasing relative to the status quo, and argues that narratives about becoming a great power are an additional element that needs to be considered. It also discusses what great power meant in the late 19th century, during the Cold War, and in post–Cold War eras, and lays out the map of the book. Topics covered in this chapter include the power transition and rising power literature, the role of ideas in foreign policy, and an overview of the perceptions of great power.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinay Kaura

Historically, India–Russia cooperation has largely been dictated by geopolitical factors. During the Cold War era, their relationship was defined by their similar strategic perceptions of the world. However, post-Cold War global politics has seen several transformations in geopolitical and geostrategic configurations, influencing the strategic worldview of both New Delhi and Moscow. Recent political trends demonstrate the growing divergence between the strategic approaches of the two states toward various global issues, including Pakistan and the Taliban. The article discusses the implications of the shift in Russia’s South Asia policy as well as India’s counterterrorism efforts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union during the 1990 negotiations on German reunification that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe? Since the end of the Cold War, an array of Soviet/Russian policymakers have charged that NATO expansion violates a U.S. pledge advanced in 1990; in contrast, Western scholars and political leaders dispute that the United States made any such commitment. Recently declassified U.S. government documents provide evidence supporting the Soviet/Russian position. Although no non-expansion pledge was ever codified, U.S. policymakers presented their Soviet counterparts with implicit and informal assurances in 1990 strongly suggesting that NATO would not expand in post–Cold War Europe if the Soviet Union consented to German reunification. The documents also show, however, that the United States used the reunification negotiations to exploit Soviet weaknesses by depicting a mutually acceptable post–Cold War security environment, while actually seeking a system dominated by the United States and opening the door to NATO's eastward expansion. The results of this analysis carry implications for international relations theory, diplomatic history, and current U.S.-Russian relations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 247-264
Author(s):  
Chunsi Wu

In the Asia-Pacific geopolitical dynamics, China's rise and its accompanying "assertive" diplomacy are often cited by some studies as the cause of security concerns. The author argues that this interpretation of the Asia-Pacific security situation is wrong. The Asia-Pacific confronts various and complex security problems, which cannot be simply attributed to the rise of China. The occurrence and activation of so many security problems in the Asia-Pacific only indicate that the security architecture in the region is undergoing a profound transition. The old security architecture inherited from the Cold War era cannot effectively handle the security problems in the region any more. The Asia-Pacific needs a new architecture adaptive to the features of the post-Cold War era. The new security architecture should embody the spirit of cooperation and reflect Asian countries' interests and ways of handling regional affairs. More importantly, the new security architecture should feature ample accommodativeness, not only including the diverse cultures and paths of development of the region, but also encouraging and incentivizing all parties of the region to learn from each other so as to JNTly create a sustainable security environment for the region.


2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-55
Author(s):  
Vladimir Rukavishnikov

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end not only of the Cold war but also of the crucial turn in Russia?s fate. For the first time in its history Russia exists as a nation-state not as an empire. Along with the search of new identity Russians faced new challenges and threats to country?s national security and integrity (the Chechen separatist?s uprising, etc). The transitional crisis of identity seems to be finished off at the beginning of 21st century, yet the process of acceptance of new security environment and multi-cultural realities is going on. The paper examines the process of reformation of Russian national and ethnic identity and development national self-understanding in the post-Cold war era.


Author(s):  
Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail ◽  
Maiko Ichihara ◽  
Amalin Sabiha Ismail

This article addresses a neglected area in Japan–Malaysia bilateral relations: democracy support. While Japan has established itself as a rising democracy supporter after the Cold War and more so in the 21st century, the country has provided Malaysia with only regime-compatible low-end assistance. Maintaining distance from pro-democracy actors, Japan continued giving de facto support to the semi-authoritarian government in Malaysia before the 2018 general election. There are two main causes: First, Japan emphasized democracy in its diplomacy with the intention of expanding its international influence and differentiate its diplomacy from that of China, rather than to promote democracy out of normative commitment. With a view to obtaining respect from and strengthening relations with state actors, Japan sought to nurture friendly relations with the Malaysian government despite its semi-authoritarian nature. Second, Japan saw elections as the most critical institution for democracy and did not intend to address the weak civil liberties in Malaysia. These two factors led Japanese projects to focus on the capacity building of public administrators as state actors rather than pushing for political change. Hence, Japan’s diplomacy and foreign aid to Malaysia have helped stabilize the status quo instead of supporting democratic diffusion.


Author(s):  
Yasser Ali Nasser

Abstract As the Cold War prompted anxieties throughout Asia about the status of postcolonial state-building and decolonization, the possibility of friendship and cooperation between China and India despite their differing political and economic systems inspired hope and political repercussions far beyond their borders. This paper reveals how Japanese commenters, in their analysis of Sino–Indian friendship and both countries' respective political trajectories, saw the two countries as providing a rubric for a new type of politics. Utilizing an array of published, unpublished, and archival sources, I will study how diverse individuals, from the historian Uehara Senroku to burakumin activist Jiichirō Matsumoto, believed that Sino–Indian friendship, unlike the failed project of Japanese imperialism, could unite “Asia” in its struggle against imperialism amid the Cold War and accelerating decolonization. In following this model, they also believed that Japan could escape American hegemony and become “Asian” again. Japanese analyses of “China–India” as offering an “Asian” recipe for overcoming imperialism and navigating bloc politics help showcase how ideas of Asia continued to serve as a space for contemplating political possibilities during the early Cold War, transforming Japan from the region's former tutor to its pupil.


InterConf ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 218-227
Author(s):  
Aida Baghirova

The end of the Cold War and decline of the bipolar structure of the international relations led to significant changes of the foreign policy strategy and tactic of a large number of countries. During the late 1990’s, especially after the Gulf War, new approaches in relation with the neighbouring countries were being shaped in the regional policy of Iraq and Turkey. After the 2003 War and the post-war years the relations between two countries developed successfully in many spheres despite the existing problems. This became largely possible due to diversification of foreign policy of Iraq and Turkey: the first lost the status of one of the leading states of the region, and the second was confirmed in the status of the leader of the Middle East. The article considers bilateral relations after the war in 2003 and until 2010’s.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document