scholarly journals The spatiotemporal organization of episodic memory and its disruption in a neurodevelopmental disorder

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilina Mastrogiuseppe ◽  
Natasha Bertelsen ◽  
Maria Francesca Bedeschi ◽  
Sang Ah Lee

AbstractRecent theories of episodic memory (EM) posit that the hippocampus provides a spatiotemporal framework necessary for representing events. If such theories hold true, then does the development of EM in children depend on the ability to first bind spatial and temporal information? And does this ability rely, at least in part, on normal hippocampal function? We investigated the development of EM in children 2–8 years of age (Study 1) and its impairment in Williams Syndrome, a genetic neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by visuospatial deficits and irregular hippocampal function, (Study 2) by implementing a nonverbal object-placement task that dissociates the what, where, and when components of EM. Consistent with the spatiotemporal-framework view of hippocampal EM, our results indicate that the binding of where and when in memory emerges earliest in development, around the age of 3, and is specifically impaired in WS. Space-time binding both preceded and was critical to full EM (what + where + when), and the successful association of objects to spatial locations seemed to mediate this developmental process.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilina Mastrogiuseppe ◽  
Natasha Bertelsen ◽  
Maria Francesca Bedeschi ◽  
Sang Ah Lee

AbstractRecent theories of episodic memory propose that the hippocampus provides the spatiotemporal framework for episodic memories. If this is true, does the development of episodic memory depend on the binding of space and time? And does this rely, at least partly, on normal hippocampal function? We investigated the development of episodic memory in children 2–8 years of age (Study 1) and its impairment in Williams Syndrome (Study 2) by implementing a nonverbal object-placement task that dissociates the what, where, and when components of episodic memory. Our results indicate that the binding of space and time in memory emerges first in development around the age of 3 and is impaired in Williams Syndrome. Space-time binding both preceded and predicted success in full episodic memory (what+where+when), and associating objects to spatial location seemed to mediate this developmental process. Importantly, these effects were not explained by improvements in object or location memory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inês Bernardino ◽  
Susana Mouga ◽  
Miguel Castelo-Branco ◽  
Marieke van Asselen

AbstractWilliams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by severe visuospatial deficits, particularly affecting spatial navigation and wayfinding. Creating egocentric (viewer-dependent) and allocentric (viewer-independent) representations of space is essential for the development of these abilities. However, it remains unclear whether egocentric and allocentric representations are impaired in WS. In this study, we investigate egocentric and allocentric frames of reference in this disorder. A WS group (n = 18), as well as a chronological age-matched control group (n = 20), a non-verbal mental age-matched control group (n = 20) and a control group with intellectual disability (n = 17), was tested with a computerized and a 3D spatial judgment task. The results showed that WS participants are impaired when performing both egocentric and allocentric spatial judgments even when compared with mental age-matched control participants. This indicates that a substantial deficit affecting both spatial representations is present in WS. The egocentric impairment is in line with the dorsal visual pathway deficit previously reported in WS. Interestingly, the difficulties found in performing allocentric spatial judgments give important cues to better understand the ventral visual functioning in WS. (JINS, 2013, 19, 1–9)


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne D. Ekstrom ◽  
Charan Ranganath

AbstractIn recent years, the field has reached an impasse between models suggesting that the hippocampus is fundamentally involved in spatial processing and models suggesting that the hippocampus automatically encodes all dimensions of experience in the service of memory. Here, we consider key conceptual issues that have impeded progress in our understanding of hippocampal function, and we review findings that establish the scope and limits of hippocampal involvement in navigation and memory. We argue that space and time serve as a primary scaffold to break up experiences into specific contexts, and to organize multimodal input that is to be associated within a context. However, the hippocampus is clearly capable of incorporating additional dimensions into the scaffold if they are determined to be relevant in the event-defined context. Conceiving of the hippocampal representation as constrained by immediate task demands—yet preferring axes that involve space and time—helps to reconcile an otherwise disparate set of findings on the core function of the hippocampus.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilina Mastrogiuseppe ◽  
Natasha Bertelsen ◽  
Maria Francesca Bedeschi ◽  
Sang Ah Lee

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.


