Repressive agent defections: How power, costs, and uncertainty influence military behavior and state repression

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 591-607
Author(s):  
Kimberly R Frugé

Leaders are incentivized to repress in the face of mobilized dissent. However, leaders are unable to repress alone and rely on repressive agents, who can shirk the order and weaken the leader’s control. I use a formal model to analyze when the leader can use repression strategically to avoid defection, based on leader type. Each type has incentives to repress to distort the leader’s risk of removal and thus deter defection. Power, cost, and uncertainty are important in both the leader’s and the agent’s decision to repress. Testable hypotheses reveal how executive power and punishment influence the level of repression.

Author(s):  
Julian Wucherpfennig

Abstract Scholars have debated whether executive power sharing can secure peace in multiethnic states, but concerns about endogeneity due to reverse causation render this a difficult problem for empirical analyses. In the absence of a suitable instrumental variable, I explore an actor-based approach by studying a simple formal model. This highlights the conditions under which governments are likely to share power with a domestic challenger depending on the threat of violence. I then formulate a statistical “strategic selection” model that closely mirrors the theoretical model, thereby directly incorporating endogeneity. Applied to data at the level of ethnic groups, the estimation results indicate that power sharing is indeed enacted strategically by governments in anticipation of the risk of conflict. However, shedding new light on an ongoing debate, I find that the critics have overstated the case against power sharing: rather than spurring it, power sharing robustly reduces civil conflict. Expertos han debatido si el reparto del poder ejecutivo puede garantizar la paz en los estados multiétnicos, pero las inquietudes sobre la endogeneidad debido a la causalidad inversa hacen que este sea un problema difícil para aplicar métodos de análisis empírico. A falta de una variable instrumental apropiada, exploro un enfoque basado en los actores aplicando un modelo formal simple. Esto pone de manifiesto las condiciones en las que es probable que los gobiernos compartan el poder con un adversario local en función de la amenaza de violencia. A continuación, formulo un modelo estadístico de “selección estratégica” que refleja fielmente el modelo teórico, incorporando así, de forma directa, la endogeneidad. Al aplicar los datos de acuerdo con los grupos étnicos, los resultados de la estimación indican que el reparto de poder es, en efecto, una práctica estratégica de los gobiernos en previsión del riesgo de conflicto. Sin embargo, al arrojar nueva luz sobre un debate en curso, descubro que los críticos han sobredimensionado los argumentos contra el reparto de poder: en lugar de estimular el conflicto, el reparto de poder reduce considerablemente los conflictos civiles. Des chercheurs ont débattu pour savoir si le partage du pouvoir exécutif pouvait garantir la paix dans les États multiethniques, mais les préoccupations liées à l'endogénéité résultant de la causalité inverse compliquent cette problématique pour les analyses empiriques. En l'absence d'une variable instrumentale adaptée, j'explore une approche basée sur les acteurs en étudiant un modèle formel simple. Cela me permet de mettre en évidence les conditions dans lesquelles les gouvernements sont susceptibles de partager le pouvoir avec un opposant national en fonction de la menace de violence. Je formule ensuite un modèle statistique de « sélection stratégique » qui reflète fidèlement le modèle théorique en intégrant directement l'endogénéité. Appliqués à des données au niveau des groupes ethniques, les résultats de l'estimation indiquent que le partage du pouvoir est effectivement adopté de manière stratégique par les gouvernements en anticipation du risque de conflit. Cependant, en apportant un nouvel éclairage sur le débat actuel, je constate que les critiques ont exagéré les arguments contre le partage du pouvoir: plutôt que d'encourager les conflits civils, le partage du pouvoir les réduit fortement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Blair ◽  
Erica Chenoweth ◽  
Michael C. Horowitz ◽  
Evan Perkoski ◽  
Philip B.K. Potter

Abstract Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability but also presents security risks. This is particularly the case when organizations face substantial repression from the state. As a consequence, for cooperation to emerge and persist when it is most valuable, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even when the incentives to defect are high. We posit that shared ideology plays this role by providing community monitoring, authority structures, trust, and transnational networks. We test this theory using new, expansive, time-series data on relationships between militant organizations from 1950 to 2016, which we introduce here. We find that when groups share an ideology, and especially a religion, they are more likely to sustain material cooperation in the face of state repression. These findings contextualize and expand upon research demonstrating that connections between violent nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.


