Comparisons of customer behavior in Markovian queues with vacation policies and geometric abandonments

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Sun ◽  
Shiyong Li ◽  
Naishuo Tian
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Poisson Process ◽  
Busy Period ◽  
Customer Behavior ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Multiple Vacations ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
Markovian Queues ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

This paper mainly studies customers’ equilibrium balking behavior in Markovian queues with single vacation and geometric abandonments. Whenever the system becomes empty, the server begins a vacation. If it is still empty when the vacation ends, the server stays idle and waits for new arrivals. During a vacation, abandonment opportunities occur according to a Poisson process, and at an abandonment epoch, customers decide sequentially whether they renege and leave the system or not. We consider four information levels: the fully/almost observable cases and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and get the customers’ equilibrium balking strategies, respectively. Then we also get their optimal balking strategies for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and make comparisons of customer strategies and social welfare for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues with single vacation and multiple vacations. Because of abandonment, we find that the customers’ equilibrium threshold in a vacation may exceed the one in a busy period in the fully observable queues. However, it has little effect on their equilibrium threshold in the almost observable queues, although frequent abandonment opportunity arrival inhibits their optimal threshold. Interestingly, for the almost unobservable queues, customers who arrive in a busy period are not affected by reneging that happened in the previous vacation when they make decisions of joining or balking, whereas the social planner expects that the customers can take it into consideration for social optimization. In the fully unobservable queues, because of no information, possible reneging surely influences customers’ equilibrium and optimal balking behavior. For the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues, the optimal social welfare is greater in the queues with single vacation than that in the queues with multiple vacations.

Strategic behavior in the constant retrial queue with a single vacation

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
System Parameter ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
System Parameters ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
The Social ◽  
System Characteristics

We study customers’ joining strategies in an M/M/1 constant retrial queue with a single vacation. There is no waiting space in front of the server and a vacation is triggered when the system is empty. If an arriving customer finds the server idle, he occupies the server immediately. Otherwise, if the server is found unavailable, the customer enters a retrial pool called orbit with infinite capacity and becomes a repeated customer. According to the different information provided for customers, we consider two situations, where we investigate system characteristics and customers’ joining or balk decisions based on a linear reward-cost structure. Furthermore, we establish the social welfare of the system and make comparisons between the two information levels. It is found that there exist thresholds of system parameters such that the social planner would prefer revealing more information when the system parameter is greater than or less than the corresponding threshold.

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

scholarly journals Analysis and Comparison of Queue with N-Policy and Unreliable Server

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Qing Ma ◽  
Xuelu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Poisson Process ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Management Decision ◽  
Dormant State ◽  
Unreliable Server ◽  
The Social ◽  
Number Of Customers ◽  
Potential Customers ◽  
Strong Ability

This work considers a queueing system with N-policy and unreliable server, where potential customers arrive at the system according to Poisson process. If there is no customer waiting in the system, instead of shutting down, the server turns into dormant state and does not afford service until the number of customers is accumulated to a certain threshold. And in the working state, the server is apt to breakdown and affords service again only after it is repaired. According to whether the server state is observable or not, the numerical optimal arrival rates are computed to maximize the social welfare and throughput of the system. The results illustrate their tendency in two cases so that the manager has a strong ability to decide which is more crucial in making management decision.

Blueprints for the Future of Welfare Provision? Shared Features of Service Innovations across Europe

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ewert ◽  
Adalbert Evers
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Services ◽  
Social Innovation ◽  
Local Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Innovations ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
The One ◽  
Eu Project ◽  
Welfare Reforms

This article discusses localised forms of social innovation in social services in relation to social policy and welfare issues. It draws upon research findings from the EU project ‘Welfare Innovations at the local Level in favour of Cohesion’ (WILCO), which takes in social innovations in twenty European cities. First, we argue why there is currently a significant gap between the debate on social innovation and the debate on social welfare reforms. Second, we present attempts that have been made to identify and interpret recurring approaches and instruments in the social innovations studied in relation to various dimensions of the debate on social welfare and services, such as the search for new ways of addressing users and citizens; the emphasis on new risks and related approaches to the issues of rights and responsibilities; and finally the concern with issues of governance. We argue that the features of the local innovations we identified may be significant for welfare systems at large, going beyond the introduction of special new items in special fields. However, the degree to which this will come about in reality will depend on building more bridges of shared understanding between concerns with social innovation on the one hand and welfare reforms on the other hand.

scholarly journals Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilko Bolt ◽  
Alexander F. Tieman
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Recovery Problem ◽  
Total Price ◽  
Two Sided Markets

