Political Competition, Partisanship, and Interpersonal Trust Under Party Dominance: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Gregory J. Love ◽  
Daniel J. Young

AbstractHow does single-party dominance influence interpersonal trust? We draw on evidence from trust games played by more than 2,000 subjects in South Africa, where, since Apartheid, race-based social enmity has persisted under democratic competition characterized by single-party dominance. We find that partisan-based trust discrimination is most pronounced for those who identify with the main opposition party and is driven by strong distrust of rival partisans. These findings underscore how electoral competition, in general, shapes trust across party lines and suggests one-sided competition, in particular, has asymmetrical effects between parties in dominant party systems. Moreover, this study provides additional evidence regarding the relative weights of trustworthiness stereotypes tied to partisanship and race.

2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 290-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle Langfield

What is responsible for the decline of democratically dominant parties and the corresponding growth of competitive party systems? This article argues that, despite a ruling party's dominance, opposition forces can gain by winning important subnational offices and then creating a governance record that they can use to win new supporters. It focuses on South Africa as a paradigmatic dominant party system, tracing the increased competitiveness of elections in Cape Town and the surrounding Western Cape province between 1999 and 2010. These events show how party strategies may evolve, reflecting how party elites can learn from forming coalitions.


Author(s):  
Teimuraz Kareli

The article deals with the features of formation of the party systems in the post-Soviet space. To understand the specific processes, the attention is focused on the inverse logic of the post-Soviet states, the basic features of which can be expressed by the concept of neopatrimonialism. In this context the functioning features of political parties, their principal tasks and the logic of creating the "power party" are described. The article examines the key criteria for the concept of the dominant party, such as its ability to consistently and steadily win the elections, the significant duration of its stay in power, as well as its personnel Control over the government. In the sociopolitical discourse the "power party" enjoys a privileged ideological position and has more opportunities compared to its competitors to appeal to voters. Along with that the party dominance reveals itself not only in its external manifestation (the stay in power), but also in the substantial one – the ability to exercise an effective political choice. The article analyzes the factors of sustainability of the "power party" systems: the historical merits of the "power party"; the ruling party’s ability to effectively take advantage of the electoral system; its strong relationships with the most affluent social groups and major corporations, as well as with the predominant ethnic or linguistic social groups; a privileged access of the ruling party to media resources. These factors are also effective in the polycentric political systems without any dominant party. However, under the dominant party systems they manifest themselves in a complex way, providing the ruling camp with a multi-layered protection due to a synergy effect. Particular attention is paid to the phenomenon of clientelism, widely used by the ruling party as a strategy of political mobilization. However, if discrimination arose by clientelism reaches the level that denies clients the right to choose, this is certainly not consistent with the rules of democracy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 103-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Klesner

Abstract Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 123-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ishiyama ◽  
Anna Batta

In this paper, we address the question of why in some de facto states something like “dominant party” politics has emerged, whereas in others there at least appears some form of real political competition. We empirically assess some of the commonly cited factors that affect the character of politics within de facto states (the wealth of the entity, the militarization of society, the level of ethnic homogeneity, and political institutional features). Using Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a method developed specifically to deal with the “small N problem” in empirical inquiry, we apply this framework to 13 post-secessionist unrecognized states.


2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Stephanie Burchard

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (10) ◽  
pp. 1314-1350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan T. Hiskey ◽  
Mason W. Moseley

Though a general consensus exists regarding the significance of perceived performance in voters’ evaluations of incumbent governments, much of the research underlying this consensus has been carried out across political systems with little internal variance in the degree of democracy. We propose that in emerging regimes, where such uniformity in terms of the territorial diffusion of democracy is not a given, characteristics of subnational political regimes can prevent electoral linkages from forming. Specifically, we argue that in subnational contexts where some minimal level of political competition has taken hold, performance-based linkages such as those driving economic voting should surface. However, in subnational dominant-party systems, where clientelistic linkages between voters and political bosses tend to prevail, economic performance and other aspects of an incumbent’s governance record will be less consequential for the voting calculus of citizens, in both provincial and national elections. We find support for this theoretical framework in Argentina and Mexico, two democratic countries characterized by highly uneven subnational political contexts. By highlighting how subnational regime characteristics facilitate or undermine electoral accountability mechanisms, we cast light on the very real representational consequences of uneven democratization in emerging regimes.


Politics ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aris Trantidis

Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of democracy and, consequently, one-party dominance is classified as an ‘inclusive hegemony’ outside his conception of democracy. For procedural definitions of democracy, however, dominant party systems are legitimate outcomes of electoral competition provided that there have been no formal restrictions to the exercise of civil and political rights. The article examines the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism, broadens the notion of authoritarian controls to include soft manipulative practices and explains why government contestability should be regarded as a constitutive property of democracy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Safia Abukar Farole

Abstract How does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.


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