Just Society as a Fair Game: John Rawls and Game Theory in the 1950s

2017 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrius Gališanka
1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


Author(s):  
Robert Allen

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.


Author(s):  
Christopher Thompson

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250001 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN SHUBIK

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given, together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The reference section given serves only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written on this topic. The purpose here is to present a broadbrush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and their abstract investigation.


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faruk Gul

The purpose of this essay is to celebrate the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten to economics. The emphasis is on tracing the influence of their work on economic analysis rather than giving a detailed account of each of their contributions. The three researchers are identified with the three most important ideas in game theory: equilibrium, asymmetric information, and credibility. These three ideas have dominated not only theoretical research but also numerous other fields within economics since the 1950s.


2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Schaefer

This paper critically assesses the “procedural” accounts of political justice set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). I argue that the areas of agreement between Rawls and Nozick are more significant than their disagreements. Even though Nozick offers trenchant criticisms of Rawls's argument for economic redistribution (the “difference principle”), Nozick's own economic libertarianism is undermined by his “principle of rectification,” which he offers as a possible ground in practice for the application of something like the difference principle. Both Rawls's and Nozick's accounts of justice fail because of their abstraction from human nature as a ground of right. At the same time the libertarianism on which they agree in the non-economic sphere would deprive a free society of its necessary moral underpinning. Rawls and Nozick err, finally, by demanding that the policies pursued by a just society conform to theoretical formulas concocted by philosophy professors, rather than leaving room (as Lockean liberalism does) for the adjustment of policies to particular circumstances based on statesmen's prudential judgment and the consent of the governed. Particularly troubling from the perspective of a citizen seriously concerned with the advancement of justice and freedom is both thinkers' shrill denunciations of existing liberal societies for failing to conform to their particular strictures.


Author(s):  
Emilio Renzi

Salvatore Veca (31 October 1943 - 7 October 2021) was not only a lecturer in many universities, including eventually Pavia, but also an active intellectual in many important civic structures. A brilliant pupil of Enzo Paci at the University of Milan, editor of the journal «aut aut», Veca chaired the Fondazione Feltrinelli and the Casa della Cultura in Milan and was the author of many books on philosophy based on the critical introduction of Anglo-Saxon analytical culture. The presentation in Italy of the work of John Rawls was important and marked the liveliest interest in the problem of the “just society”. He played a leading role in the debate on the possible developments of the Italian left after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the Expo Laboratory he was responsible for drafting the “Milan Charter” on environmental sustainability.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
Ali Mehdi

Given the backlash against the politics and practice of social justice, this chapter provides a justification for an engagement with the proactive debate in political philosophy on ‘equalisandum’—what is to be equalized across individuals in a just society—since the publication of John Rawls’ path-breaking work, A Theory of Justice, in 1971. Since injustice faced by children is the biggest blot on the promise of equality of opportunity, it makes a case for anchoring the discussion of equalisandum in the context of child survival, in India. Millions of children continue to lack the opportunity to even survive within the first five years of birth, and India has recorded not only the highest number of child deaths for decades, but also some of the worst forms of injustice. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on why Amartya Sen’s capability metric is preferable vis-à-vis its Rawlsian and resourcist counterparts, both conceptually and contextually.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Festl

AbstractIn recent years research on John Rawls has experienced a surge in interest in Rawls’s elaborations on the economic order of a just society. This research entails the treatment of the issue which societal role Rawls attaches to work. Somewhat dissatisfied with these treatments the article at hand develops an alternative account of the function Rawls has in mind for work. It will be argued that within Rawls’s idea of a just society the societal role of work consists of three components: an ‘efficiency component’, a ‘self-respect, component’, and a ‘sense of community component.’ Based on that, reconstruction of the Rawlsian position I will investigate whether such a position is reconcilable with the demand for an unconditional Basic Income. The article’s contribution is mostly exegetical albeit, in dealing with Basic Income it elucidates how an oft-proposed policy consideration with a bearing upon work can and cannot, be justified.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 449
Author(s):  
Rafael Soares de Lima ◽  
Murilo Chaves Vilarinho

Segundo John Rawls, uma sociedade justa é aquela em que há garantia da liberdade individual e da promoção e distribuição equitativa de oportunidades e recursos. O presente artigo objetiva abordar os princípios da justiça como equidade, em Rawls, enquanto instrumentos para a reflexão acerca das políticas públicas educacionais no Brasil, em especial o Plano Nacional de Educação (PNE). Metodologicamente, o estudo se baseia em pesquisa exploratória, bibliográfica e análise documental. Como resultados,  identifica correlações entre os objetivos do PNE, a manutenção das liberdades iguais e a maximização das expectativas dos menos favorecidos, bem como limitações em relação à distribuição equitativa de oportunidades de ocupação, no âmbito da estrutura básica da sociedade, com atenção especial para a educação.EDUCATION POLICY ACCORDING TO JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICEAbstract According to John Rawls, a just society is one in which individual freedom and the promotion and equitable distribution of opportunities and resources are guaranteed. The present article aims to address the principles of justice as equity, in Rawls, as instruments for reflection on educational public policies in Brazil, especially the National Education Plan (PNE). Methodologically, the study is based on exploratory research, literature and document analysis. As a result, it identifies correlations between the objectives of the PNE, the maintenance of equal freedoms and the maximization of the expectations of the less fortunate, as well as limitations regarding the equitable distribution of occupation opportunities, within the basic structure of society, with special attention to the education.Keywords: Education. Public Policies. Theory of Justice. John Rawls.


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