1998 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Charles L. Glenn

Stephen Arons, author of Compelling Belief: The Culture of American Schooling (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), is one of the most articulate and influential critics of the educational Establishment from the secular Left. In his new book, he takes on the Clinton Administration's efforts to establish national outcome standards--Goals 2000--which he describes as "comprehensive, centralizing, and insensitive to the diversity of goals that students, families, and communities bring to education. Through the use of federal grants and state regulations, it aims to bring every school in every school district in every state into conformity with politically prescribed standards of what should be learned by every child" (page 4). Arons warns that "[o]nce accepted by the public, Goals 2000 will change the balance of power in schoolhouses and courtrooms in a way unlikely ever to be undone. That change in schooling will very likely undermine the freedom of intellect and spirit that has been so essential to the American experience" (page 98).


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Jaleh Jalili

Scholarly works and public narratives dealing with the mandating of the veil in Iran in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution often focus on the coercive aspects of the process and emphasize the role of religious groups consolidating power. This article takes a closer look at how nonreligious leftist groups perceived and participated in the process. By revisiting the publications of seven prominent secular left-wing groups, this article discusses nuances in the Iranian left's historic approaches to veiling and how these groups' ideologies and political alliances shaped their responses to the quickly shifting gender politics of the post revolutionary period.


Author(s):  
Khemaies Bougatef ◽  
Hedia Jaouadi Teraoui ◽  
Amira Kaddour

The main purpose of this paper is to determine the major causes of the underdevelopment of Islamic finance in Tunisia. Indeed, it’s surprising to note that Zitouna bank established in May 2010 is the first Islamic Tunisian bank although 99% of Tunisians are Muslim and Islam is the religion of the State according to the Constitution.So we rely in our paper on the opinions of number of professors of finance and economics as educated people to prove or reject our hypothesis that the underdevelopment of Islamic finance in Tunisia can be explained by the ignorance of its main principles and advantages. Ours findings reveal that this branch of finance is still largely unknown, not only from public but also from professionals. The results obtained surprisingly show that this insignificance of Islamic banking cannot be explained by the fact that Tunisia has been governed since her independence by a secular left-wing party. Indeed, only 3% of respondents believe that legislation and regulation in Tunisia represent an obstacle to the development of Islamic finance. Moreover, respondents are not very optimistic about the future role of Islamic financing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 558-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Wegner ◽  
Francesco Cavatorta

Electoral politics in the Arab world are either portrayed as clientelistic affairs void of content or as highly ideological clashes between Islamist and Secular Left forces. Although both arguments are intuitively appealing, the empirical evidence to date is limited. This article seeks to contribute to the debate by investigating the extent of programmatic voter support for Islamist and Secular Left parties in seven Arab countries with data from recent surveys by the Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer and World Values Survey. Ideological congruence between voters and parties exists but is limited to the Islamist–Secular core divide with regard to the role of religion in politics and gender values. In contrast, there are virtually no differences in economic attitudes between respondents and there is no evidence of class-based voting, with Islamist and Secular Left parties sharing the same voter base of better-off, more educated voters. Core results are robust across surveys.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 107-110
Author(s):  
Alireza Asgharzadeh

Negin Nabavi’s Intellectuals and the State in Iran comes at a time when aprocess of soul-searching by some Iranian intellectuals that started immediately after the triumph of Islamic revolution has now faded away, withoutyielding any satisfactory results. This process was inspired by the question:What role did the (secular left-leaning) intellectuals play in the revolution’striumph, which culminated in an Islamic state inherently opposed to theactivities of these same intellectuals? This important topic, of course, givesrise to the familiar question of “What is meant by an intellectual?” whichNabavi addresses in the book’s first part. Having given a historical perspectiveon the development and evolution of intellectualism in Iran, she concludesthat a distinguishing character of the Iranian intellectual was “theintellectual’s task to take a stance and engage with issues in society” (p. 3);where “dissent” was “a necessary component in the career of any Iranianintellectual” (p. 18).In part two, Nabavi discusses the processes that led to the “radicalizationof the Iranian intellectual.” Here she explores the emergence of what shecalls “the Third-Worldist intellectual” and the cooptation of a great numberof intellectuals by the Pahlavi regime . According to her, during this period(1963-70) “the notions of the ‘native’ and the ‘authentic’ became so pervasivethat even the establishment could not remain impervious to them” (p.106). The epilogue briefly touches upon the relationships between intellectualsand the revolution, where the author concludes that the intellectuals“lost out in the year that followed the revolution” (p. 149) ...


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