1992 ◽  
Vol 269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Dauerman ◽  
Gabriele Windgasse ◽  
Naihong Zhu ◽  
Yaoll He

ABSTRACTThe objective Is to develop processes to treat hazardous waste streams using microwave treatment. First, physical chemical mechanisms have been posited for a variety, of such waste streams including: soils contaminated with organics, and toxic heavy metals; “spent” GAC; organics in the gas phase. Second, feasibility tests are being carried out to determine if on-site field testing is warranted. In the case of microwave-induced steam distillation of volatile and semivolatile organics, pilot plant stuides indicate that the incident power cost is not prohibitive: that fear of prohibitive power costs has been thought to be the major drawback for micrwave treatment to become a competitive technology in this market.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter John Loewen

Abstract.Some citizens differ in their levels of concern for the supporters of various parties. I demonstrate how such concerns can motivate citizens to vote. I first present a simple formal model that incorporates concern for others and election benefits to explain the decision to vote. By predicting substantial turnout, this model overcomes the “paradox of participation.” I then verify the model empirically. I utilize a series dictator games in an online survey of more than 2000 Canadians to measure the concern of individuals for other partisans. I show how the preferences revealed in these games can predict the decision to vote in the face of several conventional controls. Taken together, the formal model and empirical results generate a more fulsome and satisfactory account of the decision to vote than an explanation which relies solely on duty.Résumé.Les citoyens ne se préoccupent pas tous des partisans des divers partis politiques. Je démontre comment de telles préoccupations peuvent motiver les citoyens à participer aux élections. Je présente d'abord un modèle formel qui explique la décision de voter en intégrant les préoccupations à l'égard des autres électeurs et les bénéfices associés à une élection. En prédisant une part substantielle de la participation, ce modèle surmonte le paradoxe de la participation électorale. Ensuite, le modèle est vérifié empiriquement. J'emploie à cette fin une série de jeux du dictateur insérés dans une enquête menée en ligne auprès de 2000 Canadiens afin de mesurer leur degré de préoccupation à l'égard des autres partisans. Je montre comment les préférences révélées dans ces jeux peuvent prédire la décision de voter. Ensemble, le modèle formel et les résultats empiriques produisent une explication plus éloquente et plus satisfaisante de la décision de voter lors d'une élection que les explications qui s'appuient seulement sur le sens du devoir.


1987 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
V Ranganathan ◽  
Damodar Mall

Galloping demand for power and mounting constraints in its generation have forced electricity boards all over the country to impose power cuts. User industries have been forced to go for captive power plants to tide over the situation. In this article, V Ranganathan and Damodar Mall compare captive power and grid power costs in Karnataka. At the observed low utilization of between 6 and 20 per cent, captive power cost is Rs 1.95 while grid power cost is only 31 paise per KWH. The authors argue that the user industries should pursue the options of cooperative generation of power or become a financing partner with the electricity boards for assured and reliable power supply.


Author(s):  
Баранов ◽  
Vladimir Baranov ◽  
Шилова ◽  
Vera Shilova

Now the problem of ensuring economic security is a priority for the Government of the Russian Federation, federal bodies of executive power to its subjects. An effective instrument for ensuring economic security Act the executive authorities in the face of law enforcement. Their actions include a set of measures aimed primarily at minimizing threats to economic security, which, in turn, imposes special requirements to the professional readiness specialist.


Author(s):  
Irina Ichim

This chapter explores developments in the protection of human-rights in Kenya post-2002 by examining three interconnected issues: changes in the social and political landscape and how these created or constrained opportunities for activism; changes in the relationship between the state and the human-rights sector, but also within the human-rights sector; and evolving patterns of (non-)state repression of activism. The chapter shows that, against the background of a complex historical experience, and with the help of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and a reformed judiciary, the human-rights sector in Kenya has grown into a staunch and able defender of civic space in the face of recent government assaults. However, government propaganda and the sector’s institutionalization simultaneously coalesce to disconnect the sector from the public. Coupled with divisions between professional and grassroots defenders, this disconnect risks limiting the sector’s ability to build on the momentum presented by recent achievements.


