scholarly journals Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the principal–agent–client model

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indira Carr
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Recipient Country ◽  
Southern African Development Community ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Civil Service Reform ◽  
African Development ◽  
The Public ◽  
Technical Input ◽  
Donor Agencies ◽  
Pac Model

Since the 1990s, a number of anti-corruption conventions have been adopted due to pressure from international financial institutions, donor countries and governments of major industrialised nations. One of these conventions is the Anti-corruption Protocol adopted by the Southern African Development Community. This article examines this Convention against the backdrop of the principal–agent–client (PAC) model which influences much of the current anti-corruption measures ranging from legal and civil service reform through to privatisation of the public sector. In focusing on the efforts to fight and prevent corruption through legal and public sector reform, this paper highlights the limitations of externally imposed solutions largely driven by donors. Using Tanzania, a country that has seen extensive technical input from donor agencies in reforming the law and bureaucratic structures, as an illustration, this article argues that the limited success of such donor-driven anti-corruption strategies is attributable to a number of reasons ranging from reform policies of donors and paternalistic attitudes to political shifts and antipathy towards external demands for reforms that are fuelled by the colonial past. This paper recommends that for a recipient country to take ownership of the anti-corruption strategies it is important to tailor the PAC model to the cultural, social and political context of the recipient country so that the solutions are seen as an indigenous initiative, thus enabling sustainable change in attitudes and behaviour.

scholarly journals Importation and distribution of unregistered medicines in the public sector: similarities, differences and shared challenges among Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Admire Nyika ◽  
Bernard Ngara ◽  
Isaac Mutingwende ◽  
Luther Gwaza
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Software Package ◽  
Document Analysis ◽  
Southern African Development Community ◽  
African Development ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Regulatory Systems ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
Implementation Gaps

Abstract BackgroundThe purpose of the study was to assess the requirements for approval of the importation of unregistered medicines for use in the public sector in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.MethodsThe study reviewed the legal provisions and requirements to be fulfilled when importing unregistered medicines for the public sector in SADC countries relative to two comparators drawn from countries with stringent regulatory systems through extant document analysis. The relative implementation index score was calculated and used to measure the level of implementing legal provisions and requirements to be fulfilled. Analysis was performed using the STATA software package. ResultsApproximately 13 out of 16 SADC countries had a relative implementation index below 50%. The aggregated implementation index across all SADC countries was 44%, ranging from 4% to 54%, while the two comparators had a relative implementation index of 81% and 85%, respectively.ConclusionImplementing the minimum requirements for importing unregistered medicines for the public sector was deficient compared to the jurisdictions with stringent regulatory systems, and wide implementation gaps also existed within the SADC region.

scholarly journals Issues in the Designing of Public Sector Reform

1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (4II) ◽  
pp. 299-327
Author(s):  
Nadeem ul Haq
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Civil Service Reform ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Management Reform ◽  
Public Sector Management ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Government

“Civil service reform,” which has become the nickname for public sector management reform in the parlance of development economics, has only recently and grudgingly been accepted by those who advise on policy in the poor countries. Even then, the approach is somewhat paternalistic in that it emphasises externally-designed rules and processes for management, organisation, audit and accountability. It recognises the role of people in terms of noting that incentives and employment policies matter but only in terms of right-sizing the government and second to the need to spread budgetary resources over the politically chosen level of employment. What it does not accept is that and the drive to manage the public sector better has to be led and implemented by the domestic talent and in that they must have both the incentive and the honour of doing just that. This paper argues that the main reason that the public sector management has suffered in many of the poor countries is that incentives have been allowed to erode rapidly as public sector employment was viewed politically as a means of providing welfare.

Benchmarking applications in public sector principal‐agent relationships

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 723-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjørn Andersen ◽  
Bjørnar Henriksen ◽  
Ingrid Spjelkavik
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Sector Organizations ◽  
Further Development

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.Design/methodology/approachCollection and critical analysis of secondary data from relevant publications addressing applications of benchmarking in the public sector. Extraction of knowledge from several research projects where the authors have been involved in studying and developing benchmarking approaches for different public sector organizations. Induction of new theory about the use of benchmarking in principal‐agent relationships in the public sector, grounded through empirical evidence from case studies.FindingsA number of new approaches to benchmarking in the public sector have been identified and described, some of which are already used in real life cases, others which need further development before being implemented. All of these can introduce benefits to both principals and agents involved in such benchmarking efforts.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper explores benchmarking applications that are almost exclusively relevant in a public sector setting, although some of them might be adapted to certain private sector conditions.Originality/valueWhereas most work on benchmarking in the public sector tend to view only improvement‐oriented, voluntary benchmarking as relevant and useful, this paper demonstrates how many different imposed benchmarking schemes with other purposes can be useful.

