The human good and the science of man

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ryan Patrick Hanley
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

This chapter criticizes the familiar idea that humans are more important than animals. After examining some reasons why we treat humans and animals differently, and showing that they do not imply the superior importance of humans, it argues that the claim of superior human importance is not so much false as (nearly) incoherent. Importance and goodness are “tethered” values: things are only important or good when they are important-to or good-for some creature. To be important or good absolutely is to be important-to or good-for all creatures. One kind of creature could be absolutely more important than others only if the fate of that kind of creature were more important to others than their own fates. Only a teleological picture of the world that made human good the ultimate purpose of the world could support the conclusion that humans are more important than the other animals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-385
Author(s):  
Richard Kraut

Abstract Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that are non-derivatively beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial – that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Frank I. Michelman

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value.


2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (123) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Ângelo Cardita

Neste artigo, lançam-se as bases para uma reconfiguração da teologia científica em vista do bem comum. Defende-se que a teologia deve abandonar a intimidade das igrejas e comunidades religiosas e, portanto, o modelo confessional, para se reestruturar como teologia pública com pertinência social. Neste sentido, discute-se o modelo deliberativo de bem comum de Daniel Innerarity e analisamse as duas principais transformações epistemológicas, necessárias para a reconfiguração da teologia em vista do bem comum: a teologia como ciência das religiões, tal como propõe Pannenberg, e a estruturação transcendental do bem humano, integrando a própria questão de Deus, segundo Lonergan.ABSTRACT: In this article, there is an approach at the base levels for a reconfiguration of scientific theology in view of the common good. It is argued that theology should abandon the intimacy of the churches and religious communities and, therefore, the confessional model, to restructure itself as public theology with social relevance. In this sense, it discusses the deliberative model of common good of Daniel Innerarity and it analyzes the two main epistemological transformations required for the reconfiguration of theology in view of the common good: theology as a science of religions, such as proposed by Pannenberg, and the transcendental structuring of human good, integrating the issue of God, according to Lonergan.


2013 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 756-766
Author(s):  
Christopher Friel
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 1391-1426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Brown

Forty years ago, E. P. Thompson praised the English rule of law forged during the bloody and fractious eighteenth century, calling it not only “an unqualified human good,” but also a “cultural achievement of universal significance.” This article examines colonial rule-of-law development as another example of law and state building. Both have relevance for contemporary rule-of-law programming in the Global South where Thompson's “cultural achievement” has resisted fabrication by legal technicians. The problems faced today are not new, for colonial rulers also engaged with complex indigenous norms and forms and sought to balance universal principles with political control imperatives. Contra arguments about colonial “lawfare,” colonial rule of law often frustrated authoritarian tendencies while developing new forms of legal subjectivity and avenues for redress of grievances. Using data from the Indian province of Punjab, the article illustrates how historical case studies might aid contemporary rule-of-law programming in the Global South.


1968 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
Erling Skorpen
Keyword(s):  

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