A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham L. Wickelgren
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Damage Rule

Abstract While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this paper shows that settlement can lower welfare. If the defendant has private information about the harm from his action both at the time of the action and the time of settlement bargaining, then defendants who cause different levels of harm can pay the same settlement amount in a partial pooling equilibrium. Settlement acts as a damage cap, preventing the defendant's liability from increasing with the harm over the full range of possible harms, leading to under-deterrence. This result holds even though the social planner can choose the socially optimal damage rule.

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

scholarly journals Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilko Bolt ◽  
Alexander F. Tieman
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Recovery Problem ◽  
Total Price ◽  
Two Sided Markets

Using a simple model of two-sided markets, we show that, in the social optimum, platform pricing leads to an inherent cost recovery problem. This result is driven by the positive externality of participation that users on either side of the market exert on the opposite side. The contribution of this positive externality to social welfare leads the social planner to increase users' participation by setting prices at both sides of the market such that the total price is below marginal cost. Our result holds for both interior pricing and skewed pricing in two-sided markets. These findings may have interesting consequences for antitrust regulation.

scholarly journals How do Fines and Their Enforcement on Counterfeit Products Affect Social Welfare?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Biancardi ◽  
Andrea Di Liddo ◽  
Giovanni Villani
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enforcement Costs ◽  
Feedback Equilibria ◽  
Counterfeit Products

AbstractWe consider a differential game which models the competition between a genuine and a counterfeit producer. The genuine manufacturer acts as a leader, first announcing the price of the product and the investments in advertising. After observing the leader’s decisions, the counterfeiter sets the selling price of the fakes. We assume that the demand of the good is driven by the brand-name goodwill. We calculate the Stackelberg feedback equilibria and the social welfare, defined by the unweighted sum of the genuine and fakes consumers, the profit of the genuine firm, minus the enforcement costs borne by the social planner. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly we study the dependence of social welfare on the amount of the fines established in the IPR law and monitoring efforts. Then, we compare prices, profits and social welfare under Nash and Stackelberg framework.

Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050019
Author(s):  
Oliviero A. Carboni ◽  
Paolo Russu
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
The Social ◽  
Evasion Behavior ◽  
Level Of Effort ◽  
Different Levels

This work examines the issue of tax evasion through underreporting activity. The associated control problem for reducing the number of dishonest citizens and dishonest officers is explicitly analyzed. It is assumed that the social planner can choose the level of effort in order to control the dynamic system through the use of the specific countries’ characteristics [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] (the probability of punishing, respectively, a tax-evading citizen and a dishonest officer), and the level of public financial effort represented by taxation [Formula: see text] as control variables. The model implicitly considers that there is a direct correlation between these characteristics and the efficacy and the commitment of the institutional system in contrasting illegality. Hence, in the analysis, [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are considered as the effective probabilities to be charged the fine. This study supplies a novel approach concerning the dynamic model underlying the optimal control, which is based on the strategic interaction of the economic agents’ choices. These latter are described by an evolutionary dynamic process which is strongly characterized by [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. The analysis supplies a useful policy indication for the social planner in choosing the way to obtain a certain socially desirable target. Moreover, it helps the comprehension of the different corruption and evasion behavior observable in the real world, where countries with similar level of taxation may have different levels of corruption.

Comparisons of customer behavior in Markovian queues with vacation policies and geometric abandonments

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Sun ◽  
Shiyong Li ◽  
Naishuo Tian
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Poisson Process ◽  
Busy Period ◽  
Customer Behavior ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Multiple Vacations ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
Markovian Queues ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

