Ifs and Cans — I

1971 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. F. Pears

Austin's lecture on this topic contributes little to the problem of freedom of the will, and so in my discussion of his ideas I shall stop short of the difficult part of that problem. His most important positive suggestion is that hypotheticals should be divided into two classes, conditionals and pseudo-conditionals. He claims that neglect of this distinction has been the cause of mistakes in certain forms of the dispositional analysis of the statement that an agent could have acted otherwise, and he then goes on to criticise all forms of that analysis using arguments which do not depend on the difference between the two kinds of hypothetical.This discussion will be in two parts. In the first I shall take up Austin's distinction between conditionals and pseudos and criticise it and develop it at length, because it seems to me to be the most important thing in his lecture. Since I shall not have space for comment on fortuitous errors made by defenders of the dispositional analysis of the claim that an agent could have acted otherwise, I shall concentrate on the essential features of that analysis.

Author(s):  
Richard A. Muller

Grace and Freedom addresses the issue of divine grace in relation to the freedom of the will in Reformed or “Calvinist” theology in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century with a focus on the work of the English Reformed theologian William Perkins, and his role as an apologist of the Church of England, defending its theology against Roman Catholic polemic, and specifically against the charge that Reformed theology denies human free choice. Perkins and his contemporaries affirmed that salvation occurs by grace alone and that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but they also insisted on the freedom of the human will and specifically the freedom of choice in a way that does not conform to modern notions of libertarian freedom or compatibilism. In developing this position, Perkins drew on the thought of various Reformers such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and Zacharias Ursinus, on the nuanced positions of medieval scholastics, and on several contemporary Roman Catholic representatives of the so-called second scholasticism. His work was a major contribution to early modern Reformed thought both in England and on the continent. His influence in England extended both to the Reformed heritage of the Church of England and to English Puritanism. On the Continent, his work contributed to the main lines of Reformed orthodoxy and to the piety of the Dutch Second Reformation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Offer

Herbert Spencer remains an important and intriguing figure in thinking about political, social and moral matters. At present his writings in relation to idealist thought, social policy, sociology and ethics are undergoing reassessment. This article is concerned with some recent interpretations of Spencer on individuals in social life. It looks in some detail at Spencer's work on psychology and sociology as well as on ethics, seeking to establish how Spencer understood people as social individuals. In particular the neglect of Spencer's denial of freedom of the will is identified as a problem in some recent interpretations. One of his contemporary critics, J.E. Cairnes, charged that Spencer's own theory of social evolution left even Spencer himself the status of only a ‘conscious automaton’. This article, drawing on a range of past and present interpretative discussions of Spencer, seeks to show that Spencerian individuals are psychically and socially so constituted as to be only indirectly responsive to moral suasion, even to that of his own Principles of Ethics as he himself acknowledged. Whilst overtly reconstructionist projects to develop a liberal utilitarianism out of Spencer to enliven political and philosophical debate for today are worthwhile – dead theorists have uses – care needs to be taken that the original context and its concerns with the processes associated with innovation (and decay) in social life are not thereby eclipsed, the more so since in some important respects they have recently received little systematic attention even though the issues have contemporary relevance in sociology.


1948 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perry Miller

The reputation of Jonathan Edwards, impressive though it is, rests upon only a fragmentary representation of the range or profundity of his thinking. Harassed by events and controversies, he was forced repeatedly to put aside his real work and to expend his energies in turning out sermons, defenses of the Great Awakening, or theological polemics. Only two of his published books (and those the shortest), The Nature of True Virtue and The End for which God Created the World, were not ad hoc productions. Even The Freedom of the Will is primarily a dispute, aimed at silencing the enemy rather than expounding a philosophy. He died with his Summa still a mass of notes in a bundle of home-made folios, the handwriting barely legible. The conventional estimate that Edwards was America's greatest metaphysical genius is a tribute to his youthful Notes on the Mind — which were a crude forecast of the system at which he labored for the rest of his days — and to a few incidental flashes that illumine his forensic argumentations. The American mind is immeasurably the poorer that he was not permitted to bring into order his accumulated meditations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Yeni Mulyani Supriatin

Penelitian ini bertujuan mengungkap peristiwa Perang Bubat yang terjadi pada abad ke-14 atau tahun 1357 M dan resepsi sastranya. Masalah yang dibahas adalah bagaimana latar belakang terjadinya Perang Bubat, reaksi, dan tanggapannya. Teori yang digunakan adalah resepsi sastra. Metode untuk pengumpulan data adalah kualitatif dengan menerapkan prinsip resepsi sastra. Hasil penelitian menggambarkan bahwa terjadinya Perang Bubat adalah Raja Sunda tidak tunduk pada kehendak Gajah Mada dan Gajah Mada ingin menyatukan Nusantara. Resepsi sastra terhadap Perang Bubat dapat dikelompokkan menjadi 3, yaitu resepsi dari aspek kesejarahannya, resepsi pengaruhnya terhadap penciptaan karya baru, dan resepsi terhadap struktur sastra.  Simpulan penelitian ini adalah peristiwa Bubat diresepsi setelah dua abad berlalu, yaitu pada abad ke-16  dan peristiwa tersebut diresepsi ulang pada abad ke-20-an. Hasil resepsi sastra  dari abad ke-18 sampai dengan abad ke-20 cukup beragam. Keberagaman resepsi itu menunjukkan bahwa terdapat perbedaan horizon harapan pembaca.  This study aims to reveal the events of the Bubat War that occurred in the 14th century or the year 1357 AD and literary receptions that emerged after the incident occurred. The issue discussed is how the background of the Bubat War and the reactions and responses to the event through literary receptions. The theory used in analyzing data is literary receptions. The method used for data collection is qualitative by applying the principle of literary receptions. The results of this study illustrate that the background of the Bubat War have two versions and both controversial, the first version because the King of Sunda entourage do not obey to the will of Gajah Mada, on the other hand, the second version is that Gajah Mada tactics in unifying the archipelago while the Kingdom of Sunda is a state that has not been submitted. Literary receptions to the War of Bubat can be grouped into three, they are the reception of its historical aspect, the reception of its influence on the creation of new works, and the reception of the literary structure. The conclusion of this research is  Bubat event was perceived after two centuries passed, in the 16th century and the event was redrawn in the 20th century. Results of literary receptions in the 18th century until the 20th century quite diverse. The diversity of the receptions shows the difference in the horizon of readers' expectations.    


