The language of exclusion

Author(s):  
Louis Talay

Abstract It has been argued that far-right populist parties (FRPP) distinguish themselves from other parties on the right of the political spectrum through their strong association with nationalism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism and historical mythologizing. These features typically manifest in discourse that attempts to justify exclusionist immigration and asylum policies by presenting Islam as an existential threat to predominantly white societies. This paper seeks to establish whether a conservative party that has never been considered populist could possess the same features as an FRPP by comparing three selected discursive texts – one from mainstream conservative party leader John Howard and two from prominent European FRPP leaders. The analysis revealed that the key difference between the three leaders was Howard’s failure to satisfy the authoritarianism criterion, which was interpreted as a decisive factor in his party’s moderate guise. This suggests that some mainstream parties may be more ideologically extremist than they are perceived to be.

Author(s):  
John Graeber

Abstract In recent decades, citizenship policies in Europe have changed significantly: some governments have introduced restrictive new requirements for citizenship, while others have made citizenship more accessible. What explains this variation? Despite a burgeoning literature on both comparative citizenship and spatial competition among parties, scholarship on this question remains in its infancy and primarily focused on the influence of the far right. Expanding on this growing research, this article argues that citizenship policy change results from electoral competition on both sides of the political spectrum, in conjunction with governments’ ideological orientation. Using new data on citizenship policies across sixteen European countries from 1975 to 2014, the author demonstrates that left-of-center governments facing increasing levels of left party competition are associated with more accessible policy changes, while increasing levels of party competition from the far right yield more restrictive policy changes under not only right-of-center governments, but also centrist and left-of-center governments as well.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Gindler

The article discusses fascism's place on the political spectrum. At present, there is no consensus among political scientists and economists on that issue, as it has been extraordinarily politicized and distorted during ideological struggles among various currents of socialism. From the very beginning, fascism was depicted by Marxists as belonging to the Right, while Fascists themselves wanted to build a society that transcends the Left-Right paradigm. However, few voices in academia have noted that practical implementation of the fascists’ ideas, inherited from the works of revolutionary and national syndicalists, exhibited predominantly leftist characteristics.The ambiguity of placing fascism in its proper place on the political spectrum can be confidently resolved by applying three primary factors that govern political spectrum polarization: attitude to private property, scope of individual freedom, and degree of wealth redistribution. The article argues that fascism is a particular current of non-Marxian socialism that utilized collectivization of consciousness and wealth redistribution as the main paths toward socialism rather than outright expropriation of private property or means of production. Simultaneously, it is acknowledged that private property rights were inhibited by the fascist state, even though de jure they were permitted.The fascist ideal of the “alternate way” had a logical inconsistency that produced an unstable equilibrium between labor and capital as well as between the man and the state. The politico-economic structure predictably collapsed to the left in the course of building a new society. Therefore, fascism could be correctly called the Right of the Left.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-86
Author(s):  
Blagovesta Cholova ◽  
Jean-Michel De Waele

This article explores the success of populist parties in Bulgaria during the last decade. The first section focuses on the definition of populism and identifies the main populist parties in this country. The second part presents the development of these parties and their specific characteristic as well as the evolution of the “three waves” of populism in Bulgaria. The last section addresses the reasons for the success of these parties both in terms of supply side (the electorate) and the demand side (the strategy of the parties). The main conclusion is that this country is a fertile ground for populist movements due to the attitude of the electorate and the niche on the right-side of the political spectrum and that newly created parties use this opportunity of win elections but they remain short-lived because they cannot continue to mobilize populist rhetoric when they are in office and often face rapid decline.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 456-473
Author(s):  
Thomas Olesen