This paper mainly studies customers’ equilibrium balking behavior in Markovian queues with single vacation and geometric abandonments. Whenever the system becomes empty, the server begins a vacation. If it is still empty when the vacation ends, the server stays idle and waits for new arrivals. During a vacation, abandonment opportunities occur according to a Poisson process, and at an abandonment epoch, customers decide sequentially whether they renege and leave the system or not. We consider four information levels: the fully/almost observable cases and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and get the customers’ equilibrium balking strategies, respectively. Then we also get their optimal balking strategies for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and make comparisons of customer strategies and social welfare for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues with single vacation and multiple vacations. Because of abandonment, we find that the customers’ equilibrium threshold in a vacation may exceed the one in a busy period in the fully observable queues. However, it has little effect on their equilibrium threshold in the almost observable queues, although frequent abandonment opportunity arrival inhibits their optimal threshold. Interestingly, for the almost unobservable queues, customers who arrive in a busy period are not affected by reneging that happened in the previous vacation when they make decisions of joining or balking, whereas the social planner expects that the customers can take it into consideration for social optimization. In the fully unobservable queues, because of no information, possible reneging surely influences customers’ equilibrium and optimal balking behavior. For the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues, the optimal social welfare is greater in the queues with single vacation than that in the queues with multiple vacations.

Strategic behavior in the constant retrial queue with a single vacation

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
System Parameter ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
System Parameters ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
The Social ◽  
System Characteristics

We study customers’ joining strategies in an M/M/1 constant retrial queue with a single vacation. There is no waiting space in front of the server and a vacation is triggered when the system is empty. If an arriving customer finds the server idle, he occupies the server immediately. Otherwise, if the server is found unavailable, the customer enters a retrial pool called orbit with infinite capacity and becomes a repeated customer. According to the different information provided for customers, we consider two situations, where we investigate system characteristics and customers’ joining or balk decisions based on a linear reward-cost structure. Furthermore, we establish the social welfare of the system and make comparisons between the two information levels. It is found that there exist thresholds of system parameters such that the social planner would prefer revealing more information when the system parameter is greater than or less than the corresponding threshold.

scholarly journals Better social welfare through sustainable land-based production: assessing the potency of jurisdiction certification on the forestry sector

2021 ◽  
Vol 917 (1) ◽  
pp. 012029
Author(s):  
I K Nawireja ◽  
E P Pramudya ◽  
L R Wibowo ◽  
M Hapsari
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Pilot Project ◽  
Forest Community ◽  
Sustainable Resources ◽  
Government Role ◽  
Forestry Sector ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Certification and pledge have long been the primary mechanisms to safeguard unsustainable forest exploitations and maintain the social welfare of forest communities by providing better access to the market. However, commodity-based certification and pledges have been criticised for their limited success in safeguarding the social welfare of the forest community. A newly developed certification scheme, the jurisdictional certification approach, offers an alternative to sustainable resources use. It promises a more comprehensive alternative for all stakeholders operating in a given jurisdiction and a more substantial government role. The literature review indicates that although Indonesia’s jurisdictional approach pilot project shows promising results in overcoming traditional certifications’ drawbacks, the actors’ acceptance within commodity chains is limited. The adoption requires intensive collaboration among government, private sectors and civil society. The government is expected to streamline the regulatory process within the jurisdiction, while the private sectors and civil society provide material and human resource supports. This process is reliant upon effective communication among the private sector and the different levels of government.

Ways and Voices in the Psychoanalysis of Links According to Enrique Pichon-Rivière

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Jaitin
Keyword(s):  
Couple Therapy ◽  
Clinical Observation ◽  
Clinical Work ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Social ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Different Levels

This article covers several stages of the work of Pichon-Rivière. In the 1950s he introduced the hypothesis of "the link as a four way relationship" (of reciprocal love and hate) between the baby and the mother. Clinical work with psychosis and psychosomatic disorders prompted him to examine how mental illness arises; its areas of expression, the degree of symbolisation, and the different fields of clinical observation. From the 1960s onwards, his experience with groups and families led him to explore a second path leading to "the voices of the link"—the voice of the internal family sub-group, and the place of the social and cultural voice where the link develops. This brought him to the definition of the link as a "bi-corporal and tri-personal structure". The author brings together the different levels of the analysis of the link, using as a clinical example the process of a psychoanalytic couple therapy with second generation descendants of a genocide within the limits of the transferential and countertransferential field. Body language (the core of the transgenerational link) and the couple's absences and presence during sessions create a rhythm that gives rise to an illusion, ultimately transforming the intersubjective link between the partners in the couple and with the analyst.

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