1997 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
TASSOS STEVENS ◽  
ANNETTE KARMILOFF-SMITH

Williams syndrome (WS), a rare neurodevelopmental disorder, is of special interest to developmental psycholinguists because of its uneven linguistico-cognitive profile of abilities and deficits. One proficiency manifest in WS adolescents and adults is an unusually large vocabulary despite serious deficits in other domains. In this paper, rather than focus on vocabulary size, we explore the processes underlying vocabulary acquisition, i.e. how new words are learned. A WS group was compared to groups of normal MA-matched controls in the range 3–9 years in four different experiments testing for constraints on word learning. We show that in construing the meaning of new words, normal children at all ages display fast mapping and abide by the constraints tested: mutual exclusivity, whole object and taxonomic. By contrast, while the WS group showed fast mapping and the mutual exclusivity constraint, they did not abide by the whole object or taxonomic constraints. This suggests that measuring only the size of WS vocabulary can distort conclusions about the normalcy of WS language. Our study shows that despite equivalent behaviour (i.e. vocabulary test age), the processes underlying how vocabulary is acquired in WS follow a somewhat different path from that of normal children and that the atypically developing brain is not necessarily a window on normal development.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristie Miller

It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times — relativising properties to spatial locations — or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times — relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Jin-Hyuck Park

ABSTRACT Background: To date, there is a controversy on effects of cognitive intervention to maintain or improve hippocampal function for older adults with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Objective: The main objective of this study was to exam effects of virtual reality-based spatial cognitive training (VR-SCT) using VR on hippocampal function of older adults with MCI. Method: Fifty-six older adults with MCI were randomly allocated to the experimental group (EG) that received the VR-SCT or the waitlist control group (CG) for a total of 24 sessions. To investigate effects of the VR-SCT on spatial cognition and episodic memory, the Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Block Design Test (WAIS-BDT) and the Seoul Verbal Learning Test (SVLT) were used. Results: During the sessions, the training performances gradually increased (p < .001). After the intervention, the EG showed significant greater improvements in the WAIS-BDT (p < .001, η2 = .667) and recall of the SVLT (p < .05, η2 =.094) compared to the CG but in recognition of the SVLT (p > .05, η2 =.001). Conclusion: These results suggest that the VR-SCT might be clinically beneficial to enhance spatial cognition and episodic memory of older adults with MCI.


Hippocampus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 680-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne D. Ekstrom ◽  
Charan Ranganath

1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy Reilly ◽  
Edward S. Klima ◽  
Ursula Bellugi

AbstractThe study of clearly identifiable patterns of atypical development can inform normal development in significant ways. Delayed or deviant development puts in high relief not only the sequence of development but also the individual components. This article presents the results of studies that compare adolescents with Williams syndrome, a rare metabolic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in mental retardation, with cognitively matched adolescents with Down syndrome. We investigate the interaction between affect and language through storytelling. In contrast to the adolescents with Down syndrome, the Williams syndrome subjects tell coherent and complex narratives that make extensive use of affective prosody. Furthermore, stories from the Williams but not the Down subjects are infused with lexically encoded narrative evaluative devices that enrich the referential content of the stories. This contrast in expressivity between two matched atypical groups provides an unusual perspective on the underlying structure of the social cognitive domain.


1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Karmiloff-Smith ◽  
Edward Klima ◽  
Ursula Bellugi ◽  
Julia Grant ◽  
Simon Baron-Cohen

Many species can respond to the behavior of their conspecifics. Human children, and perhaps some nonhuman primates, also have the capacity to respond to the mental states of their conspecifics, i.e., they have a “theory of mind.” On the basis of previous research on the theory-of-mind impairment in people with autism, together with animal models of intentionality, Brothers and Ring (1992) postulated a broad cognitive module whose function is to build representations of other individuals. We evaluate the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile. The results are discussed in terms of how the comparison of different phenotypes (e.g., Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, autism, and hydrocephaly with associated myelomeningocele) can contribute both to understanding the neuropsychology of social cognition and to current thinking about the purported modularity of the brain.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document