WHITE TIME

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Mills

AbstractThe racialization of space is the subject of a huge body of literature, most recently in George Lipsitz’s (2011)How Racism Takes Place. But less has been done on the ways in which time could be racialized. Inspired by provocative treatments of the subject in writings by Michael Hanchard (1999) and Lawrie Balfour (2011), I suggest in this paper that we need to explore the workings of a “White temporal imaginary” analogous to Lipsitz’s “White spatial imaginary,” which likewise serves to protect White racial privilege from the threatening encroachments of racial justice. Using Eviatar Zerubavel’s (2003)Time Mapsas a jumping-off point, I argue accordingly for the recognition of a “White time,” a “sociomental” representation of temporality shaped by the interests and experience of the White “mnemonic community.” The concept is obviously one of potentially very general usefulness, but in this essay I seek to apply it specifically to the dominant discourse on justice in political philosophy, as framed for the past forty years by John Rawls’ ([1971] 1999c) “ideal theory.” The relevance to the postracial theme of this issue is that, because of the peculiarity of philosophy as a discipline, it can claim it was always, or always-already, postracial, dealing as it ostensibly does with the (timeless) human condition as such. By making ideal theory—the normative theory of a perfectly just society—central to the conceptualization of social justice, by never exploring how radically different actual societies are from the ideal of society as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” an exclusionary sociohistorical framework is established that makes the Euro-time of the West—abstracted out of the West’s relations of domination over people of color—the Greenwich Mean Time of normativity, while the alternative non-White temporality of structurally unjust societies requiring rectificatory racial justice remains a subject permanently untimely.

Author(s):  
Christopher Thompson

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).


2019 ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Lebron

What will ensure that persons abide by the moral demands imposed on them by a normative theory of justice? Rawls believed that these demands, which he called “strains of commitment,” will not be betrayed when undertaken by rational agents under reasonable conditions. Christopher Lebron argues that we are not so dependable; facts such as regret, bias, and poor critical judgment are central to the human condition and threaten to undermine the fulfillment of justice. Given the complexity of our moral lives, Lebron argues that love can play an important ethical role in upholding justice. Focusing specifically on racial justice, he brings James Baldwin’s notion of philia into the conversation about strains of commitment and argues that it is a potent resource for achieving stability and a lasting justice. He concludes by discussing the role love can play in bending the arc of the moral universe increasingly toward justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-237
Author(s):  
Uskali Mäki

Idealization is ubiquitous in human cognition, and so is the inclination to be puzzled by it: what to make of ideal gas, infinitely large populations, homo economicus, perfectly just society, known to violate matters of fact? This is apparent in social science theorizing (from J. H. von Thünen, J. S. Mill, and Max Weber to Milton Friedman and Thomas Schelling), recent philosophy of science analyzing scientific modeling, and the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy (since John Rawls). I will offer a set of concepts and principles to improve transparency about the precise contents of idealizations (in terms of negligibility, applicability, tractability, and early-step status) and their distinct functions (such as contributing to minimal modeling, benchmark modeling, and how-possibly modeling).


JCSCORE ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-124
Author(s):  
OiYan A. Poon ◽  
Jude Paul Matias Dizon ◽  
Dian Squire

This article presents a case study of the 2006-2007 Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) student-led Count Me In! (CMI) campaign. This successful campaign convinced the University of California (UC) to account for 23 AAPI ethnic identities in its data system. Celebrated as a victory for AAPI interests in discourses over racial equity in education, which are often defined by a Black- white racial paradigm, CMI should also be remembered as originating out of efforts to demonstrate AAPI solidarity with Black students and to counter racial wedge politics. In the evolution of the CMI campaign, efforts for cross-racial solidarity soon faded as the desire for institutional validation of AAPI educational struggles was centered. Our case study analysis, guided by sociological frameworks of racism, revealed key limitations in the CMI campaign related to the intricate relations between people of color advocating for racial justice. We conclude with cautions for research and campaigns for ethnically disaggregated AAPI data, and encourage advocates and scholars to address AAPI concerns over educational disparities while simultaneously and intentionally building coalitions for racial equity in higher education.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


Author(s):  
Christopher W. Morris

It is often said that the subject matter of political philosophy is the nature and justification of the state. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel thinks that political science is “nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity.” John Rawls famously understands “the primary subject of justice [to be] the basic structure of society,” restricting his attentions to a society “conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies,” and assuming that “the boundaries of these schemes are given by the notion of a self-contained national community.” Contemporary political philosophers often follow suit, disagreeing about what states should do, and simply assuming that they are the proper agents of justice or reform. The history of philosophy and the development of political concepts seem to be central to understanding the state. The influence of Roman law and republican government, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, are obvious important influences. The modern state emerged first in Western Europe in early modern times.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.


Author(s):  
Edward G. Goetz

This chapter outlines the points of agreement and disagreement between integrationist and community development approaches to racial justice. The evolution of the debate between these two approaches is summarized. The chapter provides an argument for moving forward and resolving the conflict by focusing on providing people of color with real housing choice but without placing the burden for resolving inequalities on their shoulders. The way forward involves the larger pursuit of racial justice and regional equity, pursuits that are more readily achievable through community development initiatives.


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