scholarly journals Preliminary Reference and the Hungarian Constitutional Court: A Context of Non-Reference

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1569-1590
Author(s):  
Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
New Member States ◽  
Current State

Jiri Zemanek, Professor at Charles University, Prague, asks what conclusions may be drawn from the current state of acceptance of the European Union (EU) law doctrine by the constitutional courts of the new Member States for their performance in the agenda of preliminary rulings. What can they learn from the experience of the old Member States? Should they follow the practice of the AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof(Constitutional Court), which referred its first question in 1999, four years after its accession, and later repeated it several times? Or should they follow the most active Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle? Should Hungary follow the practice of the Italian Constitutional Court, Lithuania, France, Spain, or Germany? Having reviewed the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the scholarly analysis in search of the “missing links,” this study wishes to contribute to the diverse range of ideas concerning European “rule of law” integration and constitutional court contributions to it.

Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Law

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.

scholarly journals Constitutional Courts and the Rule of Law in the New EU Member States

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-231
Author(s):  
Angela Di Gregorio
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
New Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
New Eu Member States

This paper analyses the use of the rule-of-law principle in the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts of the new Member States of the European Union. The purpose is to discover whether past or recent decisions could clarify the use of the principle in these countries. An example is the legalistic concept of the rule of law as expressed by the Hungarian and Polish constitutional courts in examining the constitutionality of lustration laws. On the other hand, some constitutional courts (such as the Czech one) have used a wider and more sophisticated application of the rule of law. Considering the severe rule-of-law crisis which has been taking place in Hungary and Poland in recent years, this recognition is particularly important in order to avoid cumulative judgments that could devalue the former communist countries in general, trivializing the harsh path of democratic conditionality with its strengths and weaknesses.

Constitutional Jurisdictions Between the Supremacy of the Constitution and the Primacy of European Union Law

De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoriya Mingova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Unique Nature

The interaction between the national constitutional jurisdictions of the Member States and the Court of Justice of the European Union raises questions that often cannot be answered unequivocally. The focus of this debate is, of course, on the fundamental question of whether European Union law takes primacy over national constitutions. This study presents the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the establishment of the principle of autonomy of EU law in relation to the internal law of the Member States in its development, since it is precisely the positions it adopts that allow the Court of Justice to derive the principle of primacy over ‘any provision of internal law’ as a logical and natural consequence of the unique nature of EU law. On the other hand, since this integration activity of the Court of Justice is not the result of a conscious activity of the Member States, legitimated by their constitutions, the inevitable question arises of whether the results of the activity in question do not clash with the main task of the constitutional courts ‒ to ensure a coherent and uniform application of the law within the national legal order and above all in accordance with the constitution. The case law of the constitutional courts of the Member States presented in this study leads to the conclusion that they regard autonomy as a relative characteristic, which is why they reject the principle of absolute primacy of European Union law over constitutional rules. It seems that no constitutional court could abdicate its role as a court of ‘last word’ in this respect.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on ‘judicial authority’ and issuing European arrest warrants

2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Judicial Protection

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.

scholarly journals COLLECTIVE LABOUR RIGHTS AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR LAW

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Labour Rights ◽  
Social Partners ◽  
The Right

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.

scholarly journals The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Law

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.

Mixed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union

scholarly journals How Far Is It from Warsaw to Luxembourg and Karlsruhe: The Impact of the PSPP Judgment on Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104-1115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Impact

AbstractA concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim openness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena. The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the Polish authorities are unfounded.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

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