Effects of punishment intensity and consistency on the internalization of behavioral suppression in children.

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Leff
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Suppression ◽  
Punishment Intensity

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150139
Author(s):  
Jie Lu ◽  
Peipei Zhang ◽  
Dandan Li
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Memory Factor ◽  
Penalty Cost ◽  
Memory Mechanism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Final Fraction

To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain [Formula: see text] or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals [Formula: see text] would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

scholarly journals Game Research on Coal Mine Workers’ Off-Post Behaviors

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jun Zeng ◽  
Qingguo Yao ◽  
Xinhua Wang ◽  
Yansong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Model ◽  
Coal Mine ◽  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Coal Miners ◽  
Inspection Cost ◽  
Wage Loss ◽  
Safety Production ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

In order to seek for causes and solutions of off-post behaviors of coal miners, static and evolutionary games were utilized on the basis of an established strategy simulation model between coal mine enterprise and coal miners. These games were used to determine the revenue matrix of two game parties given off-post behaviors of coal miners from two levels (coal miners and coal mine enterprise). Thus, equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary analyses of the two parties should be conducted. Results indicated that, in the enterprise’s perspective, inspection cost and punishment intensity are important factors that influence the safety production and economic benefit of coal mine enterprises; in the coal miners’ perspective, wage loss and the constraint degree it generates are essential factors. Furthermore, these factors constitute a key to solving off-post behaviors of coal miners. Reasonability of the established simulation model was analyzed and verified on the basis of off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine that belongs to Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. The coal mine enterprise should enhance the inspection of safety production and establish scientific and complete off-post punishment mechanism. Moreover, the coal mine enterprise should provide proper compensation, treatment, and reward policies of workers to reduce the off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine enterprise effectively.

scholarly journals Hard clam walking: Active horizontal locomotion of adult Mercenaria mercenaria at the sediment surface and behavioral suppression after extensive sampling

PLoS ONE ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. e0173626 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen T. Tettelbach ◽  
James R. Europe ◽  
Christian R. H. Tettelbach ◽  
Jason Havelin ◽  
Brooke S. Rodgers ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mercenaria Mercenaria ◽  
Sediment Surface ◽  
Hard Clam ◽  
Behavioral Suppression

Behavioral suppression induced by oral administration of monosodium L-glutamate in rats

1974 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 619-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sakutaro Tadokoro ◽  
Yoichiro Higuchi ◽  
Hisashi Kuribara ◽  
Kiyoko Okuizumi
Keyword(s):  
Oral Administration ◽  
Behavioral Suppression

Effects of punishment intensity on instrumental avoidance behavior.

1966 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Sandler ◽  
Robert S. Davidson ◽  
William E. Greene ◽  
Ronald D. Holzschuh
Keyword(s):  
Avoidance Behavior ◽  
Punishment Intensity

scholarly journals Preprint: What stops revenge taking? Effects of observed emotional reactions on revenge seeking

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas B Eder ◽  
Vanessa Mitschke ◽  
Mario Gollwitzer
Keyword(s):  
Reactive Aggression ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Retributive Justice ◽  
Total N ◽  
Emotional Display ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Retributive Punishment ◽  
Interpersonal Transgression ◽  
Punishment Intensity

What reaction stops revenge taking? Four experiments (total N=191) examined this question where the victim of an interpersonal transgression could observe the offender’s reaction (anger, sadness, pain, or calm) to a retributive noise punishment. We compared the punishment intensity selected by the participant before and after seeing the offender’s reaction. Seeing the opponent in pain reduced subsequent punishment most strongly, while displays of sadness and verbal indications of suffering had no appeasing effect. Expression of anger about a retributive punishment did not increase revenge seeking relative to a calm reaction, even when the anger response was disambiguated as being angry with the punisher. It is concluded that the expression of pain is the most effective emotional display for the reduction of retaliatory aggression. The findings are discussed in the light of recent research on reactive aggression and retributive justice.

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