Ritið ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-94
Author(s):  
Lára Magnúsardóttir

The article recounts the account from the Árna saga about Loftur Helgason’s trip to Bergen in 1282 and his stay there over winter, explained in terms of the formal sources about the organization of the government and changes in the law in the latter half of the 13th century. These changes were aimed at introducing into Iceland the power of both the King and the Church and in fact marked the actual changes throughout the Norwegian state. Loftur was Skálholt‘s official and the story about him was part of a long-standing dispute about the position of the chieftains versus the new power of the Church and the opposition to its introduction. The article defines the political confusion described in the Árna sagain Bergen in the winter of 1282-1283 as, on the one hand, changes in the constitution and, on the other hand, legislation, and at the same time whether the Kings Hákon Hákonarson and his son Magnús had systematically pursued a policy of having the Church be an independent party to the government of the state from 1247 onward until the death of the latter in 1280. When the disagreement is looked at as continuing, it is seen that Icelanders had made preparations for changes in the constitution with assurances of introduction of the power of the Church beginning in 1253 and the power of the King from 1262, but, on the other hand, the disagreements in both countries disappeared in the 1270s in the face of the conflict of interests that resulted from the laws that followed in the wake of the constiututional changes. Árna saga tell of this and how the disputes were described, but also that their nature changed as King Erikur came to power in 1280, as he gave the power of the King a new policy that was aimed against the power of the Church. Ousting of the archbishop from Norway and the Christian funerals of the excommunicated chieftains are examples of the conditions of government that could not have been, if the King had no longer had executive power over Christian concerns, as he had already conceded power over spiritual issues to the Pope in Rome with the Settlement at Túnsberg in 1277.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Christine Bogle

<p>In the first decade of the 21st century, Bhutan and Tonga enacted reforms which took executive power away from the monarch and placed it the hands of an elected government. Conversely, Thailand and Nepal have faltered in their trajectory towards democracy. Thailand is stuck in a cycle of repression, popular protest, limited democracy, renewed military takeover, and constitutional revision to allow a controlled “democracy.” Nepal has broken out of a similar cycle (although without military rule), at the cost of abolishing its monarchy. This thesis looks at factors, including the monarchy’s role, which contributed to the different outcomes. The study questions Huntington’s theory of the modernising monarch’s dilemma (fear that reform would do the monarch out of a job), and suggests that, on the contrary, a democratising monarch is more likely to retain the throne, albeit with reduced power.  This comparative qualitative study is based on research into primary and secondary sources, plus interviews. The thesis found that in Bhutan and Tonga strong leadership of democratisation by Kings Jigme Singye and George V greatly favoured a successful democratic transition. In both Thailand and Nepal, monarchs Bhumibol and Gyanendra resisted a democratic bargain, seeking instead to retain or regain political power, in a context where popular mobilisation and the role of the military were significant in both countries, but with considerable differences. Contrary to Huntington’s theory, monarchs in Thailand and Nepal, in seeking to avoid loss of political ascendancy suffered the opposite, although to differing degrees (one monarchy was disestablished while the other first gained ground but ultimately ceded ground to the military, reversing a pattern of monarchical dominance in the partnership). The thesis concluded that, against a historical background of special status for the monarch as symbol of national unity, and even in the face of unpromising structural conditions, monarchs who used their charisma to promote and lead a move to democracy were a critical factor in whether a transition would be successful, while securing the future of the monarchy for their heirs. Conversely, monarchs who formed strategic alliances with elite groups seeking to preserve their ascendancy, including the military, provided an excuse to autocratic groups for resisting democracy and risked either a reversion to (or retention of) autocratic rule or a transition to a democracy that did not include a place for the monarchy.</p>


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