Strategic behavior in the constant retrial queue with a single vacation

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
System Parameter ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
System Parameters ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
The Social ◽  
System Characteristics

We study customers’ joining strategies in an M/M/1 constant retrial queue with a single vacation. There is no waiting space in front of the server and a vacation is triggered when the system is empty. If an arriving customer finds the server idle, he occupies the server immediately. Otherwise, if the server is found unavailable, the customer enters a retrial pool called orbit with infinite capacity and becomes a repeated customer. According to the different information provided for customers, we consider two situations, where we investigate system characteristics and customers’ joining or balk decisions based on a linear reward-cost structure. Furthermore, we establish the social welfare of the system and make comparisons between the two information levels. It is found that there exist thresholds of system parameters such that the social planner would prefer revealing more information when the system parameter is greater than or less than the corresponding threshold.

Comparisons of customer behavior in Markovian queues with vacation policies and geometric abandonments

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Sun ◽  
Shiyong Li ◽  
Naishuo Tian
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Poisson Process ◽  
Busy Period ◽  
Customer Behavior ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Multiple Vacations ◽  
Single Vacation ◽  
Markovian Queues ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

This paper mainly studies customers’ equilibrium balking behavior in Markovian queues with single vacation and geometric abandonments. Whenever the system becomes empty, the server begins a vacation. If it is still empty when the vacation ends, the server stays idle and waits for new arrivals. During a vacation, abandonment opportunities occur according to a Poisson process, and at an abandonment epoch, customers decide sequentially whether they renege and leave the system or not. We consider four information levels: the fully/almost observable cases and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and get the customers’ equilibrium balking strategies, respectively. Then we also get their optimal balking strategies for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable cases, and make comparisons of customer strategies and social welfare for the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues with single vacation and multiple vacations. Because of abandonment, we find that the customers’ equilibrium threshold in a vacation may exceed the one in a busy period in the fully observable queues. However, it has little effect on their equilibrium threshold in the almost observable queues, although frequent abandonment opportunity arrival inhibits their optimal threshold. Interestingly, for the almost unobservable queues, customers who arrive in a busy period are not affected by reneging that happened in the previous vacation when they make decisions of joining or balking, whereas the social planner expects that the customers can take it into consideration for social optimization. In the fully unobservable queues, because of no information, possible reneging surely influences customers’ equilibrium and optimal balking behavior. For the almost observable and the almost/fully unobservable queues, the optimal social welfare is greater in the queues with single vacation than that in the queues with multiple vacations.

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

Strategic priority-purchasing and joining rules in a retrial queue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Customer Welfare

Abstract This paper considers a retrial queueing system with a pay-for-priority option. A queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among the customers, the service provider (SP) and the social planner is developed. We obtain the equilibrium strategy of customers for any fixed priority premium and identify the unique Pareto-dominant strategy. The optimal pricing strategies for the SP and the social planner are derived and compared extensively. Interestingly, we find that the equilibrium outcome of customers is non-monotone in the service reward and the profit of the SP is bimodal in the priority premium. We reveal the fact that the SP’s optimization makes the system more congested than what is socially desirable. Finally, numerical examples indicate that the customer welfare can be improved by providing priorities when the market size is large.

scholarly journals Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilko Bolt ◽  
Alexander F. Tieman
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Recovery Problem ◽  
Total Price ◽  
Two Sided Markets

Using a simple model of two-sided markets, we show that, in the social optimum, platform pricing leads to an inherent cost recovery problem. This result is driven by the positive externality of participation that users on either side of the market exert on the opposite side. The contribution of this positive externality to social welfare leads the social planner to increase users' participation by setting prices at both sides of the market such that the total price is below marginal cost. Our result holds for both interior pricing and skewed pricing in two-sided markets. These findings may have interesting consequences for antitrust regulation.

scholarly journals How do Fines and Their Enforcement on Counterfeit Products Affect Social Welfare?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Biancardi ◽  
Andrea Di Liddo ◽  
Giovanni Villani
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enforcement Costs ◽  
Feedback Equilibria ◽  
Counterfeit Products

AbstractWe consider a differential game which models the competition between a genuine and a counterfeit producer. The genuine manufacturer acts as a leader, first announcing the price of the product and the investments in advertising. After observing the leader’s decisions, the counterfeiter sets the selling price of the fakes. We assume that the demand of the good is driven by the brand-name goodwill. We calculate the Stackelberg feedback equilibria and the social welfare, defined by the unweighted sum of the genuine and fakes consumers, the profit of the genuine firm, minus the enforcement costs borne by the social planner. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly we study the dependence of social welfare on the amount of the fines established in the IPR law and monitoring efforts. Then, we compare prices, profits and social welfare under Nash and Stackelberg framework.

A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham L. Wickelgren
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Damage Rule

Abstract While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this paper shows that settlement can lower welfare. If the defendant has private information about the harm from his action both at the time of the action and the time of settlement bargaining, then defendants who cause different levels of harm can pay the same settlement amount in a partial pooling equilibrium. Settlement acts as a damage cap, preventing the defendant's liability from increasing with the harm over the full range of possible harms, leading to under-deterrence. This result holds even though the social planner can choose the socially optimal damage rule.

scholarly journals The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in  an unobservable  Markovian queue with unreliable server

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamel Meziani ◽  
Fazia RAHMOUNE ◽  
Mohammed Said RADJEF
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
System Parameters ◽  
Service Pricing ◽  
Markovian Queue ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Social

A Stackelberg game is used to study the service pricing and the strategic behavior of customers in an unreliable and totally unobservable M/M/1 queue under a reward-cost structure. At the first stage, the server manager, acting as a leader, chooses a service price and, at the second stage, a customer, arriving at the system and acting as a follower, chooses to join the system or an outside opportunity, knowing only the service price imposed by the server manager and the system parameters. We show that the constructed game admits an equilibrium and we give explicit forms of server manager and customers equilibrium behavioral strategies.  The results of the proposed model show that the assumption that customers are risk-neutral is fundamental for the standard approach usually used. Moreover, we determine the socially optimal price that maximizes the social welfare and we compare it to the Stackelberg equilibrium. We illustrate, by numerical examples, the effect of some system parameters on the equilibrium service price and the revenue of the server manager.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document