Ideological structure and foreign policy preferences

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Nincic ◽  
Jennifer M. Ramos
Res Publica ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-48
Author(s):  
Youri Devuyst

During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of1996, the European Union's institutional structure should be adapted, most notably in preparation for the Union's enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries. The IGC's institutional debate will befar from easy. This is not surprizing since the institutional discussions during the IGC will reflect the grave substantive policy differences between the Member States on the Union's functions in the economy and on the Union's foreign policy role. The IGC is, indeed, largely a position game during which the Member States attempt to create a congenial institutional framework, favourable to their substantive policy preferences. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 ◽  
pp. 102036
Author(s):  
Anna Getmansky ◽  
Tolga Sınmazdemir ◽  
Thomas Zeitzoff

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

When leaders depart from their long-held, publicly known policy positions, one possible explanation is changes in their personality. This paper inquires about one example: Ariel Sharon’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Middle East observers long believed that Sharon was one of the last Israelis to cede any territory to Palestinians; alas, that became the decision to mark Sharon’s reign as prime minister. The “bulldozer” decided to evacuate the homes he had built. Assuming that Gaza disengagement implied a significant reassessment of Sharon’s previously held policy preferences, this paper asks if Sharon changed. Using leadership trait analysis, the paper develops two profiles of Sharon, before and during his premiership. Sharon is then profiled in three phases during his tenure: first term, second term until the announcement of disengagement, and until the end of his tenure. In making his decision, Sharon temporarily became a complex thinker, yet did not change in his distrust or develop empathy to the Palestinians. The findings suggest that leaders can experience a fundamental but temporary change to implement radically different decisions, and confirm that leaders’ traits are stable over time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Castano ◽  
Alain Bonacossa ◽  
Peter Gries

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eddie Hearn

AbstractPublic support for protection is typically attributed to economic self-interest. Beyond pocketbook anxieties, a competing approach, however, contends that sociotropic attitudes dictate foreign policy preferences. Researchers, however, have faced difficulty in disentangling sociotropic attitudes from pocketbook concerns in observational studies. This article addresses this problem by utilizing a priming experiment to examine the relationship between socio and egotropic attitudes. In line with the predictions of the sociotropic framework, individuals are less certain about the egotropic effects of trade and sociotropic attitudes are found to influence egotropic perceptions by reducing uncertainty about the pocketbook effects of trade. In contrast, the study fails to find support for the hypothesis that individuals project egotropic concerns onto societal evaluations. The results of the study suggest that future research should pay careful consideration to the relationship between socio and egotropic attitudes when modeling and analyzing trade-policy preferences.


2011 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hays Gries ◽  
Qingmin Zhang ◽  
H. Michael Crowson ◽  
Huajian Cai

AbstractWhat is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document