scholarly journals Precedents, parliaments, and foreign policy: historical analogy in the House of Commons vote on Syria

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Kaarbo ◽  
Daniel Kenealy
1971 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lois G. Schwoerer

The struggle between King and Parliament in 1641-42 for command of the militia was to King Charles I “the Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel.” As the King himself and a group of pamphleteers, preachers and members of Parliament realized, the controversy was not just a contest for control of military power. The fundamental issue was a change in England's government, a shift in sovereignty from King or King-in-Parliament to Parliament alone. As Charles explained, “Kingly Power is but a shadow” without command of the militia. His contemporaries, representing various political allegiances, also testified to the significance of the contest over the militia. They described it as the “avowed foundation” of the Civil War, “the greatest concernment” ever faced by the House of Commons, and the “great quarrel” between the King and his critics. To some men it was this dispute over military authority and the implications for government which were inherent in it, rather than disagreements about religion, taxes or foreign policy, that made civil war unavoidable.Concern about military authority first erupted in the fall of 1641 in response to a series of events – rumors of plots involving the King, the presence in London of disbanded soldiers who had returned from the war with Scotland, the “Incident” in Scotland, and above all the rebellion in Ireland which required the levying of an army to subdue those rebels.


1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Kennedy

A dozen years ago Conrad Russell initiated a major historiographical debate when he rejected the traditional interpretation of seventeenth-century parliamentary history expounded in the classic studies of S. R. Gardiner and Wallace Notestein, whose work on early Stuart parliaments dominated the field for three quarters of a century. According to Russell, Gardiner's and Notestein's conviction that Jacobean and Caroline parliaments were the scene of escalating constitutional conflicts between the Crown and the House of Commons was the result of the two historians' failure to understand either the nature of early Stuart politics or seventeenth-century notions of Parliament's proper functions. Politics in general and parliamentary politics in particular were devoid of ideological content, and the provincial gentry who filled the benches of the House of Commons were as certain as the rest of their countrymen that the “proper business” of Parliament was the passing of bills, not the debating of issues of national or constitutional significance. Russell, of course, did not suggest that the conflicts so crucial to the traditional interpretation were made out of whole cloth, but he did deny that disagreements between Crown and Parliament were due to the emergence of a constitutional opposition. Instead, such disagreements were the inevitable product of the pervasive tension that marked the relationship between the royal government in London and the local communities in the provinces. During the reigns of James I and Charles I, the Crown's incompetent parliamentary management made it more difficult than usual for local gentlemen to reconcile their obligations to their king with their loyalties to their communities. The result was some remarkably unhappy parliaments, but since no important issue of principle divided parliamentary leaders from privy councilors or officers of state, there could be no organized, ideologically based opposition, no constitutional crisis leading inexorably to civil war.


1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Phyllis S. Lacks

This essay examines the role of Parliament in the formation and conduct of foreign policy after the Restoration. My principal interest has been to see how the Members of the House of Commons viewed that role. I have, therefore, focussed on the parliamentary debates rather than the diplomatic correspondence in order to observe the changes and limits of the parliamentary position.These limits can be observed initially in a view of the prerogatives of the Crown. Charles II was a francophile king. He loved the country of his mother; he openly admired the absolutism of his cousin, the Sun King; he secretly cherished the Roman Catholic faith which he associated with successful Kingship. Like his model, the King of France, Charles interested himself actively in foreign affairs. Although not remarkable for diligence and industry in many aspects of government, he was a regular attender at the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The membership of this group fluctuated at the royal will, but always included the two Secretaries of State. Sir Henry Bennet, later earl of Arlington, as Secretary of State for Southern Europe, was virtually Minister for Foreign Affairs for about a dozen years. The King, acting with the Secretaries in Committee, instructed diplomats, who negotiated treaties independently of Parliament. The Triple Alliance of 1668, for example, although publicly known, was concluded while Parliament was not in session. Occasionally, Charles II acted without even these intimate advisors. The classic example is the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670 whose real provisions were kept even from some members of the Foreign Committee.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 690-691
Author(s):  
Marc Lynch

David Patrick Houghton's U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis explores the power of historical analogies in foreign policy decision making, offering along the way an engaging, thought-provoking account of decision making during the Iranian hostage crisis. Posing the question “How do decision makers reason when confronted by a problem which seems almost entirely novel in character and therefore without precedent?” (p. 19), Houghton follows Khong's Analogies at War in arguing for the centrality of analogical reasoning. The seizure of the American embassy by Iranian student radicals presented a genuinely perplexing problem for decision makers on all sides, and Houghton captures their uncertainty well. Since decision makers can rely on different historical analogies, and even the same historical analogy can offer competing lessons or be subject to divergent interpretations, Houghton focuses attention upon the interpretive interplay of analogies. As the crisis unfolded, decision makers deliberated, directly and indirectly, over the most relevant and useful analogy. These analogies, according to Houghton, are not merely justifications for strategies chosen for other reasons but directly affect individual policy preferences by shaping beliefs about the nature of the problem. Houghton convincingly establishes the prevalence and power of historical analogies in shaping the response of policymakers to unfamiliar situations. His efforts to construct generalizable theoretical propositions about their relative causal weight are somewhat less successful but are consistently thought-provoking.


Significance As intended, the changes will temporarily ease the Conservative Party's internal atmosphere, most importantly before the October annual party conference. However, they are unlikely to alter the fundamentals of the referendum or its outcome. The more significant internal party battle will be over the terms of Prime Minister David Cameron's EU membership renegotiation. Impacts The government could still face a September 7 House of Commons defeat over 'purdah', despite its reversal on the issue. This would boost eurosceptic elements in the Labour Party before the September 12 leadership election result. Cameron's wish to discourage migration from the Middle East could intensify his foreign policy focus on the region.


1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conrad Russell

On 3 December 1621 the House of Commons resolved to submit a petition to King James I, asking him for stricter enforcement of the laws against Catholic recusants, asking ‘that your Majesty would propose to yourself to manage this war with the best advantage, by a diversion or otherwise, as in your deep judgement shall be found fittest, and not to rest upon a war in these parts only, which will consume your treasure and discourage your people’, and that ‘our most noble prince may be timely and happily married to one of our own religion’.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 876-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Boyle

Following NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee commenced an inquiry with the following terms of reference: “To inquire into the foreign policy lessons of the Kosovo crisis and how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might best promote peace and stability in the region.” The Committee heard oral evidence from government ministers, diplomats, FCO staff, journalists, academics, and lawyers. It also received written memoranda. The President of Montenegro and the Foreign Minister of Albania were interviewed in private, and the Committee visited Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Committee's Report was published on 7 June 2000 as the 4th Report of The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2331006) together with the evidence and appendices (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2333009).


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