Returning foreign fighters: The case of Denmark

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (907-909) ◽  
pp. 315-336
Author(s):  
Helene Højfeldt Jakobsen

AbstractThis article considers which legal regimes apply in cases where a Danish citizen and/or resident returns from Syria or Iraq after having taken part in the armed conflict on behalf of the group known as Islamic State, and continues his/her affiliation with the armed group. The article argues that international humanitarian law currently applies to the Danish territory and that a Danish foreign fighter may continue to be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities after having returned from Iraq or Syria. The article then considers the application of Danish criminal law to returned foreign fighters and argues that Danish counterterrorism laws do not apply to members of the armed forces of an armed group that is party to an armed conflict with Denmark.

Author(s):  
Hanne Cuyckens ◽  
Christophe Paulussen

Abstract The collapse of the Caliphate, including the resulting surrender of hundreds of fighters to the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the tweets from President Trump threatening his allies to release 800 Islamic State fighters if they would not take back their own citizens, has led to an intense debate on what to do with these so-called foreign fighters. Many counter-terrorism experts and international lawyers have argued that these fighters should be brought home and brought to justice before national courts, for moral, legal and long-term security reasons. In the context of national prosecutions, the aim should be to not have a one-size fits all, but rather a tailored approach, ensuring that perpetrators are prosecuted, as much as possible, for the actual crimes they have committed. If we consider foreign fighters to be individuals joining a non-state armed group in an armed conflict, there is by definition an important nexus between foreign fighters and armed conflict. Hence due regard should also be paid to international humanitarian law in the framework of their prosecution. This article will analyse and assess the first cases where the relationship between counter-terrorism and international humanitarian law played a role and aims to provide, based on the direction this discussion is heading, the necessary guidance.


Author(s):  
Hanne Cuyckens

Abstract Contemporary foreign fighters (FFs) often join so-called dual-nature groups, i.e. groups that can at the same time be qualified as a non-State armed group involved in a non-international armed conflict and a terrorist organization. Both international humanitarian law and counterterrorism (CT) legislation may hence be of relevance when assessing the legality of FF conduct. The CT perspective tends to remain predominant, however. This paper argues that, especially in terms of prosecution, due regard must be paid to both legal frameworks where possible. It also argues that national prosecution in the country of origin seems to offer the best prospects for realizing such cumulative prosecution.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (861) ◽  
pp. 197-206 ◽  

A. LegislationAfghanistanA. Legislation. Afghanistan. The Order of the Minister of National Defence on the Establishment of a Board of Curriculum on [the integration of] the International Law of Armed Conflict into the Educational and Training Institutions of the National Armed Forces, as well as National Army Units was adopted in July 2005. The Order nominates the members of the Board and defines a number of duties and actions to be undertaken for the training and education of national armed forces in the law of armed conflict. These activities include in particular the preparation of teaching materials, the appointment of instructors, and the proposed establishment of a legal department within the education and training institutions of the Ministry of Defence.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANNAH TONKIN

AbstractTens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-134
Author(s):  
Sabin Guţan

Abstract The violent events of December 1989 in Romania, which led to the removal of the Communist regime from power are still shrouded in mystery today. The social disorder and the political chaos of those days overlapped with the violent use of the armed forces that used all kinds of weapons. During the armed confrontations, many casualties (military and civilian) and destruction of goods, including cultural ones, took place. In the years following these events a series of theories, hypotheses, controversies, and trials have emerged, but no one has clearly defined the legal nature of this social-political crisis. The purpose of this scientific approach is not to analyze the events and crimes committed in December 1989, but to determine whether and to what extent the international humanitarian law can be applied to these events.


Author(s):  
Thomas Van Poecke ◽  
Frank Verbruggen ◽  
Ward Yperman

Abstract While armed conflicts are principally governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), activities of members of non-State armed groups and their affiliates may also qualify as terrorist offences. After explaining why the concurrent application of IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism causes friction, this article analyzes the chief mechanism for dissipating this friction: a clause excluding activities governed by IHL from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism. Such armed conflict exclusion clauses exist at the international, regional and national level. This article explains how an exclusion clause can best avoid friction between IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 853-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel O'Donnell

AbstractDuring the second half of the twentieth century the international community, facing the terrorist phenomenon, reacted with the adoption of a series of treaties concerning specific types of terrorist acts, and the obligations of states with regard to them. Alternatively terrorism-oriented legislation, which initially covered only acts affecting civilians, has gradually expanded to cover some acts of terrorism against military personnel and installations. This contribution attempts to assess the repercussions of this evolution on the status and the protection of armed forces engaged in the so-called “war on terrorism” by examining the existing dynamic between these regulations and international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
McLaughlin Robert

This chapter provides a background of the international humanitarian law (IHL) fundamental guarantees. The IHL fundamental guarantees is that body of rules, equally applicable in both forms of armed conflict, that deals with the treatment (and its consequences) of civilians, and of combatants/civilians who are not taking a direct part in hostilities (DPH)/organized armed groups (OAGs) who are hors de combat or otherwise under the control of an adversary belligerent party (and, in some cases, of their own party), when and whilst they remain under that control, and where no other more contextually specific rule of law of armed conflict (LOAC) applies to the treatment or consequence in question. The chapter then assesses a number of specific fundamental guarantees under two broad category headings. The first is humane treatment, which is itself an umbrella fundamental guarantee encompassing: violence to life; through other violent breaches of fundamental guarantees, such as torture and rape; to the proscriptions relating to degrading treatment. The second broad category is restriction of freedoms, focusing upon forced labour and slavery. Whilst this provides but a slim and selective assessment across the broad and still evolving concept of fundamental guarantees, it is hoped that it will nevertheless furnish some indication of the scope and content of this externally referencing, inclusive category of IHL rights and obligations.


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