Experimental Research in Reducing the Risk of Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis

Belief, Bias and Intelligence outlines an approach for reducing the risk of cognitive biases impacting intelligence analysis that draws from experimental research in the social sciences. It critiques the reliance of Western intelligence agencies on the use of a method for intelligence analysis developed by the CIA in the 1990’s, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). The book shows that the theoretical basis of the ACH method is significantly flawed, and that there is no empirical basis for the use of ACH in mitigating cognitive biases. It puts ACH to the test in an experimental setting against two key cognitive biases with unique empirical research facilitated by UK’s Professional Heads of Intelligence Analysis unit at the Cabinet Office, includes meta-analysis into which analytical factors increase and reduce the risk of cognitive bias and recommends an alternative approach to risk mitigation for intelligence communities. Finally, it proposes alternative models for explaining the underlying causes of cognitive biases, challenging current leading theories in the social sciences.

Download Full-text

Intelligence and Belief Acquisition

Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis ◽

10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.003.0002 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 21-60

Author(s):

Martha Whitesmith

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Bias ◽

Philosophical Study ◽

Intelligence Analysis ◽

Sources Of Information ◽

Theoretical Context ◽

Essential Nature ◽

Covert Activity

Chapter one examines whether belief acquisition in intelligence a unique epistemological act. It examines the nature of intelligence analysis as an act of belief acquisition, providing a theoretical context grounded in epistemology, the philosophical study of the nature of belief and knowledge, and examining the sources of information on which intelligence analysis is based, and the mechanisms by which knowledge is gained. The chapter argues that: 1) the essential nature of intelligence is epistemological: that it is necessarily defined by the attempt to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge; 2) intelligence is necessarily a covert activity; 3) intelligence does not require unique methods of gaining knowledge and does not derive from unique sources, and; 4) the covert characteristic of intelligence means that belief acquisition in intelligence is likely to differ in the degree of epistemic complexity it faces, and that this may produce a difference in the degree to which intelligence analysis is vulnerable to cognitive bias.

Download Full-text

The Efficacy of ACH in Establishing Epistemic Justification and Mitigating Cognitive Bias

Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis ◽

10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.003.0003 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 61-104

Author(s):

Martha Whitesmith

Keyword(s):

Peer Review ◽

Cognitive Bias ◽

Epistemic Justification ◽

Cognitive Biases ◽

Intelligence Analysis ◽

Current Version ◽

Analytical Technique ◽

Competing Hypotheses ◽

Do So

The chapter examines the ability of current versions of the structured analytical technique, assessment of competing hypotheses (ACH) to provide theoretically valid methodologies for establishing justified beliefs in intelligence analysis, to cope with the higher risk of epistemic complexity in intelligence analysis, and to mitigate or reduce cognitive bias. It argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to establish justification for beliefs, or to cope with epistemic complexity, but that the method can be adapted to do so. It also argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to mitigate the risk of cognitive bias, but that the method could be adapted to make the occurrence of some cognitive biases visible to peer review.

Download Full-text

Reducing the Risk of Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis

Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis ◽

10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.003.0007 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 207-228

Author(s):

Martha Whitesmith

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Bias ◽

Best Practice ◽

Future Research ◽

Intelligence Analysis

Recommendations for future research and best practice for intelligence analysis.

Download Full-text

Secondary Transfer Effect of Contact

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335.40.2.55 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 40 (2) ◽

pp. 55-65 ◽

Cited By ~ 146

Author(s):

Thomas F. Pettigrew

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Dissonance ◽

Experimental Research ◽

Intergroup Contact ◽

Transfer Effect ◽

Evaluative Conditioning ◽

Transfer Effects ◽

Secondary Transfer ◽

Primary Reduction

This paper reviews the evidence for a secondary transfer effect of intergroup contact. Following a contact’s typical primary reduction in prejudice toward the outgroup involved in the contact, this effect involves a further, secondary reduction in prejudice toward noninvolved outgroups. Employing longitudinal German probability samples, we found that significant secondary transfer effects of intergroup contact exist, but they were limited to specific outgroups that are similar to the contacted outgroup in perceived stereotypes, status or stigma. Since the contact-prejudice link is bidirectional, the effect is inflated when prior prejudice reducing contact is not controlled. The strongest evidence derives from experimental research. Both cognitive (dissonance) and affective (evaluative conditioning) explanations for the effect are offered.

Download Full-text