Mass Publics and Foreign Policy Preferences

Author(s):  
Stephen White ◽  
Valentina Feklyunina
Res Publica ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-48
Author(s):  
Youri Devuyst

During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of1996, the European Union's institutional structure should be adapted, most notably in preparation for the Union's enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries. The IGC's institutional debate will befar from easy. This is not surprizing since the institutional discussions during the IGC will reflect the grave substantive policy differences between the Member States on the Union's functions in the economy and on the Union's foreign policy role. The IGC is, indeed, largely a position game during which the Member States attempt to create a congenial institutional framework, favourable to their substantive policy preferences. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 ◽  
pp. 102036
Author(s):  
Anna Getmansky ◽  
Tolga Sınmazdemir ◽  
Thomas Zeitzoff

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

When leaders depart from their long-held, publicly known policy positions, one possible explanation is changes in their personality. This paper inquires about one example: Ariel Sharon’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Middle East observers long believed that Sharon was one of the last Israelis to cede any territory to Palestinians; alas, that became the decision to mark Sharon’s reign as prime minister. The “bulldozer” decided to evacuate the homes he had built. Assuming that Gaza disengagement implied a significant reassessment of Sharon’s previously held policy preferences, this paper asks if Sharon changed. Using leadership trait analysis, the paper develops two profiles of Sharon, before and during his premiership. Sharon is then profiled in three phases during his tenure: first term, second term until the announcement of disengagement, and until the end of his tenure. In making his decision, Sharon temporarily became a complex thinker, yet did not change in his distrust or develop empathy to the Palestinians. The findings suggest that leaders can experience a fundamental but temporary change to implement radically different decisions, and confirm that leaders’ traits are stable over time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Castano ◽  
Alain Bonacossa ◽  
Peter Gries

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Nincic ◽  
Jennifer M. Ramos

2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Goldsmith ◽  
Yusaku Horiuchi

Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.


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