Determinants of Cooperation in the Trust Game

Author(s):  
Gideon Keren ◽  
Chris Snijders
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.


2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (8) ◽  
pp. 1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwen WANG ◽  
Zhen ZHANG ◽  
Sheng YUAN ◽  
Fengbo GUO ◽  
Shaoying HE ◽  
...  

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King

I report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the influence of noncredible communications and group affiliation on auditors' formation of self-serving bias. I find that manager-subjects use noncredible communications to induce auditors to develop an unwarranted trust of managers (i.e., a biased judgment). However, the bias is neutralized when auditor-subjects belong to groups that create social pressure to conform to group norms. Thus, my finding calls into question the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-serving biases resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 183449092097475
Author(s):  
Na Zhao ◽  
Kaiqiang Xu ◽  
Ling Sun

This study examined the link between residential mobility and interpersonal trust building. Study 1 revealed a negative association between residential mobility and trust by measuring personal residential-mobility history. Study 2 demonstrated that participants who were momentarily primed with mobility showed a lower investment than participants in the control group in a trust game. The results of Study 3 showed that need for closure moderated the link between residential mobility and trust-building intention. Specifically, lower need-for-closure people had a significantly lower trust tendency in the mobility group than in the stable group. These findings illuminate the underlying influence of need for closure in the link between residential mobility and trust.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Oskarsson ◽  
Christopher Dawes ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
Patrik K. E. Magnusson

Recent studies have shown that trusting attitudes and behavior are biologically influenced. Focusing on the classic trust game, it has been demonstrated that oxytocin increases trust and that humans are endowed with genetic variation that influences their behavior in the game. Moreover, several studies have shown that a large share of the variation in survey responses to trust items is accounted for by an additive genetic component. Against this backdrop, this article makes two important contributions. First, utilizing a unique sample of more than 2,000 complete Swedish twin pairs, we provide further evidence of the heritability of social trust. Our estimates of the additive genetic component in social trust were consistent across the sexes – .33 for males and .39 for females – and are similar to the results reported in earlier studies. Secondly, we show that social trust is phenotypically related to three psychological traits – extraversion, personal control, and intelligence – and that genetic factors account for most of these correlations. Jointly, these psychological factors share around 30% of the genetic influence on social trust both for males and females. Future studies should further explore the possible causal pathways between genes and trust using panel data on both psychological traits and social trust.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
Anne van Aaken

Ever more risky service activities are carried out across borders, creating spillovers and externalities. At the same time, if freedom to provide services is legally enabled, states can cooperate in multiple ways to mitigate the potential risks accruing from crossborder activities. Global Administrative Law Scholarship distinguishes five types of administrative regulation: “administration by formal international organizations; administrations based on collective action by transnational networks of governmental officials; distributed administration conducted by national regulators under treaty regimes, mutual recognition arrangements or cooperative standards; administration by hybrid intergovernmental–private arrangements; and administration by private institutions with regulatory functions. In practice many of these layers overlap or combine […]”. In the area of risky cross–border service provision, the EU has moved from a more decentralised version of networks and mutual recognition characterised by coordination and minimum harmonization of rules and standards to a more centralized commandand–control system with European authorities and supervision.


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