Neoliberalism versus distributional autonomy: the skipped step in rawls’s the law of peoples

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Minimum Degree ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
The Law

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls

Human Affairs ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Hrubec
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Liberal Nationalism ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John RawlsThe paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate.

Justice Across Borders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Blake
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Arena ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.

Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 193-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
International Context ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
The Difference

Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context.

Reconstructing Rawls's Law of Peoples

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Paden
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
The Law

In his recent article “The Law of Peoples,” John Rawls attempts to develop a theory of international justice. Paden contrasts “The Law of Peoples” with Rawls's “A Theory of Justice,” reconstructing Rawls's new theory to be more consistent with the earlier work. Paden finds Rawls's new theory inadequate in its response to communitarian criticisms, those that advocate a different theory of good than that of liberal societies. Paden goes back to “A Theory of Justice” to state that all societies seek one good, that is, the protection of their just institutions. In so doing, he provides a more expansive view of the interests of societies, which, he argues, is more consistent with “A Theory of Justice” than “The Law of Peoples,” yet avoids the flaws identified in the original argument.

scholarly journals A Boundedly Rational Analysis of Global Distributive Justice

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu ◽  
Iris-Patricia Golopenta
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Identification Problem ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Complete Failure ◽  
Justice Theories ◽  
National Governments

In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.

The Law of Peoples as inclusive international justice

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichao Tong
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Modern China ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Cultural Tradition ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Global Responsibility ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Law

In this essay, I argue for the “inclusive” advantage of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples through a critical engagement with the political development of modern China. I start by introducing some recent developments in contemporary Chinese political theory, showing why it is now theoretically difficult to imagine that China can be incorporated into a liberal international order as a liberal society. In the main body of the essay, I conduct a comparative study of Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism, a Confucian-inspired political theory embedded in Chinese cultural tradition and constructed for modern China, and the Law of Peoples. The purpose is to reveal (a) that there has already existed a school of Chinese political thought that will incorporate China into the Law of Peoples as a decent Confucian-inspired society and (b) that such a society will accept its global responsibility designated by the duty of assistance yet reject a global difference principle in the global original position. I conclude by suggesting how this potential “inclusiveness” of the Law of Peoples may help to remove some of new disturbance to the ideal of a just and stably peaceful world.

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