Dynamic performance incentive model with supervision mechanism for PPP projects

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (9) ◽  
pp. 2643-2659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Zhang ◽  
Lu Yu ◽  
Wenyu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Dynamic Performance ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Operation Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Model

PurposeThis study is aimed to explore the dynamic performance incentive model for a flexible PPP contract to handle uncertainties based on supervision during the long-time concession period, so as to ensure operation performance and benefits of the public sector while protecting the economic benefit of the private sector, thus avoiding unnecessary renegotiation.Design/methodology/approachThe microeconomic and principal–agent theories and relevant studies on the basic incentive model and flexible contract are fully utilized. The procedure for developing the dynamic incentive model and the assumptions about the quantitative relationships among fundamental variables or factors are first proposed. The static incentive model without incentive parameter adjustment and then the dynamic incentive model allowing incentive parameter adjustment are successively developed. Finally, the propositions regarding the valid adjustment ranges of the incentive parameter with respect to the economic, social and hybrid benefits of the public sector and the economic benefit of the private sector are suggested.FindingsThe dynamic incentive model enables to achieve a flexible contract to handle uncertainties on the PPP project to ensure the benefits of the public sector while protecting the benefit of the private sector. The economic, social and hybrid benefits of the public sector and the economic benefit of the private sectors can be respectively realized through adjusting the reward–punishment coefficient under different adjustment ranges and different importance. The incentive model is able to ensure the benefits of the public sector while protecting the benefit of the private sector by controlling the private sector's effort level unknown to the public sector.Originality/valueThe dynamic incentive model helps implement a flexible PPP contract to handle uncertainties during the operation period, thus controlling the effort level of the private sector and ensuring the benefits of the public sector while protecting the economic benefit of the sector. It enables to clarify the quantitative relationships between the operation performance, the benefits of the stakeholders, the effort level of the private sector and the reward–punishment coefficient. This study contributes to the domain knowledge of the incomplete contract theory for designing a flexible PPP contract with dynamic incentive and supervision mechanism by applying the microeconomic and principal–agent theories.

scholarly journals Directions of Civil Service Institutional Transformation

Upravlenie ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Борщевский ◽  
G. Borshchevskiy
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Public Service ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Civil Service ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Civil Service Reform ◽  
The Public ◽  
New Public

The concepts of rational bureaucracy, New Public Management and Good Governance were studied. It is indicated that wrongly assume that one of them is more progressive, because all concepts originally aimed at the rationalization of the public service and subordination its own interests according the interests of society. A set of conditions for the participation of citizens in governance exists today. There are a networked organization, a partnership, a production of public goods, and value of public interest. It is proved that in the Concept of the Russian Federation civil service reform (2001) laid the modernization potential for building an open and democratic public service. We postulate the classification of the barriers and challenges that hinder the civil service reform, and we formulate the growth points and the alternative transformation vectors. Then we consider the risks of each alternative in the short, medium and long term, and how to overcome them. It is indicated that the priority should be the harmonization of the legal framework for civil service and public sector. In the first step is need the convergence of the legal content of civil service with other activities in the public sector, and the renouncement the civil servants to serve to politicians, which is aimed at increasing their personal responsibility. It is necessary to implement the new basic legal principle of targeting efforts of the civil servants to achieve economic growth and improve the quality of citizens life. In the next step a new phenomenon – the public service – should be formed. The new public service will include the civil service, municipal service and the public sector organizations, as well as some other types of organizations. This requires some changes in the personnel policy: the formation of a single personnel reserve for the entire public service, improving the qualification requirements for all public positions based on professional specializations, and ensuring the effective public control. A systematic approach to the creation of the public service will increase the efficiency of public institutions and their resilience in the face of global instability. Our conclusions were tested in draft the Strategy of socio-economic development of Russia for the period till 2030.

scholarly journals Foreign Aid, Defence Expenditure and Public Investment in Pakistan

1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (4II) ◽  
pp. 895-908 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salim Chishti ◽  
M. Aynul Hasan
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Foreign Capital ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Capital Inflows ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Consumption ◽  
Foreign Capital Inflows ◽  
The Government ◽  
Donor Agencies

The government schemes in many develqping economies are, in general, financed through internal borrowings, generating taxes domestically and increased foreign capital resources from public or private donor agencies. While the need for the public sector in planning, operation and implementations process of the government schemes, in developing economies is now well recognised [e.g., Weisskopf (1972); Papanek (1973); Heller (1974, 1975)], there still seems to be some controversy prevailing, at least for some developing nations, so far as, the ability of the public sector in channelling these scarce resources to the most productive use is concerned. In this context, [Heller (1975), p. 429] writes: ... the effectiveness of the govemment's development efforts have been cast in doubt. {It has been] argue{d] that foreign capital inflows have resulted in increased public or private consumption rather than increased investment, and contributed less to growth than was anticipated... the higher tax burden has been squandered on non-productive fonns of public consumption. It is also important to note that foreign inflows come under two dominant categories, namely, grants and loans. The first type (grants) can be viewed as inflows intended to provide temporary and immediate relief of the developing economy in situations of emergencies. On the other hand, the second category of transfers by the donor agencies are for long-term developmental purposes and are expected to be used for public investments. Based on a panel data on developing countries, [Levy (1987), p. 456] argued that:

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