Contending visions of East Asian regional order: insights from the United States, China, Japan, and Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-41
Author(s):  
Bhubhindar Singh ◽  
Sarah Teo ◽  
Shawn Ho ◽  
Henrick Tsjeng
2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040005
Author(s):  
T. J. PEMPEL

Tensions between the United States and China have been on the rise under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, challenging longstanding regional moves to peace and prosperity. In response, a number of less powerful East Asian states have taken steps toward deeper regional economic ties and multilateral institutions. This paper analyzes these competing tensions and their implications for the Asia-Pacific regional order.


Author(s):  
Beverley Loke

Abstract China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability or end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post–Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary “order versus disorder” or “US versus Chinese hegemony” scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—“coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy”—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will not only form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Wang

One of the key questions for understanding the future trajectory of regional order is whether or not China is trying to push the United States out of East Asia and build a China-dominated regional order. Some Western analysts accuse China of pursuing the Monroe Doctrine and excluding the United States from the region. This article argues that the Western discourse of China practicing the Monroe Doctrine is a misplaced characterization of China's behavior. Rather than having intention of pushing the United States out of East Asia and build a China-dominated regional order, China is pursuing a hedging strategy that aims at minimizing strategic risks, increasing freedom of action, diversifying strategic options, and shaping the U.S.' preferences and choices. This can be exemplified in five issue areas: China's ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's foreign policy activism, China-Russia relations, the Conference on Interactions and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the New Asian Security Concept, as well as China-U.S. relations. Beijing has explicitly acknowledged the U.S. predominance in the international system and reiterated its willingness to participate in and reform the existing system. It concludes by suggesting that, for a more peaceful future to emerge in East Asia, the United States and China, as an incumbent power and a rising power, will have to accommodate each other, and negotiate and renegotiate the boundaries of their relative power, as well as their respective roles in the future regional order where Beijing and Washington would learn to share responsibilities and leadership.


2021 ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Rush Doshi

Chapter 7 explores the dawn of China’s grand strategy to build regional order as well as the ends, ways, and means of this strategy. Using Party texts, it explores how the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to take a more assertive course. It begins with a thorough review of China’s discourse on “multipolarity” and the “international balance of forces,” concepts China uses as euphemisms for US power and which it ties to its strategic guidelines. It then shows that the Party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercion, inducements, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance “actively accomplish something” issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao in 2009. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economic.


2019 ◽  
pp. 317-334
Author(s):  
Chin-Hao Huang ◽  
David C. Kang

States interact in a multiplicity of domains, and most of them are not military in nature. Situating the security domain alongside economic and social domains of interaction among countries is important for creating a full analysis of a state’s priorities in a particular region, or with any particular other state. Failure to appreciate the nonmilitary dimensions of international relations in Asia in particular can lead one to misdiagnose the prospects of conflict and cooperation, potentially leading to tragic spirals. Data on East Asian defense spending over twenty-five years appears to present a puzzle: by many measures, East Asian military expenditures have declined significantly over the past quarter century. This finding appears starkly at odds with the conventional wisdom that Chinese bellicosity, its expenditure on anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and the United States’ reallocation of forces are increasing tensions in the region. Any policy of cross-domain deterrence that fails to appreciate interactions across the full multiplicity of domains of international intercourse risks courting deterrence failure.


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