scholarly journals The problem of value pluralism. Isaiah Berlin and beyond

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Dimova-Cookson
Keyword(s):  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin

Value Pluralism and Monotheism

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 818-840
Author(s):  
George Crowder
Keyword(s):  
Modern Society ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
A Value ◽  
Religious Accommodation ◽  
Pluralist Approach

AbstractHow far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.

The Crucifix Dispute and Value Pluralism

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Beata Polanowska-Sygulska
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
European Court ◽  
Ethical Monism

Abstract This article seeks to interpret the striking divergence between the two judgments passed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi v Italy case in terms of value pluralism. The latter is a hotly debated position in ethics, brought to life in the second half of the twentieth century by Isaiah Berlin. Pluralism elucidates these in interesting ways. First, value pluralism sheds light on three major aspects of the trial before the European Court of Human Rights: the nature of the collision of values, the discrepancy between the two decisions, and the rationale of the final judgment. Secondly, this is my thesis that while the first judgment fits ethical monism, which underlies Dworkin’s ‘one right answer’ theory, the second ruling chimes with pluralism. The pluralist spirit of the Grand Chamber’s final decision turned Europe away from the path of Americanization.

scholarly journals The Value-Pluralism and Liberalism Problem Revisited

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beata Polanowska - Sygulska
Keyword(s):  
Controversial Issue ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Is Value

This article tackles one of the most burning issues discussed by adherents of the dynamically developing movement in ethics which bears on political and legal philosophy, that is value-pluralism. In particular, the article is devoted to an investigation into the highly controversial issue of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism, based upon the three crucial, divergent approaches represented by Isaiah Berlin and his two main opponents, John Gray and George Crowder. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the two concepts in question are neither mutually exclusive nor logically connected, but actually overlapping, which signifies the existence of a loose, de facto connection between them. Such a final thesis proves to be consistent with the position of Isaiah Berlin, and contrary to the final statements endorsed by his critics, John Gray and George Crowder.

Value Pluralism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy: Waldron and Berlin in Debate

2018 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127
Author(s):  
George Crowder
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Extended Discussion

AbstractJeremy Waldron claims that Isaiah Berlin wrongly neglects, and is hostile to, constitutional and democratic institutions. I argue that although Berlin offers no extended discussion of constitutionalism or democracy, he is not hostile to them. Moreover, the logic of Berlin's value pluralism is strongly supportive of these ideas—for example, it fits well with constitutionalist notions such as the separation of powers and checks and balances. On the other hand, Waldron's rejection of judicial review on the ground of democracy is questionable in these same pluralist terms. Here I argue that Berlinian pluralism supports democracy as long as this is inclusive in its outcomes. But contemporary democracy cannot be relied upon to be sufficiently inclusive, in part because of the effects of the war on terror and the rise of populism. Under these conditions it is unwise for pluralists to dispense with judicial review.

A Liberal Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and John Stuart Mill

2013 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Zakaras
Keyword(s):  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Liberal Pluralism ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ways Of Life

AbstractThe essay explores the relationship between value pluralism, as Isaiah Berlin understood it, and liberalism. It consists of two main parts. In the first part, I argue that value pluralism does not entail liberalism, and I criticize two philosophers—William Galston and George Crowder—who believe that it does. In the second, I reconstruct and defend Isaiah Berlin's own understanding of this relationship, drawing on an essay that is often neglected by Berlin's interpreters: “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life.” Berlin thought that the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism was largely psychological. He believed that those who embraced value pluralism would be more likely to affirm liberal institutions, because they would be more likely to exhibit certain virtues—notably empathy, imagination, and openness to other ways of life—that typically motivate tolerance.

Global legal pluralism as fact and norm

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
TURKULER ISIKSEL
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Legal Regimes ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Intellectual Foundations ◽  
Pluralistic World

AbstractThis article interrogates the intellectual foundations of global legal pluralism as a descriptive and normative position, and assesses its core claims with reference to the changing status of individuals in the postnational realm. In order to uncover the normative core of the pluralist position, the article turns to the rich tradition of value pluralism in political philosophy, particularly as articulated by Isaiah Berlin. It argues that as a normative position, pluralism – whether applied to the abstract sphere of values or the concrete realm of legal regimes – is normatively underdetermined, offering too little guidance as to how the conflicts endemic to a pluralistic world ought to be resolved. Unless it is supplemented by other, more substantive principles of political legitimacy such as democracy, freedom, equality, or justice, the principle of pluralism applied to the global legal realm is poised to reproduce, even exacerbate, existing inequalities of power and resources among those whom it affects.

PLURALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 228-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Galston
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
General Category ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
The One

AbstractThis essay explores the ways in which a broadly pluralist outlook can help illuminate longstanding issues of constitutional theory and practice. It begins with a common-sense understanding of pluralism as the diversity of observed practices within a general category (section 2). It turns out that many assumptions Americans and others often make about constitutional essentials are valid only locally but not generically. The essay then turns to pluralism in a more technical and philosophical sense—specifically, the account of value pluralism adumbrated by Isaiah Berlin and developed by his followers. Section 3 sketches this version of pluralism, and section 4 brings it to bear on a range of familiar constitutional issues. In the process, a distinction emerges between, on the one hand, areas of variation among constitutions and, on the other, some general truths about political life that define core constitutional functions. The essay concludes (section 5) with some brief reflections on the normative thrust of pluralist constitutional theory—in particular, a presumption in favor of the maximum accommodation of individual and group differences consistent with the maintenance of constitutional unity and civic order.

From Pluralism to Liberalism: Rereading Isaiah Berlin

2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ella Myers
Keyword(s):  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Interpretive Approach ◽  
Local Norms ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe relationship between pluralism and liberalism has been at the center of recent considerations of Isaiah Berlin's thought. In particular, liberal theorists have asked whether the value pluralism Berlin endorses actually undermines his liberalism. A common interpretive approach resolves this problem by presenting Berlin's pluralism as “limited” rather than “radical,” and therefore capable of serving as a moral foundation authorizing liberalism. I challenge this re-construction of Berlin's work, arguing that such readings are premised on a conception of judgment Berlin does not share. While many of his readers believe that a judgment on behalf of liberalism requires the identification of a transcontextual ground, Berlin invites us to see human judgment as a meaningful practice that occurs in the absence of absolutes yet does not simply mirror local norms. Berlin's defense of liberalism models this kind of judgment—a judgment that is neither mandated, nor ruled out, by pluralism.

Two concepts of pluralism

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 383-391
Author(s):  
Ramin Jahanbegloo
Keyword(s):  
Spiritual Growth ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Universal Method ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Civic Friendship ◽  
Universal Values ◽  
Liberal Citizenship

This article argues that Mohandas K. Gandhi and Isaiah Berlin remain the two main thinkers of pluralism in the 20th century. Though the two never met and despite their essential differences, the two political thinkers can be read as complementary in order to hold on to the idea of a common human horizon. As such, Gandhi’s transformative conception of pluralism, exemplified by his universal method of transforming liberal citizenship into a civic friendship, offers definitely a way to enlarge the Berlinian concept of value pluralism as an alternative of moral monism. Consequently, the reading of Gandhi could complete Isaiah Berlin’s idea of value pluralism by adding an effective exercise of plurality through his antagonism to monism as a tradition of thought that does not possess the resources to change and the potential for the moral and spiritual growth of humanity. As a result, this article suggests that it is worth trying to strike a balance between the Gandhian and Berlinian concepts of pluralism in order to be able to differentiate pluralism and relativism and to search for a core of shared or universal values which allows us to reach an agreement on at least some moral issues in today’s world.

The Unromantic Rousseauian: Scanlon on Justice, Value Coherence and Freedom

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Waheed Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Political Values

Scanlon differs from many liberals – Isaiah Berlin, for example – in that he rejects deep value pluralism. He thinks that the requirements of social justice actually cohere with the requirements of other political values. But like many other liberals, Scanlon does not think that value coherence has any implications for the kind of freedom that we should care about in assessing social and political institutions. In this paper, I take issue with Scanlon’s view of the relation between value coherence and freedom. Following Rousseau, I argue that value coherence does in fact contribute to our freedom, and that we should structure our basic institutions so as to increase value coherence and thereby enhance our freedom overall.

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