The Law of Life Insurance in France as affected by a Recent Decision of the Supreme Court of Judicature

1872 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
M. Leon de Montluc
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Life Insurance ◽  
Insurance Policies ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Written Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Made In

Never was a more complete change suddenly brought about in the laws of a nation by legislative enactment than that which has taken place this year in France in the law of life insurance, in consequence of one single decision of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Up to the present time the construction given to the contract of life insurance in this country has been quite different from what it is in England. As there is no provision of written law that relates to life insurance, it being not even so much as mentioned in the Civil or Commercial Codes, people thought themselves justified in governing it by laws and rules of their own. For instance, although it is a principle of law common to both English and French jurisprudence (we may add, to the law of all legislating nations from time immemorial) that choses in action shall necessarily devolve upon our legal representatives after our death, it has hitherto been decided almost universally by French tribunals that an exception was to be made in favour of life insurance policies. By the advocates of that doctrine, the right in the sum assured was thought never to have vested in the person effecting the policy, and the assurance monies were said to be transferred directly, i. e., omisso medio, from the assurer to the party entitled to receive the sum assured; and that sum, accordingly, would not be liable to succession duty.

scholarly journals Piespiedu servitūtu nodibināšana pret atlīdzību

2021 ◽  
pp. 134-153
Author(s):  
Erlens Kalniņš ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Historic Development ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

This article deals with the historic development of the legal framework related to the establishment of coercive servitude in Latvia and the understanding of the so-called “coercive servitude” institute in the existing law in Latvia, as well as the regulation of analogous legal institutes in the law of other states that are a part of the Germanic legal system (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), with the main focus on the establishment of coercive way servitude or the so-called “way of necessity” institute and the preconditions associated with its establishment, as well as the right of the owner of the encumbered (serving) immovable property to receive an adequate remuneration for establishing such limitation, which, by way of legal analogy, should also be recognized in the practice (judicature) of the Senate of the Supreme Court.

PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Finance ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Private Prosecutions in Mauritius: Clarifying Locus Standi and Making the Director of Public Prosecutions more Accountable

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Statutory Requirement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

scholarly journals The Right to Receive Information

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Nevelow Mart
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Board Of Education ◽  
Legal Evolution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

Ms. Mart examines the legal evolution of the right to receive information, particularly focusing on its application to libraries, beginning with the Supreme Court holding in Board of Education v. Pico, and followed by cases that have considered the meaning of Pico in a variety of library-related contexts.

scholarly journals Legal Aid by the State as a Constitutional Right of the Poor: Problems and Challenges in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.

Protection in Ascent, 1908–23

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch
Keyword(s):  
Women Workers ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Children's Hospital ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Children’S Hospital ◽  
The Law ◽  
Made In

This chapter examines Muller's aftermath in legal history through the landmark case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923). In Oregon, an employer (Children's Hospital) sought an injunction against the DC Minimum Wage Board to restrain it from imposing the minimum wage of $16.50 per week for women workers in hotels, hospitals, restaurants, clubs, and apartment houses. The District of Columbia Supreme Court upheld the law in June 1920, as did the DC Court of Appeals in June 1921. However, at the second hearing in November 1922, the DC Court of Appeals upset the law. In 1923, when Adkins v. Children's Hospital reached the Supreme Court, defenders of the minimum wage faced a less receptive roster of justices than they had in 1917; recent appointments made in wartime and soon after had produced a more conservative court. As such, the Supreme Court failed to sustain the District of Columbia minimum wage law by a 5–3 decision.

Under the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Universal Declaration ◽  
Educational Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The World ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The U.S

The right to an education is guaranteed by international law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, UNESCO’s Constitution sets out the right to an education as necessary to “prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.” No such right is mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, though. Perhaps Congress or the Supreme Court would be sympathetic, however, to an argument for educational rights based on the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of the rights of citizenship.

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