The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls

Human Affairs ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Hrubec

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John RawlsThe paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate.

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Paden

In his recent article “The Law of Peoples,” John Rawls attempts to develop a theory of international justice. Paden contrasts “The Law of Peoples” with Rawls's “A Theory of Justice,” reconstructing Rawls's new theory to be more consistent with the earlier work. Paden finds Rawls's new theory inadequate in its response to communitarian criticisms, those that advocate a different theory of good than that of liberal societies. Paden goes back to “A Theory of Justice” to state that all societies seek one good, that is, the protection of their just institutions. In so doing, he provides a more expansive view of the interests of societies, which, he argues, is more consistent with “A Theory of Justice” than “The Law of Peoples,” yet avoids the flaws identified in the original argument.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 621-644
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls develops a theory of global justice whose scope and ambitions are quite modest. Far from justifying a global resource distribution principle modeled on the difference principle, Rawls’s theory does not argue for significant redistribution among peoples. This paper focuses on Rawls’s claim that the character and scope of his account of global justice are determined by the constructivist method that he employs to extend political liberalism’s project from the domestic to the global sphere. The principles of an acceptable law of peoples, he argues, are simply those principles that would be selected by rational representatives of peoples from the standpoint of a suitably characterized fair choice position. This paper argues that Rawls’s constructivist method in fact provides support for an account of global justice of greater scope and ambition than Rawls’s Law of Peoples.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Maria Varaki

John Rawls in the second part of his Ideal Theory as it is developed in the Law of the Peoples, argues that both liberal and non-liberal but decent people can still be considered to be people in good standing in a reasonable society of people and proposes the toleration of non-liberal but decent societies by the liberal ones. Within this framework, the current proposal will focus on the relationship between the ‘West’ and the Russian Federation as it has evolved after the collapse of the Soviet regime through recent developments on human rights protection and the regulation of the use of force or the “law of peace” as Rawls claims. The aim of this endeavor is twofold. First, to provide a critical assessment of liberal theories such as cosmopolitan constitutionalism, which promote a particular liberal understanding of global governance based on common values and universal goals. Second, to examine the potential but also limits of the Rawlsian theory of toleration towards the development of a more pluralistic normative analysis of the global order which will be neither utopian nor apologetic but one that will contribute into the realization of a “realistic utopia” between pure liberal and non-pure liberal states.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
A. Khudori Soleh

Rawls' justice theory is based on three basic concepts: concept of property from John Locke, social contract from Rousseau, and imperative categories from Kant. This Rawls' justice conception itself emerges as a respond for social injustice in society as well as i nequitable behavior affected by the ethics of utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to Rawls, justice is fairness. The principles of justice are, (1) equal and maximum feasible liberty for all, (2) power and wealth to be distributed equally, except where inequalities; would work for the adage of all and where all would have equal opportunity to attain the higher position. The first principle supposes as permanent principle and, which cannot be interpreted. On the other hand, the second principle degrades two formulas: (a) everyone’s  advantage (b) equally open. So forth, from formula (a) can be degraded two possibilities: principle of efficiency and principle of differentiation, whereas from formula (b) also can be degraded two possibilities: equality as careers open to talents and equality as equality of fair opportunity): Hencefonh, from possibility of (a) and (b) yielded four possibilities of justice interpretation: natural freedom, free equality, free aristocracy and the equality democratize.  


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
pp. 171-180
Author(s):  
Anna Paula Bagetti Zeifert
Keyword(s):  

No presente artigo analisamos como o projeto de justiça social rawlsiano, pensado inicialmente para as sociedades nacionais, foi estendido para a Sociedade dos Povos na obra The Law of Peoples. Examinamos como John Rawls resgata e apresenta seus elementos essenciais na proposta de justiça entre os povos, sua preocupação em garantir estabilidade e o mínimo de justiça social no interior das sociedades que integram a Sociedade dos Povos. Ponderamos como seus objetivos se encontram interligados tanto na proposta de justiça política para o interior dos Estados, quanto na relação entre Estados, garantindo a legitimidade das sociedades a partir de uma estrutura básica e de instituições justas. Nesse contexto, nosso objetivo é demonstrar que ao pensar esse processo paralelo de justiça (nacional e internacional), e projetar uma segunda posição original, guia para seus elementos essenciais com vistas a promoção da justiça social entre os povos, Rawls também apresentou os limites da sua realistic utopia e os caminhos para a reconciliação do indivíduo com o mundo social ao qual pertence. O estudo foi desenvolvido com base no método de abordagem hipotético-dedutivo, utilizando uma base teórica presente na filosofia política contemporânea.


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