Highlighting the Moral Dimension of Psychology and Psychotherapy: Joining the Natural-Science/Human-Science Dialectic

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (52) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel B. Fishman
2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fraser Watts

The dialogue between theology and psychology is part of the broader dialogue between theology and science, but more two-way. Theology operates with a broader conceptual framework, and points to approaches that psychology may neglect. One of the principal points of intersection between theology and psychology concerns human nature, though there is also a dialogue between theology and psychology about religion itself. Though the claims of the two disciplines are often seen as alternatives, it is argued that they are better seen as complementary perspectives. Issues also arise about the psychological significance of particular religious doctrines. It is argued that psychology is a methodological hybrid, part natural science, part human science, and this facilitates its dialogue with theology. Part of the resistance to psychological approaches to theology is that it is mistakenly thought to undercut the claimed objectivity of the claims made by theology.


1980 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
N. I. Vulegjanin

Among the works on the philosophical problems of medicine, published recently, this book attracts attention with an attempt to consider "the specifics of the subject of medicine as an independent branch of natural science." Clarifying the task, the author notes that in particular, a person can be the subject of many sciences (biology, psychology, medicine, etc.), because each of them finds special laws inherent in a given object (p. 41). According to the famous Soviet psychologist prof. BG Ananiev, there was a promotion of man as a general problem of science, and medicine occupies an increasingly fundamental position in human science [1].


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Applebaum

Abstract Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism.


1995 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Cloonan

AbstractThis article on the early history of phenomenological psychological research in the academic context in America focuses on the four approaches of the following respective psychologists: 1) Donald Snygg, Arthur W. Combs, and Anne C. Richards and Fred Richards; 2) Robert B. MacLeod; 3) Adrian L. van Kaam; and 4) Amedeo P. Giorgi. It begins by first addressing the "context" for this early history namely, the European origin of philosophical phenomenology and the connection of it with the psychology of its times in Europe, and then the American background for the development of a sensibility for phenomenology and an eventual connection of phenomenology with psychology. Each of the four positions was examined in terms of basic approach to the study of human experience and behavior. That is, examination was directed toward whether the respective position was under the aegis of psychology as a human science or as a natural science. Also examined were the research postures and the methodologies of the four positions in terms of their respective degrees of reflecting either the human science or the natural science approach, and in terms of their approximation to a phenomenological psychology. It was found that syncretism characterized the approaches of the first three positions, and that there was either an absence of phenomenological psychological method in the psychologies of those positions or, in the case of MacLeod, an undeveloped and non-worked-out method. Only the work of Amedeo Giorgi presented 1) a human science approach that was radical and not compromised by natural science syncretions, and 2) an articulated phenomenological psychological method based on Husserl's concept of intentionality and on mediation of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical phenomenological method.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-266
Author(s):  
George Kunz

AbstractThis article is a continuation of the challenge begun by early phenomenologists of the reductionistic scientism of Natural Science Psychology. Inspired by five distinctions of Emmanuel Levinas, it seeks to bring a deeper interruption of the seemingly unalterable force of mainstream psychology to model itself after the hard sciences. Levinas distinguishes the experience of totality from infinity, need from desire, freedom as self-initiated and self-directed from freedom as invested by and for the Other, active agency from radical passivity, and the said from saying. Five commonly accepted characteristics of science, objective, empirical, causal, reducible, and value neutral, are used to compare three approaches to psychology: Natural Science, Phenomenology (psychology as a human science), and Psychology for the Other. Using the definition of science, “knowing the phenomenon as it shows itself,” this paper argue that Natural Science Psychology is the least “scientific,” Phenomenological Psychology is more scientific, and Psychology for the Other is the most “scientific” with its ethical command to allow the Other to reveal her/himself. This extravagant but compelling claim is illustrated with descriptions of research and therapy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-154
Author(s):  
Ian Coxon

Oil and water don’t mix: a common expression describing two things that do not usually combine well. In this paper I use this analogy to discuss some of the techniques and methods used within a Danish postgraduate engineering stream to merge the contested territory between Human Science, abductive thinking and Natural Science, logical preconceptions (Water & Oil). The course was designed to help young engineers to step outside their normal positivist system of thinking and to explore, embrace or at least suspend judgement on various forms of emotional/meta-physical logic. Students were introduced to practical methods for developing deeper insight into specific human experiences and to apply this genuinely human-centred perspective to their 'engineered' solutions. The broader goal being, to help students to come to deeper understandings and appreciation of the people for whom they would propose design 'solutions'. The pedagogical process was intended to disrupt their preconceptions in such a way as to help them see many situations more clearly; a process of in-sight based engineering.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Walsh-Bowers

In exploring psychology’s relationship with spirituality and religion, I argue that natural-science psychologists have tended to repress their discipline’s spiritual and religious heritage. History of psychology textbooks sharply distinguish “objective” psychology from “subjective” philosophy, theology, religion, and spirituality, while glossing over historical anomalies such as natural-science psychologists’ ambivalent stance regarding psychoanalysis. Psychologists’ scientism (“worship” of the experimental model, technology, scientific progress, and materialist conceptions of the soul) militates against resolving persistent, disciplinary tensions between objectivity and subjectivity. Rather than emulating psychology, social workers should turn to their own traditions and develop a human-science orientation for their profession. When theorizing, they could connect empowerment and the ecological metaphor with these concepts’ spiritual base. When researching, social workers could foster more active roles for their participants and could write their research articles in more personalized, inter-subjective, and contextualized ways. When educating, they could incorporate critical education in process and content.


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