Trump-ing Foreign Affairs: Status Threat and Foreign Policy Preferences on the Right

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gyung-Ho Jeong ◽  
Paul J. Quirk

Severe party conflict, not a high-minded suspension of politics, now prevails “at the water’s edge.” Democrats and Republicans fight pitched battles over foreign affairs. But are the two parties polarized in their substantive preferences on foreign policy, or mainly jockeying for partisan advantage? Are they polarized on foreign policy less sharply than on domestic policy? What are the sources of party polarization over foreign policy? Using a new measure of senatorial foreign-policy preferences from 1945-2010, we explore party polarization over foreign policy. We find that foreign-policy preferences have had varying relationships with party politics and general ideology. Since the 1960s, however, the parties have become increasingly polarized on foreign policy. Using a multilevel analysis, we show that foreign-policy polarization has developed in response to partisan electoral rivalry, foreign-policy events, and general ideological polarization. The analysis indicates an increasing influence of domestic politics on foreign policy.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Askerov

With the advancement of power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has introduced revolutionary policies in Turkey in various realms, including foreign affairs. The new trend in the foreign policy focused on not having problems with neighbors. This could be possible or nearly possible theoretically but eliminating century-long and deep-rooted conflicts with some of the neighbors would not be easy in practice. The new idealistic/moralistic approach necessitated new ways of policy formulation based on mutual gains and unthinkable concessions on the part of Turkey. Ankara’s new approach had given a special importance to building bridges of trust with the neighbors, which also seemed attractive to the political leaders of the neighboring states. This idealistic/moralistic approach was vulnerable to the dynamic political and economic developments in the region and the world in general. The policy did not have a power of sustainability due to the various old, new, and emerging problems around Turkey and hence, the government had to give it up gradually and take a new course of foreign policy based on realistic approaches to defend its national interests.


2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-505
Author(s):  
Mladen Lisanin

Due to turbulent circumstances and controversial heritage in regard to the breakup of ex-Yugoslavia, regional position of Serbia is, within academic as well as the wider public, most often observed in the context of its relations with the ?new? neighbors - the states that have emerged from the breakup of the former common country. This is in part because of constant tensions in the relations with ex-Yugoslav states, but also due to the political agenda of Western actors, which sets the framework for regional integration processes through the concept of ?Western Balkans?. Foreign policy relations of Serbia with its ?old? neighbors (most notably, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, given that Albania has a distinct status as a de facto interested party in the dispute regarding the status of Kosovo and Metohija), nonetheless, remain at least just as important element of Serbia?s regional position. It is the author?s intention to point towards determinants of the foreign policy of Serbia, as factors that work, or are visible, through relations with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. This will be observed in the context of bilateral and multilateral, formal and informal foreign policy connections and relations. The conclusion, in the form of a recommendation, is that international political dynamics in the ?Western Balkans? should not completely avert research attention away from Serbian relations with its non-Yugoslav neighbors.


Kosmik Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rizkon Maulana ◽  
Indriati Amarini ◽  
Ika Ariani Kartini

The fulfillment of political rights for persons with mental disabilities in general elections has not been running as it should be. Pros and cons arise when collecting data on citizens who have the right to vote at the time of general elections. This research analyzes how the fulfillment of the political rights of persons with mental disabilities in legislation and the obstacles experienced in fulfilling the political rights of persons with mental disabilities. This research is a normative juridical study using secondary data as the main data, namely books, journals, research results, and legislation. Secondary data were analyzed normatively qualitative. The results showed that the political rights of persons with disabilities, including persons with mental disabilities, are a component of human rights that must be fulfilled in a democratic country. The fulfillment of the political rights of persons with disabilities is generally based on Law Number 8 of 2016, namely Article 13 which stipulates that persons with disabilities have the political right to vote and be elected in public office. These rights are important to be respected, protected and fulfilled in order to achieve justice for eliminating political discrimination against persons with disabilities. As for the obstacles experienced in fulfilling the political rights of persons with mental disabilities, namely the difficulty in conveying socialization materials to persons with mental disabilities and the level of voter participation among persons with mental disabilities is still low.Keywords: Political Rights, General Election, Mental Disability


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-141
Author(s):  
Hasbi Aswar

A speech from the President of United States, Donald Trump, who explicitly state Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel triggering debate that threatens harmonization of the Middle East. Disagreement appear from South East Asia state up to European state regarding to Trump’s statement, which turn into United States foreign policy. Trump’s statement described as the main reason of increasing tension Palestinian – Israel conflict. This essay argues that The US policy toward Jerusalem was merely influenced by domestic politics in the sense that to satisfy Trump`s main voters of the Republican Party that is Evangelical Christian base.


Author(s):  
Lee Drutman

This chapter examines the paradox of partisanship. In 1950, the American Political Science Association put out a major report arguing for a “more responsible two-party system.” The two parties—the Democratic Party and the Republican Party—were then largely indistinguishable coalitions of parochial local parties, and the political scientists argued that too little, rather than too much polarization, was the problem. This sets up a paradox: Some party division is necessary, but too much can be deadly. Various traditions in American political thought have tried to resolve this paradox. Antipartisans have urged consensus above all. Responsible partisans have urged competition above all. Meanwhile, bipartisans have urged compromise above all. Consensus is impossible. However, both compromise and competition are essential to democracy. Only the neglected multiparty tradition can solve the paradox with the right balance of competition and compromise.


2018 ◽  
pp. 203-260
Author(s):  
Vineet Thakur

This chapter traces the post-apartheid transformation of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in South Africa. It argues that in the first decade of transition, the Department remained preoccupied with the process of internal restructuring, which was successfully achieved. This caused structural pains as many of the old white diplomats left the service, robbing the Department of crucial expertise. In these years, the political leadership played a stronger role in the South African foreign policymaking. While Mandela’s foreign policy formulation was ad-hocist, Mbeki relied on institutional structures. However, rather than emphasizing on strengthening the DFA, he created new institutional structures under his integrated governance scheme which, ironically, further centralised foreign policymaking. Consequently, the DFA was further marginalized.


2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1111-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICK ANDELIC

ABSTRACTThe 1970s was a decade of acute existential crisis for the Democratic party, as ‘New Politics’ insurgents challenged the old guard for control of both the party apparatus and the right to define who a true ‘liberal’ was. Those Democrats who opposed New Politics reformism often found themselves dubbed ‘neoconservatives’. The fact that so many ‘neoconservatives’ eventually made their home in the Grand Old Party (GOP) has led historians to view them as a Republican bloc in embryo. The apostasy of the neoconservatives fits neatly into the political historiography of the 1970s, which is dominated by the rise of the New Right and its takeover of the Republican party. Yet this narrative, though seductive, overlooks the essentially protean character of politics in that decade. This article uses the 1976 Senate campaign mounted by Daniel Patrick Moynihan – the dandyish Harvard academic, official in four presidential administrations, and twice US ambassador – to demonstrate that many ‘neoconservatives’ were advancing a recognizably liberal agenda and seeking to define a new ‘vital center’ against the twin poles of the New Politics and the New Right. A microcosm of a wider struggle to define liberalism, Moynihan's candidacy complicates our understanding of the 1970s as an era of rightward drift.


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