Using a simple model of two-sided markets, we show that, in the social optimum, platform pricing leads to an inherent cost recovery problem. This result is driven by the positive externality of participation that users on either side of the market exert on the opposite side. The contribution of this positive externality to social welfare leads the social planner to increase users' participation by setting prices at both sides of the market such that the total price is below marginal cost. Our result holds for both interior pricing and skewed pricing in two-sided markets. These findings may have interesting consequences for antitrust regulation.

scholarly journals Almería’s fruit and vegetable competitive advantage and the growth of GDP per capita

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-29
Author(s):  
Antonio Miguel Gil Salmerón
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Gdp Per Capita ◽  
Agricultural Income ◽  
The Social ◽  
Extensive Growth ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The One

Almeria's horticulture has experienced extensive growth that is sustained by the main macroeconomic variables: an acceleration of the agricultural income, broadly-speaking, a positive commercial balance throughout the first quindenium of the century and a GDP that on the whole represents the 16.69% of that accounted by all the province, without taking the agricultural auxiliary industry into account. This trend leads to an asymmetric process of deagrarianization which registers the whole of the Spanish economy and acts as a source of competitive plus point in comparative terms with the development of the social welfare of its territory. A linear regression analysis crosses two variables to assess the degree of coincidence that exists between the growth registered by Almeria's horticulture industry and the quality of life of its citizens. On the one hand, the productivity of the sector is used (average in tonnes of production per hectare) whilst, on the other hand, per capita GDP -because economic growth theories go against GDP as an indicator of social welfare. There is evidence that GDP per capita follows a parallel or symmetrical pattern to the citizens' perception of happiness. It has been categorically confirmed that the horticulture industry of Almería intervenes as a competitive advantage through its productivity, as it stands above all as a long-term determinant of the standard of living of any territory

scholarly journals How do Fines and Their Enforcement on Counterfeit Products Affect Social Welfare?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Biancardi ◽  
Andrea Di Liddo ◽  
Giovanni Villani
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enforcement Costs ◽  
Feedback Equilibria ◽  
Counterfeit Products

AbstractWe consider a differential game which models the competition between a genuine and a counterfeit producer. The genuine manufacturer acts as a leader, first announcing the price of the product and the investments in advertising. After observing the leader’s decisions, the counterfeiter sets the selling price of the fakes. We assume that the demand of the good is driven by the brand-name goodwill. We calculate the Stackelberg feedback equilibria and the social welfare, defined by the unweighted sum of the genuine and fakes consumers, the profit of the genuine firm, minus the enforcement costs borne by the social planner. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly we study the dependence of social welfare on the amount of the fines established in the IPR law and monitoring efforts. Then, we compare prices, profits and social welfare under Nash and Stackelberg framework.

A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham L. Wickelgren
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Damage Rule

Abstract While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this paper shows that settlement can lower welfare. If the defendant has private information about the harm from his action both at the time of the action and the time of settlement bargaining, then defendants who cause different levels of harm can pay the same settlement amount in a partial pooling equilibrium. Settlement acts as a damage cap, preventing the defendant's liability from increasing with the harm over the full range of possible harms, leading to under-deterrence. This result holds even though the social planner can choose the socially optimal damage rule.

Murder with Impunity: The Construction of Arab Masculinities and Honor Crimes

1970 ◽  
pp. 38-45
Author(s):  
May Abu Jaber
Keyword(s):  
Violence Against Women ◽  
Social Boundaries ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Media ◽  
The One ◽  
Male Authority ◽  
Cultural Networks ◽  
Gender Specific

Violence against women (VAW) continues to exist as a pervasive, structural,systematic, and institutionalized violation of women’s basic human rights (UNDivision of Advancement for Women, 2006). It cuts across the boundaries of age, race, class, education, and religion which affect women of all ages and all backgrounds in every corner of the world. Such violence is used to control and subjugate women by instilling a sense of insecurity that keeps them “bound to the home, economically exploited and socially suppressed” (Mathu, 2008, p. 65). It is estimated that one out of every five women worldwide will be abused during her lifetime with rates reaching up to 70 percent in some countries (WHO, 2005). Whether this abuse is perpetrated by the state and its agents, by family members, or even by strangers, VAW is closely related to the regulation of sexuality in a gender specific (patriarchal) manner. This regulation is, on the one hand, maintained through the implementation of strict cultural, communal, and religious norms, and on the other hand, through particular legal measures that sustain these norms. Therefore, religious institutions, the media, the family/tribe, cultural networks, and the legal system continually disciplinewomen’s sexuality and punish those women (and in some instances men) who have transgressed or allegedly contravened the social boundaries of ‘appropriateness’ as delineated by each society. Such women/men may include lesbians/gays, women who appear ‘too masculine’ or men who appear ‘too feminine,’ women who try to exercise their rights freely or men who do not assert their rights as ‘real men’ should, women/men who have been sexually assaulted or raped, and women/men who challenge male/older male authority.

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