Problemos ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 8-33
Author(s):  
Skirmantas Jankauskas

Straipsnyje aptariama graikiškojo filosofavimo genezė, t. y. nagrinėjamos pirmojo filosofijos teiginio susiklostymo prielaidos ir tų prielaidų numanoma teiginio prasmė. Filosofijos istorijoje nusistovėjusios pirmųjų filosofų teiginių interpretacijos kilmė siejama su Aristotelio filosofija. Teigiama, kad Aristotelis graikiškąjį filosofavimą jau visiškai įkurdina rašte. Iš rašto pozicijų Aristotelis žvelgia ir į pirmųjų filosofų ištaras, todėl suvokia jas vien kaip rašto (teorinio mąstymo) elementus. Straipsnyje daroma prielaida, kad filosofavimas prasidėjo ne kaip raštas, o kaip su žmogaus veikla susijęs tradicinis kalbėjimas. Filosofavimo kaip konstruktyvios kalbėjimo atmainos specifiką lėmė antikoje susiklosčiusi refleksijos situacija, kuri siejama su septynių išminčių imperatyvu ‘Pažink save!’ Parodoma, kad šis imperatyvas steigia skirtį tarp logo ir kosmo, kurią antikos išminčius išgyvena kaip sinkretinio gyvenimo vidujybės netektį. Straipsnio autorius interpretuoja filosofavimą kaip kalbėjimą ir veikimą, kuriais antikos išminčius siekia susigrąžinti ikirefleksinę būseną. Teigiama, kad sinkretinių mąstymo įgūdžių nepraradęs antikos išminčius savąjį filosofavimą linkęs aiškinti kaip pritapimo prie kosmo būdą. Kadangi refleksija įkurdina žmogų teorinio mąstymo erdvėje, tai pritapimo prie kosmo veiksmas tegalimas mąstymo plotmėje, todėl filosofavimą steigianti skirtis tarp logo ir kosmo besiplėtojančiame filosofavime nuaidi skirtimis kosme. Tačiau pirmieji išminčiai dar tikisi pilnatviško pritapimo prie kosmo ir tokio pritapimo regimybę jie dar pelno kosmo kaip grožio išgyvenimu, kurį Platonas ir Aristotelis sieja su nuostaba. Pirmoji kanonizuotoji filosofijos ištara interpretuojama kaip estetinį pritapimą prie kosmo referuojantis poetinis bylojimas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: raštas, priežastis, refleksija, kosmas, pritapimas, archė, grožis, tiesa, būtis.On the Nature (of Philosophy)Skirmantas Jankauskas   SummaryThe paper deals with the genesis of Greek philosophy. The circumstances of the appearance of the first utterance in Greek philosophy and their impact upon its meaning are revealed. The traditional interpretation of the first utterances in the early Greek philosophy is attributed to Aristotle. The latter is said to have transferred Greek philosophizing totally into writing and subsequently to treat the first utterances as elements of writing. In the article, the suggestion is put forward that philosophizing did not begin as a writing but rather as a talking activity immersed in human activity in general. The specificity of philosophizing as constructive talking is related to the situation of reflection, caused by the imperative of the Seven Sages, namely by the imperative ‘Know thyself!”. It is shown here that the imperative introduces the difference between logos and cosmos, which is experienced by a Greek Sage as a loss of sincretic life. Philosophizing is then introduced as an activity of talking, provoked by the will to reestablish the original sincretic state. The author argues that because of syncretist skills, this activity is treated by early Greek philosophers as a way of partaking in cosmos. As reflection conveys a philosopher into the realm of theoretical thinking, partaking in cosmos is possible only as a way of thinking. Consequently, the difference between logos and cosmos in philosophizing resolves itself in the differences of cosmos. Nevertheless, the first philosophers still retained some hope for complete partaking in cosmos, and they gained the illusion of such a partaking by aesthetic experience of cosmos, which was attributed by Plato and Aristotle to wondering. Consequently, the first utterance of Greek philosophy is interpreted in this article as a kind of poetic discourse that refers to the activity of aesthetic partaking in cosmos.Keywords: writing, reason, reflection, cosmos, partaking, arche, the beautiful, truth, being.


Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.


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