This article argues that opinions on distant suffering must be understood via three variables: recipients of aid and sympathy; cause of suffering; and providers of aid and sympathy. These insights are present in the literature but have not to date been combined. One advantage of such a combination is that it allows us to explore the extent to which providers of aid and sympathy employ deservingness criteria in their opinion formation. Theoretically, the article thus opens a dialogue between the distant issue literature and theories of deservingness in welfare state research. Methodologically, it builds on an original survey of 2003 Danish respondents. The article’s main ambition is to probe (1) the relationships between political preference and opinions on distant suffering; (2) the extent to which Danes engage in deservingness calculations when they relate to it; and (3) whether deservingness calculations are patterned along political preference. The data show that political preference predicts opinions and that deservingness calculations are indeed prevalent. Yet they also demonstrate that these differences should be interpreted against the background of a high aggregate level of support for distant issue engagement. The effect of political preference is most pronounced at the outer poles of the political spectrum, and less so at the centre. And while deservingness logics are most prevalent on the right, the pattern is moderate and non-consistent.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Baer ◽  
Christian Boulanger ◽  
Alexander Klose ◽  
Rosemarie Will

For Germany 2009 was a year of constitutional anniversaries: the first democratic constitution (Paulskirchenverfassung of 1849) was promulgated 160 years ago; the 1919 Weimar Constitution would have turned 90; and finally, the country celebrated 60 years of the Basic Law, which was proclaimed and signed in Bonn on 23 May 1949. Despite its birth in the midst of economic and political turmoil and widespread disillusion with politics, the Basic Law has come to be regarded as a “success story.” As is well known, it was never meant to last – the very term “Grundgesetz” (basic law) indicated that it was intended to serve as a temporary constitutional framework until the enactment of a new constitution for the whole of Germany. Yet the Basic Law outgrew its provisional character. Today, not only the political establishment is united in praising the Grundgesetz. The scholarly assessment also has been mostly positive. The constitutional bargain struck in 1949 has been able to achieve what no previous German constitution had managed. The right and the left of the German political spectrum fashioned an enduring compromise that combined democracy, federalism and the welfare state. It is part of the story that the old anti-liberal and nationalist elite had been thoroughly delegitimized by loosing the war. Also, the Allies gave the effort an additional nudge. The progressive changes could then be implemented quite effectively by relying on the juristic culture of the Rechtsstaat that dates back to the bureaucratic legacy of, among others, the Prussian state.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Tjitske Akkerman

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.


Significance The new government will have only 34 of the 179 seats, because policy differences among the right-wing parties, and the political strategy of the electorally strengthened anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic Danish People's Party (DF), mean DF will remain outside. Policy-making will be difficult. The government will be more economically liberal and pro-EU than it would have been with DF, but to make policy it will rely on partners across the political spectrum, especially the ousted Social Democrats -- who remain the largest party -- and DF. Impacts If DF is seen as a welfarist protector of ordinary citizens, it is more likely to repeat, at least, its 22% vote in the next election. The much-tighter immigration regime which is in prospect could taint Denmark's image and make it less attractive to foreign investment. The new government is likely to be an ally for much of UK Prime Minister David Cameron's EU reform agenda.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svenja Kopyciok ◽  
Hilary Silver

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of “right” and “left,” this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karina Bénazech Wendling ◽  
Matthew Rowley

Populism, like nationalism, can be found on the right as well as on the left-wing of the political spectrum. However, current political debates demonstrate how in recent years, nationalist and populist movements have advanced the preservation of Christian “roots” against a global cosmopolitanism. Right-wing populism thus tends to present itself as a guardian of Christian culture, or Judeo-Christian culture. However, there is a struggle over the definition and the ownership of this religious heritage. Whilst it is certainly possible to identify sources within the Protestant tradition that may legitimise support for right-wing populism, the questions this struggle raises often relate to particular intersections of culture, theology, perspectives on history as well as political thought. This special issue explores and critiques these intersections, employing theological, historical, and sociological methods. While the main perspective is that of cross-disciplinary reflections on the fraught relationship between Protestantism and right-wing populism, it also examines the evolution of broader connections between Christianity and nationalism through time.


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