The hardy perennials of maintenance

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Neil Clegg

This paper is about the maintenance of safety critical elements on oil and gas facilities. Different approaches can be applied to design the appropriate maintenance plans that will ensure the availability of safety critical barriers. The challenge and opportunity for maintenance engineers today is to apply their knowledge and experience to improve the issues that are already known to exist with the current approaches for maintaining safety critical elements. Additionally, collaboration is required between operators, regulators and the standard-setting authorities to ensure that the appropriate application of risk-based approaches to maintenance are being endorsed. The two examples considered in the paper are the maintenance and testing of firefighting water-deluge systems and lifeboats (TEMPSC). Overall, improvements using risk-based approaches to maintenance will lead to safer operations, more consistency in maintenance plans, greater alignment between standards and practice, and reduced costs.


Author(s):  
John V. Sharp ◽  
Edmund G. Terry ◽  
John Wintle

Many offshore installations in the North Sea have now exceeded their original design life and are in a life extension phase. A Framework of six processes has been developed for the management of ageing of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) in offshore installations. The processes include an analysis of the effect of ageing modes on SCE performance. Examples of performance indicators for typical SCEs are proposed based on how their condition and performance as may be affected by physical deterioration and other effects of ageing. Indicators for calibrating the maturity and effectiveness of the management processes are also suggested.



2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Girish Kamal

Abstract Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) are the equipment and systems that provide the foundation of risk management associated with Major Accident Hazards (MAHs). A SCE is classified as an equipment, structure or system whose failure could cause or contribute to a major accident, or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Once the SCE has been ascertained, it is essential to describe its critical function in terms of a Performance Standard. Based on the Performance Standard, assurance tasks can be stated in the maintenance system to ensure that the required performance is confirmed. By analyzing the data in the maintenance system, confidence can be gained that all the SCEs required to manage Major Accidents and Environmental Hazards are functioning correctly. Alternatively, corrective actions can be taken to reinstate the integrity of the systems if shortcomings are identified. This paper shall detail out how the MAH and SCE Management process is initiated to follow the best industry practices in the identification and integrity management of major accident hazards as well as safety critical equipment. The tutorial shall describe in detail the following important stages:Identification of Major Accident HazardsIdentification of Safety Critical Equipment, involved in managing Major Accident HazardsDefine Performance Standards for these Safety Critical EquipmentExecution of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the continued suitability of the SCE Equipment, and that these are meeting the Performance StandardsVerification that all stages have been undertaken, any deviations being managed and thus that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled.Analyze and Improve Through the diligent application of these stages, it is possible to meet the requirements for MAH and SCE Management process giving a better understanding and control of risks in the industry.







1999 ◽  
Vol 122 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Wang ◽  
O. Kieran

The offshore installations (safety case) regulations were developed in the UK in 1992 and came into force in 1993 in response to the accepted findings of the Piper Alpha enquiry. Recently, “the offshore installations and wells (design and construction, etc.) regulations” (DCR 1996) were introduced to offshore safety analysis. From the earliest stages of the installation’s life cycle, operators must ensure that all safety-critical elements in both the software and system domains be assessed. Hazards can be identified and the risks associated with them can be assessed and evaluated using a number of techniques and decision-making strategies, all aimed at producing an installation with lifetime safety integrity. In this paper, following a brief review of the current status of offshore safety regulation in the UK, several offshore safety assessment frameworks are presented. These include top-down, bottom-up, probabilistic, and subjective approaches. The conditions under which each approach may be applied effectively and efficiently are discussed. Probabilistic safety-based decision-making and subjective safety-based decision-making are then studied. Two examples are used to demonstrate the decision-making approaches. Recommendations on further development in offshore safety analysis are suggested. [S0892-7219(00)00901-8]



2012 ◽  
Vol 614-615 ◽  
pp. 550-554
Author(s):  
Rong Ge Xiao ◽  
Dong Rui Yi ◽  
Pei Fen Yao ◽  
Jia Quan Zhou

Because the most of crude oil has the nature of "three-high" in China and the natural aging of crude oil in the part of oil field, the transmission of crude-oil has reduced, and the oil refining has increased in oil field, Thus the majority of pipelines laid in china are running at a low-flowrate. Analysis of the problems in the running of low-flowrate pipeline: with the temperature drops up, the viscosity increases; the accident of condensate tubes very easily occurs; the turnover point increases; the pressure load of pipeline increases; the supply of heat is shortage, the reliability of equipment is reduced; costs increases and so on. There is proposing the main operation mode to solve the pipeline in low-flowrate, including intermittent transportation, the transportation of mixing light oil, oil and gas batch transportation, the transportation with adding pour point depressant and so on, and has discussed the instability of the running of hot pipeline in the low-flowrate.



2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah H. Schlanger ◽  
Signa Larralde ◽  
Martin Stein

ABSTRACTThe alternative mitigation program that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) established in 2008 to address impacts to the archaeological resources in the Permian Basin of southeastern New Mexico, now one of the most active of the nation's oil and gas energy fields, has supported more than $10 million in field research programs and is poised to be able to fund about $1 million in field research annually for the foreseeable future. The financial success of the program is mirrored by the program's outstanding contributions to our understanding of the Permian Basin's long and complex history of human occupation. Surprisingly, although other public lands under the auspices of the BLM are seeing similar rates of energy development, the critical elements of this program have not been picked up elsewhere in the BLM. The Permian Basin program appears doomed to be an example of a “one-off” alternative mitigation solution. The factors barring more widespread adoption include the ebb and flow of energy production activity, complications arising from mixed land status and the ability to work across jurisdictional boundaries, hesitation to change procedures that are working adequately for the time being, and a lack of capacity to institute systemic change.



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