Domain and probability/expected value in risky choice framing effects

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis A. Cleland ◽  
Sandra L. Schneider
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Fisher ◽  
David R. Mandel

This article surveys the latest research on risky-choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision-making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people’s judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete – and potentially rationalizing – explanation of framing effects.


2018 ◽  
Vol 226 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Steiger ◽  
Anton Kühberger

Abstract. We reevaluated and reanalyzed the data of Kühberger’s (1998) meta-analysis on framing effects in risky decision making by using p-curve. This method uses the distribution of only significant p-values to correct the effect size, thus taking publication bias into account. We found a corrected overall effect size of d = 0.52, which is considerably higher than the effect reported by Kühberger (d = 0.31). Similarly to the original analysis, most moderators proved to be effective, indicating that there is not the risky-choice framing effect. Rather, the effect size varies with different manipulations of the framing task. Taken together, the p-curve analysis shows that there are reliable risky-choice framing effects, and that there is no evidence of intense p-hacking. Comparing the corrected estimate to the effect size reported in the Many Labs Replication Project (MLRP) on gain-loss framing (d = 0.60) shows that the two estimates are surprisingly similar in size. Finally, we conducted a new meta-analysis of risk framing experiments published in 2016 and again found a similar effect size (d = 0.56). Thus, although there is discussion on the adequate explanation for framing effects, there is no doubt about their existence: risky-choice framing effects are highly reliable and robust. No replicability crisis there.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 771-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaxi Peng ◽  
Yuan Jiang ◽  
Danmin Miao ◽  
Rui Li ◽  
Wei Xiao
Keyword(s):  

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1059-1062 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Dickson

A risky choice was created by manipulating two dimensions of risk for 21 managers attending a conference. The first dimension varied risk by altering the difference in expected value between two alternatives of widely differing variance. The second dimension varied the expectancy of achieving a particular outcome. Whereas choice was significantly related to both dimensions of risk, it was not significantly related to estimates of the subjective risk inherent in the choice situation. It appears that subjective risk does not mediate between objective risk and choice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 241-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Sadolin Damhus ◽  
Gabriela Byskov Petersen ◽  
Thomas Ploug ◽  
John Brodersen

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