The Seriousness of Doubt and Our Natural Trust in the Senses in the First Meditation

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Macarthur
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

In the Synopsis to the Meditations Descartes assures us that ‘extensive doubt… [provides] the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses’ (12). And in the Fifth Replies Descartes adds that it is essential to a proper understanding of the Meditations that ‘the entire testimony of the senses should be regarded as uncertain and even as false’ (350). But to deny our ordinary trust in the senses on the grounds of such ‘hyperbolic’ or ‘metaphysical’ doubts as that one might be dreaming or the victim of an evil demon is, as Descartes himself puts it, quite mad: ‘no sane person has ever seriously doubted that there really is a world and that human beings have bodies’ (16). We seem, then, to be confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand, the skepticism about the senses that we find in the First Meditation must be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is, in some sense, a sham. How, then, are we to understand these doubts?

scholarly journals Two Conceptions of Second Nature

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Activities ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
The One ◽  
First Nature

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

On the Veiling and Unveiling of Experience: A Comparison Between the Micro-Phenomenological Method and the Practice of Meditation

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-77
Author(s):  
Claire Petitmengin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Buddhist Meditation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.

Filosofia, politica e società ai tempi della pandemia. Agamben e la «paranoia della ragione»

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 617-642
Author(s):  
Antonio Di Chiro
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Of Exception ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Giorgio Agamben ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Intimate Relations ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.

Païdeia et Sport

1998 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Leo-Paul Bordeleau
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Modern Education ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Can sport claim to be an educative means, and what becomes of Greek paideia in the world of sport? The author intends to answer these questions through the use of a semantic and historical clarification of the notions of sport and education. Indeed, on the one hand, sport appears like a social practice not much propitious to education; on the other hand, modern education seems to have deviated from the Greek paideia’s trajectory. Therefore, to take into account this deviation and, by doing so, to make precise the idea of education, and then demonstrate that sport carries all characteristics of modern rationality which has produced it, will allow the author to conclude that sport could be considered one of the preferential means of human beings’ formation. Nevertheless its educative function more likely belongs to the nature of "poïèsis" than to the nature of "praxis."

Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls

Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The One

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

Personal Identity and the Idea of a Human Being

1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Personal Approach ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.

Loving Tolerance

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hussein Ganji ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Epistemological Basis

The deepening and development of epistemological issues on the one hand, and the unpleasant historical experience on the other hand, made modern humanity after the Renaissance gradually became tolerant and recognized "the Other." The epistemological basis for tolerance is the obscurity and complexity of truth and difference in the understanding of human beings. Its moral basis is not to see oneself as above others and to endure the intricacies of practicing morality. Tolerance is rational for two reasons: one is the epistemological basis that hinders the dogma of possessing absolute truth, self-knowledge, and repudiating others; the other is the advantages of tolerance for collective living. This article seeks to show that Rumi, while paying attention to the moral and epistemological principles of tolerance, goes beyond the rational tolerance of calculating profits, losses, and trading. According to his mystical view, his tolerance is a “loving tolerance,” a tolerance which is based solely on love and compassion towards human beings, rather than being based on calculations of profit and loss, with no expectation for reward.

The Art of Misunderstanding Moral Bioenhancement

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
INGMAR PERSSON ◽  
JULIAN SAVULESCU
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Future ◽  
The One ◽  
Scientific Technology

Abstract:In our book Unfit for the Future and a number of papers, we have argued that there is a dangerous mismatch between, on the one hand, the tremendous power of scientific technology, which has created societies with millions of citizens, and, on the other hand, our moral capacities, which have been shaped by evolution for life in small, close-knit societies with primitive technology. To overcome this mismatch before it results in the downfall of human civilization, human beings stand in acute need of moral enhancement, not only by traditional means but also by biomedical means, should this turn out to be possible. After summarizing this argument, we respond to two critics, Michael Hauskeller and Robert Sparrow.

The Aristotelian Categories

1925 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Gillespie
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Precise Position ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The precise position to be assigned to the Categories in the Aristotelian system has always been somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, they seem to be worked into the warp of its texture, as in the classification of change, and Aristotle can argue from the premiss that they constitute an exhaustive division of the kinds of Being (An. Post. I. 22, p. 83 b 15). On the other hand, both in the completed scheme of his logic and in his constructive metaphysic they retire into the background, giving place to other notions, such as causation, change, actuality and potentiality. Investigation has, moreover, been hampered, especially in Germany, by attempts to correlate them with the Kantian Categories, with which they have obvious points of contact. But Kant's formal a priori concepts by which the mind makes for itself a world, to use Mr. Bosanquet's phrase, imply an attitude to knowledge and reality so utterly opposed to the Aristotelian that the comparison has tended to confusion rather than elucidation. Scholars now realize better that the Aristotelian Categories can only be understood in connexion with the problems of Aristotle's own age.

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