Justice Across Borders

Author(s):  
Michael Blake

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.

Author(s):  
Simon Caney

This chapter explores the relevance of facts and empirical enquiry for the normative project of enquiring what principles of distributive justice, if any, apply at the global level. Is empirical research needed for this kind of enquiry? And if so, how? Claims about global distributive justice often rest on factual assumptions. Seven different ways in which facts about national, regional and global politics (and hence empirical research into global politics) might inform accounts of global distributive justice are examined. A deep understanding of the nature of global politics and the world economy (and thus empirical research on it) is needed: to grasp the implications of principles of global distributive justice; to evaluate such principles for their attainability and political feasibility; to assess their desirability; and, first, to conceptualize the subject-matter of global distributive justice and to formulate the questions that accounts of global distributive justice need to answer.


2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni

Abstract:Recently, republicans have been increasingly arguing that the ideal of nondomination can ground both a more plausible account of global justice and better insights for global institutional design than liberal egalitarianism does. What kind of global institutions, however, does nondomination require? The essay argues that a global institutional blueprint based on the republican ideal of nondomination is a multifaceted endeavor. Republican institutions should aim to fulfill three different desiderata: 1) avoiding excessive concentration of power; 2) bringing informal asymmetrical power under institutional control; 3) furthering an active, vigilant citizenry. The three desiderata often pull in different directions. At the global level in particular, they do not converge on a verdict over whether we should switch to a cosmopolitan institutional order, stick to a world of states, or opt for something altogether different. As a result, there is no straightforward pathway leading from the vindication of nondomination as the central principle of global justice to a clear vision for a global institutional order. The issue is, instead, a matter of careful balancing.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu ◽  
Iris-Patricia Golopenta

In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nili

What kind of normative constraints do domestic political theories generate at the global level? While much attention has been given to the global implications of specific domestic theories, little if any attention has been dedicated to the more general question - in what ways can a domestic theory of justice generate normative constraints for a global theory of justice? My aim here is to take first steps in addressing this meta-theoretical question. The main reason why global justice theorists have been ignoring this question is the implicit assumption that a domestic political theory can generate normative constraints for global theory only if its conclusions need to be replicated at the global level. While intuitive, I argue that this replication framework misses the possibility that domestic theories can have global implications by directly modifying, through their design process and output, the starting point of global theory. I elaborate this alternative modification framework in two main stages. The first introduces in detail the distinction between the replication and modification frameworks. The second stage demonstrates the distinctive value of the modification framework by applying it to two specific themes central to global political philosophy: the normative constraints that domestic egalitarianism generates for thinking about global distributive justice, and the nature of individual moral duties concerning global institutions. Understanding these issues through the modification framework will allow us to render coherent global theories that might seem incoherent with their domestic origins. More generally, this understanding might yield surprising normative conclusions about global affairs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre

A good deal of political theory over the last fifteen years or so has been shaped by the realization that one cannot, and ought not, consider the distribution of resources within a country in isolation from the distribution of resources between countries. Thus, thinkers such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge advocate extensive global distributive policies; others, such as Charles Jones and David Miller, explicitly reject the view that egalitarian principles of justice should apply globally and claim that national communities have only duties to help other countries be viable economically and meet the basic needs of their members. In the global justice debate, pretty much all parties acknowledge that we have obligations of distributive justice to for-eigners. The question is how strong those obligations are, and in particular whether national boundaries can make any difference to the distribution of resources between members of different countries.


2008 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Caney

Many hold that the state has normative significance because its borders define the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. On this view egalitarian principles of distributive justice should be applied within the state but should not be adopted at the global level. This article examines two reasons for accepting this view and for rejecting global egalitarianism, and finds both wanting. It then presents three challenges to any view that holds that the scope of principles of distributive justice should be determined by the boundaries of the state. It concludes by noting four distinct ways in which the state has normative significance, each of which can be endorsed by global egalitarians.


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
Bill Jordan

This article reflects on the events of 11th September, 2001, in their immediate aftermath. Globalisation has brought economic interdependence without institutions for global distributive justice. The challenge for social policy of greater mobility of people, both within and between states, is as pressing as the problems of security highlighted by those events. These issues will demand attention long after the ‘war against terrorism’ has abated, because rich First World countries can no longer insulate themselves from the effects of poverty and injustice in the developing world.


2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 974-997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Caney

The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examination of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by three responses to the cosmopolitanism, – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals, the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national interest.


Author(s):  
Petra Gümplová

AbstractThis paper contrasts conceptions of global distributive justice focused on natural resources with human rights–based approach. To emphasize the advantages of the latter, the paper analyzes three areas: (1) the methodology of normative theorizing about natural resources, (2) the category of natural resources, and (3) the view of the system of sovereignty over natural resources. Concerning the first, I argue that global justice conceptions misconstrue the claims made to natural resources and offer conceptions which are practically unfeasible. Concerning the second, I show that contemporary philosophy of justice downplays the plurality of meanings resources have for collectives and argue that conflicts over natural resources can best be accounted for using human rights. Finally, the paper looks at sovereignty over natural resources and argues that rather than dismissing it as unjustifiable on moral grounds, it should be reformed in line with valid principles of international law, most importantly with human rights.


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