scholarly journals The Right to Receive Information

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Nevelow Mart
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Board Of Education ◽  
Legal Evolution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

Ms. Mart examines the legal evolution of the right to receive information, particularly focusing on its application to libraries, beginning with the Supreme Court holding in Board of Education v. Pico, and followed by cases that have considered the meaning of Pico in a variety of library-related contexts.

Political Science and Science Fiction

1958 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1026-1029 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Roche
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Board Of Education ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

I want to dissent initially from the rather constricting frame of reference that Schubert has established in his paper. He has every right in the world to set rhetorical snares, but I have no intention of walking into them. If I may summarize, Schubert asserts that he is a spokesman for a radical new direction in the study of public law, claiming that the old ways are moribund. He further urges that we should look with envy at the creative function of the social psychologists who supplied the Supreme Court with the banners it carried in Brown v. Board of Education while we were bumbling around with historical and philosophical trivia. He concludes that instead of wasting our time with talmudic disputations on whether the Supreme Court reached the “right” or the “wrong” decisions in specific cases, we should settle down to build a firm “scientific” foundation for our discipline.Not the least amusing aspect of this indictment is that I find myself billed as the defender of the ancien régime, as the de Maistre of public law. Therefore, for the benetfit of the young and impressionistic, let me break loose from Schubert's rhetorical trap: I too think that much of the research done in public law—and, for that matter, in political science generally—has been trivial.

The Law of Life Insurance in France as affected by a Recent Decision of the Supreme Court of Judicature

1872 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
M. Leon de Montluc
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Life Insurance ◽  
Insurance Policies ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Written Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Made In

Never was a more complete change suddenly brought about in the laws of a nation by legislative enactment than that which has taken place this year in France in the law of life insurance, in consequence of one single decision of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Up to the present time the construction given to the contract of life insurance in this country has been quite different from what it is in England. As there is no provision of written law that relates to life insurance, it being not even so much as mentioned in the Civil or Commercial Codes, people thought themselves justified in governing it by laws and rules of their own. For instance, although it is a principle of law common to both English and French jurisprudence (we may add, to the law of all legislating nations from time immemorial) that choses in action shall necessarily devolve upon our legal representatives after our death, it has hitherto been decided almost universally by French tribunals that an exception was to be made in favour of life insurance policies. By the advocates of that doctrine, the right in the sum assured was thought never to have vested in the person effecting the policy, and the assurance monies were said to be transferred directly, i. e., omisso medio, from the assurer to the party entitled to receive the sum assured; and that sum, accordingly, would not be liable to succession duty.

Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-708
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
To Receive

In 1968 the United States Supreme Court decided Zschernig v. Miller, a foreign relations case that has been characterized as unique. An Oregon probate statute provided for escheat of a decedent’s property in preference to a nonresident alien’s claim to inherit it unless the alien’s country (1) allowed United States citizens to inherit under similar circumstances, (2) allowed U.S. citizens to receive payment here of funds inherited there, and (3) gave foreign heirs the right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confiscation. Residents of then East Germany, who were the heirs of an Oregon decedent, challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, finding that Oregon probate and appellate judges were basing their decisions on “foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war.’”

scholarly journals Piespiedu servitūtu nodibināšana pret atlīdzību

2021 ◽  
pp. 134-153
Author(s):  
Erlens Kalniņš ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Historic Development ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

This article deals with the historic development of the legal framework related to the establishment of coercive servitude in Latvia and the understanding of the so-called “coercive servitude” institute in the existing law in Latvia, as well as the regulation of analogous legal institutes in the law of other states that are a part of the Germanic legal system (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), with the main focus on the establishment of coercive way servitude or the so-called “way of necessity” institute and the preconditions associated with its establishment, as well as the right of the owner of the encumbered (serving) immovable property to receive an adequate remuneration for establishing such limitation, which, by way of legal analogy, should also be recognized in the practice (judicature) of the Senate of the Supreme Court.

Brown’s Half Light

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derrick Bell
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Black People ◽  
Board Of Education ◽  
New Era ◽  
Black Experience ◽  
Educational Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Black Residents ◽  
The Right ◽  
The City

The Evening Of May 17, 954, was a night for celebration. An office full of ecstatic NAACP workers in Manhattan, as well as black people throughout the country, were doing just that as they hailed the bright new era all assumed would arrive with the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education handed down by the Supreme Court earlier that day. The case was not easily won. It was the culmi­nation of two decades of planning and litigation. At the very least, a party was in order. The NAACP staff hailed the high court’s opinion with cheers, toasts, and impromptu dancing, but according to one report, Thurgood Marshall, one of the chief architects of the litigation wandered morosely through the happy throng frowning. “You fools go ahead and have your fun,” he said, “but we ain’t begun to work yet.” Marshall’s prediction was both prophetic and a highly accurate commentary on the black experience. Even so, the staff had reason to celebrate. The orga­nization was doing what its founders had intended. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)was founded in 1909. Its founders, an interracial group of liberal lawyers and socialists, concerned with the nonenforcement of the Four­teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, saw the need for an organization that would effectively press for political, legal, and educational rights. They sought an end to segregation, the right to work, and the right to protec­tion from violence and intimidation. The need for the NAACP was clear. In the previous year, in addition to the several dozen blacks lynched each year, thousands of whites rioted in Springfield, Illinois. They killed six blacks, two by lynching, and burned and destroyed black homes and businesses. Two thousand blacks left the city but none of the alleged riot leaders were punished, although the city obtained indictments following the restoration of order. The white community launched a political and economic boycott to drive out the remaining black residents. After its founding, the NAACP established a legal redress com­mittee, and in the next decades several of its cases reached the Supreme Court.

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Finance ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

Constitutional Law in 1942–1943: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1942

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese American ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

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